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Can Leninist states recreate a base of labor support and stability in the private 
sector? To what extent can Leninist states transform factory regimes in private 
enterprises where capital has created its domain of dominance? In light of the 
limited work on factory regime changes in transitioning Leninist states, this 
study investigates the state-sponsored unionization in the post-Socialist China 
in order to explain the uneven outcome of this state-engineered project.  
 
  I argue that the state-sponsored unionization has created neither state 
apparatus nor managerial tool, but a variance in union efficacy. Three major 
types of enterprise unions emerge in response to the contestations between the 
state, capital, and grassroots union leaders in the process of unionization. State 
intervention and managerial perception are necessary but not sufficient to 
explain this variance. When the two structural factors are held constant, 
agency of union leaders explains much of the variance in union efficacy.     
 
  Paperwork unions emerge only in enterprises which are hostile to 
unionization. They are the direct outcome of subdued agency of union leaders, 
who are suppressed by hostile management. Their presence indicates the 
failure of the Leninist state in transforming the factory regime in some part of 
the private sector. When enterprises are friendly to unionization, two other 
variances emerge. In managerial unions, union leaders are similar to 
constrained middlemen, straddling between the management and the state. 
Being middlemen means that they have constrained agency but have to 
prioritize managerial interest over the interest of employees and the state. 
Managerial unions cooperate with the state on beneficiary conditions but 
withdraw their cooperation when state policies incur costs on their host 
enterprises. Only proto-economic unions possess collective action power to 
support the interest-based claims of their employees. This power largely stems 
from their union leaders who have the ability in interest aggregation, 
organizational discipline and managing union-state relations. While the 
conciliatory variant of the unions represent the ideal union expected by the 
state, the confrontational variant is an unintended outcome of the 
state-sponsored unionization.  
 




List of Tables 
 
TABLE 1.1 Variance in Union Efficacy: Paperwork Unions, Managerial 
Unions and Proto-economic Unions……………………………….....12 
 
TABLE 2.1 Conceptualization: Liberal Unionism, Socialist corporatist 
Unionism & State-sponsored Unionization…………………………..37 
 
TABLE 2.2 A Categorization of Literature on Factory Regime Politics and 
Unions……………………………………………………………..45 
 
TABLE 2.3 Explanation of the Variance in Union Efficacy 
(N=17)…………......................................................................................69 
 
TABLE 3.1 Selection of Institutional Informants in Shenzhen: geographic 
distribution……………………………………………………………..80 
 


























List of Figures 
 
FIGURE 3.1 A Comparison of Guangdong and National Average in Per 
Capita Labor Disputes, 2001-2012……………………………………78 
 






































List of Pictures 
 
PICTURE 2.1 The Union System under State Socialism (1950s)………..27 
 
PICTURE 2.2 Transformation of the Union System in Market Economy 
(2000s)…………………………………………………………………..35 
 
PICTURE 3.1: Shenzhen & The Pearl River Delta………………………76 
 
PICTURE 5.1 SFTU’s 2017 Flyer for Skills Training Program………..140 
 
PICTURE 5.2 Organization of A Full-fledged Enterprise Union………143 
 
PICTURE 6.1 AME-1’s Collective Wage Negotiation…………..………220 
 















List of Abbreviations 
 
ACFTU   All-China Federation of Trade Unions 
 
CCP      Chinese Communist Party 
 
CSR      Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
FDI       Foreign Direct Investment 
 
FIEs      Foreign-invested Enterprises 
 
ILO       International Labor Organization 
 
MNCs     Multinational Corporations 
 
NICs      Newly Industrialized Countries 
 
SOEs      State-owned Enterprises 
 
SFTU  Shenzhen Federation of Trade Unions 
 
SMEs      Small to Medium-sized Enterprises 
 
TVEs      Township-village Enterprises 
 
VCP       Vietnamese Communist Party 
   
VGCL     Vietnam General Confederation of Labour
 1 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This is an exploratory study of factory regime transitions in one of the Leninist 
states, China, which have embraced the market economy. Despite their 
economic reforms, Leninist states such as China and Vietnam have maintained 
their monopolistic governance of labor organizations and sought to spread 
unionization in their private sector in order to recreate stability. Scholars have 
thus argued that the communist party-states sponsor unionization in the private 
sector to recreate the state apparatus or managerial tools: “unions” which are 
irrelevant to workers. Based on an extensive fieldwork, I argue that 
state-sponsored unionization in China does not intend to recreate Socialist 
unions in the private sector, nor do these enterprise unions become managerial 
tools which do nothing good to workers. The state-sponsored unionization has 
instead created a variance in union efficacy, as manifested in the emergence of 
three types of union: paperwork unions, managerial unions, and 
proto-economic unions. Paperwork unions consume state resources but serve 
no state interest. Managerial unions prioritize managerial interest over the 
interests of the state and of employees. Proto-economic unions acquire 
collective action power and hold the potential to agitate labor protests to 
challenge both capital and the state. The variance demonstrates that enterprise 
unions in the private sector are neither state apparatuses nor managerial tools. 
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It further suggests that the Leninist state can no longer intrude into the society 
from the commanding height as it did in the era of state socialism. In a market 
economy, it has to cultivate the incentives on the part of private sector actors – 
capital and union leaders – in order to make its policy produce some 
intended outcomes. Before outlining the specific research questions of my 
study and the variance in the dependent variable (union efficacy), I would like 
to set the stage by highlighting the research topic in the larger context of 
academic research.
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1.1 Research Background 
 
Unions are social organizations which promote labor rights and economic 
equity of the working class. The trajectories of economic and political 
transformation in a particular country largely determine the origins and 
functions of its unions. Early unions were the associations of craftsmen, which 
emerged in response to capitalist development. These early labor organizations 
exerted controls over production process to limit output in order to reduce the 
competition among craftsmen, bargained with employers, and staged 
sympathetic strikes to support the struggles of working class brethren 
(Montgomery, 1979). The associational power of the craftsmen was formed 
out of their intimate workplace, social and communal relationship (Koo, 1990, 
p. 677). The cultural heritage of crafts tradition laid the historical foundation 
of industrial trade unionism. Despite their origins as economic organizations, 
unions in industrial democracies have evolved into core equalizing institutions, 
raising overall labor standards of both unionized and non-unionized 
employees (Rosenfeld, 2014).  
 
  As capitalism spread to the late-developing countries, it caused the 
emergence of another kind of industrial relation which was dramatically 
different from those in industrial democracies. In order to harness labor to 
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support industrialization, the newly industrialized countries (NICs) in East 
Asia such as South Korea and Taiwan adopted a repressive industrial relation 
policy to handle labor unrests. The states allied with capital to coopt and 
suppress labor movements, thus eventually subordinating labor to the 
developmental goals propagated by their state elites (Deyo, 1989). A typical 
example is South Korea under Park Chung-hee’s dictatorship. This 
authoritarian developmental state prioritized industrialization over social and 
economic equity, suppressed leftist unions, and propagated labor loyalty and 
worker-management harmony (Koo, 2001). As a result, labor movements only 
survived underground at the margins of the society. It was not until South 
Korea embarked on political liberalization in the late 1980s that independent 
unions were provided a political opportunity to join civil society’s resistance 
against the authoritarian rule and facilitate the democratic transition.  
 
  The preceding historical account suggests that when the state was largely 
absent from intervening capitalist development and with the presence of a 
crafts tradition, unions emerged as economic organizations to wrestle a larger 
share of wealth generated in the production process. On the other hand, when 
the state drove industrialization and had a stake in maintaining political 
stability in the process of accumulation, labor agitations were often seen as a 
threat to the dominant state-capital alliance. As a result, union movements 
were heavily regulated, placed under state surveillance or actively repressed 
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by state elites and their industrial collaborators. Labor movements were only 
legalized and incorporated into conventional politics after democratization. 
 
  The end of the Cold War witnessed a further expansion of capitalism into 
the former Socialist bloc. Within three decades, successful reformers such as 
China and Vietnam revitalized their private sector, embraced foreign capital, 
actively participated in global capitalist production, and eventually replaced 
the old industrial centers in North America and Northeast Asia to become the 
new manufacturing hubs of the world. These post-Socialist states have become 
essential to the global capitalist production as the suppliers of inexpensive 
labor, the exporters of raw materials, and perhaps the entrepreneurs in the 
future. For their ruling communist parties, the rapid marketization of economy 
and labor has proved not only a developmental opportunity but also a political 
challenge. Since the 2008 global financial crisis, China’s growth rate has 
slowed, fueling labor disputes and unrests which press on with an increasing 
amount of demands on the state. Industrial relation policies in these 
transitioning economies has become strategically important to the state as they 
affect millions of local workers, lifelines of global capitalism (through the 
global supply chains), and consumers in developed countries. These policies 
also reflect an imperative of the Leninist state in seeking ways, through 
building institutions or implementing ad hoc administrative directives, to cope 
with the dramatic socio-economic transformation and dislocation, while at the 
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same time preserving their regime legitimacy and improving social welfare. 
 
  This study seeks to examine industrial relation policies in one of the 
post-Socialist states: China. This country witnessed the most rapid 
industrialization in the 20th century. Its economic reform sent millions of 
peasants from the countryside to factories in urban regions. This process 
generated wealth and foreign reserves for China, but also spurred labor 
disputes and social unrests. The post-Socialist states are a unique amalgam of 
Leninist political institutions and market economy, which sets them apart from 
industrial democracies and authoritarian developmental states in terms of 
industrial relation policies. The ways in which these states manage labor 
disputes are new phenomena and remain under-investigated (Chen, 2015). 
Unlike liberal democracies, late industrialization did not allow the 
post-Socialist states to develop a crafts tradition, which had been essential to 
the germination of crafts unionism in the early European context. Moreover, 
unlike NICs in East Asia such as South Korea, the post-Socialist states have 
not democratized to allow the self-governance of labor organizations. Instead, 
their unions have evolved a different historical and institutional trajectory. As 
we will see in the case of China, the Leninist party-state does not rely on 
repression to harness labor to support accumulation, but seek to incorporate 
labor into state institutions to serve state goals of promoting labor productivity 
and garnering labor allegiance.   
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  A legacy of these Leninist states 1  is that they have no intention to 
relinquish social control in the economic reform. Under the command 
economy, most industrial workers were employed in state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and were guaranteed a lifelong employment. Unions were established 
in every SOE to take care of workers’ recreation, education and welfare. 
However, the restructuring of the state-owned sector, which started in the 
1990s and culminated in the mid-2000s, devastated the SOEs unions. After 
that, it became impossible to recover unionization rates in the shrinking 
state-owned sector. Yet, the advance of the market economy has not succeeded 
in forcing the Leninist states to retreat from the private sector. With the 
intensification of labor unrests, the Leninist states have sought to recreate 
stability in the private sector through a state-sponsored unionization. For the 
state, unionization is a necessary means to recreate stability as well as to 
regenerate a base of support among employees and employers in the private 
sector. Thus, the state aims to create enterprise unions under the umbrella of 
                                                        
1 In this research, “Leninist state”, instead of “authoritarian state”, is used to describe China’s political 
institution in union governance. There are three reasons to justify the use of the term. First, I adopt a 
strict definition of "authoritarian state" as developed by Linz (2000) so that China is not yet qualified as 
“authoritarian”. In a paradigmatic authoritarian state, there is an institutional separation between military 
force and the ruling party. By this definition, the Chinese party-state is not yet an authoritarian state 
because its military remains a part of the ruling party, which is a distinct feature of the 
communist totalitarian states. Second, the state's governance of labor organizations is Leninist. The 
Leninist principles are embodied in the ways in which the party-state governs labor organizations. Despite 
the market reform, the official unions maintain their monopoly on labor representation, including the 
private sector. All primary unions must affiliate with the official unions led by the All-China Federation of 
Trade Unions (ACFTU). The party-state suppresses independent labor organizations such as NGOs. Third, 
“the Leninist state” is a better analytical tool to understand the state-society relation in contemporary 
China and, in particular, the institutional difference between the post-Socialist states and paradigmatic 
authoritarian states. The term is used in the latest textbooks and journal articles such as Guo (2013) and 
Chen (2015). In my thesis, “the Leninist state” is used exchangeable with “the party-state” and “the 
post-Socialist state”.   
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the official unions. At the same time, in order to prevent the emergence of 
alternative labor organizations, the state delegitimizes and represses 
independent labor organizations. 
 
  Beginning in the mid-2000s, China’s peak labor organization, the All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), has pushed unionization through the 
private sector by persuading firms to establish unions. A milestone was 
reached in 2006 when the ACFTU succeeded in persuading Wal-Mart, the 
most anti-union among multinational corporations (MNCs), to establish 
unions in all its branch stores across China. By 2012, the unionization drive 
has succeeded in boosting the number of enterprise unions to reach 2.6 million 
(China Statistical Yearbook, 2013), making enterprise unions the most 
numerous social organizations in the country. 
 
  Yet, limited research has been done to explore to the extent to which 
state-sponsored unionization has transformed industrial relations in China. So 
far, most of it is in the form of single case study, which has only yielded some 
limited empirical evidence. Some researchers hold a pessimistic view on union 
quality, suggesting that unionization has created shell unions or 
management-dominated unions which are irrelevant to workers (Chen, 2003; 
Liu, 2009, 2010). Others suggest that the unionization is a conspiracy between 
the state and capital to weaken labor movements by limiting labor’s 
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organizational base at the enterprise level (Friedman, 2014). In their view, the 
Leninist state only intends to recreate either state apparatus or managerial 
tools through the unionization. The almost exclusive reliance on single case 
studies has prevented researchers from allowing for and showing a systematic 
inter-case and intra-case variance in union quality. It disallows them to engage 
a meaningful comparison of enterprise unions based on a larger and more 
representative sample size and then to construct an explanatory framework to 
explain these variances. The variances in union efficacy, as observed and 
measured in my research, suggest that enterprise unions are neither state 
apparatus nor managerial tool. They are resultant from, as I argue, a constant 
contestation between the state, capital and union leaders at the workplace in 
order to steer the direction of union development. Thus, in contrast to the 
previous research which saw enterprise unions embodying no contestation, my 
research suggests that contestation exists in all enterprise unions regardless 




1.2 Research Questions 
 
My research seeks to answer the following research questions. How does a 
Leninist state, when it institutionalizes enterprise unions, intervene in the 
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factory regime of capitalist firms? What outcomes have the state-sponsored 
unionization produced? How can we explain the variance in union efficacy?  
 
  The research questions connect to an underexplored terrain in the 
theoretical literature on factory regime politics. The first question assesses the 
means and effectiveness of state intervention in the private sector in terms of 
spreading unionization. The second question seeks to identify the variance in 
the dependent variable – union efficacy. The third question allows us to work 
on an explanation for this variance by offering an explanatory framework 
incorporating three variables: state intervention, managerial perception of 
unionization, and agency of union leaders.  
 
1.3 Variance in Union Efficacy: Operationalization and Measurement 
 
Union efficacy refers to the extent to which a union serves state interest and 
employees’ interests. TABLE 1.1 shows the measurement of union efficacy in 
terms of six institutional indicators. In this research, union efficacy is 
measured categorically as varying between paperwork unions, managerial 
unions, and proto-economic unions. Union registration, organizational 
development and transfer of state resource are the indicators of state-union 
relations. They reflect the degree of state intervention in union development 
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and the extent to which a union serves state interest. The other three indicators 
– promotion of fringe welfare, support for rights-based and interest-based 
claims – measure the extent to which a union serves the interest of its 
employees. Together, these six indicators enable a more refined measurement 
of union efficacy, as in previous research no such attempt of systematic 
measurement has been put forward.
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  As shown in TABLE 1.1, paperwork unions represent a group of enterprise 
unions which have the lowest level of union efficacy. Apart from acquiring 
registration, paperwork unions barely function and develop hardly any 
organizational structure. They do not serve the interests of their employees, as 
they are unable to represent them or promote their welfare, nor can they 
support their rights-based or interest-based claims. Paperwork unions do no 
serve the interest of the state either. They are unable to transfer state resources 
to enterprises nor can they preempt labor unrests. The presence of paperwork 
unions, as I argue, indicates the failure of state intervention in the internal 
environment of capitalist production. Thus, paperwork unions are an 
unintended outcome of state-sponsored unionization, rather than of a 
state-capital conspiracy.  
 
  Managerial unions represent a group of enterprise unions which have a 
 13 
medium level of union efficacy. As TABLE 1.1 shows, these unions acquire 
organizational development to varying degrees and their organizational 
structure ranges from minimal to full-fledged staffing. They can facilitate a 
partial implementation of state policies at the firm level by transferring state 
resources to enterprises and reverting grassroots information back to the state. 
Managerial unions can promote fringe welfare of employees and sometimes 
support their rights-based claims within the scope of law and the acceptability 
of management. However, they are incapable of supporting employees’ 
interest-based claims by challenging managerial authority. This is due to the 
institutional weakness of managerial unions: they do not possess collective 
action power. Thus, they are unable to support interest-based claims such as 
wage increase, reduced work hours and severance pay, which require 
collective bargaining power on the part of unions. As a result, these unions 
seek to reconcile with the management in labor disputes rather than to 
aggravate labor-capital relations. Unlike previous research that regards them 
as managerial tools (Liu, 2009, 2010), I argue that they are not irrelevant to 
workers and that their efficacy varies with the level of union’s organizational 
development, union leadership, and union-management relations.   
 
  Proto-economic unions represent the highest end of union efficacy in the 
Leninist state. As my research reveals, the emergence of proto-economic 
unions suggests that there is a potential of union activism in the Leninist state. 
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What constitutes their major institutional strength is their collective action 
power, which supports the interest-based claims of their employees. The 
collective actions they mobilize can take two forms: conciliatory collective 
actions and confrontational collective actions. When employers consent to 
bargain with the unions, these unions can mobilize conciliatory collective 
actions such as collective wage negotiations to realize wage increases without 
having resort to strikes. When the cooperation of employers is not granted, 
proto-economic unions mobilize confrontational collective actions, e.g. strikes 
and petitions, to wrestle concessions from capital and generate pressure on the 
Leninist state.  
 
  The variance in union efficacy is the phenomenon that this research seeks to 
explain. TABLE 1.1 presents the inter-case variance of union efficacy, that is, 
the categorical difference between three types of union resultant from the 
state-sponsored unionization. The variance testifies that previous research, 
which saw union efficacy as an invariance, was empirically deficient. If the 
state-sponsored unionization in the private sector merely recreates state 
apparatus, we are unlikely to see paperwork unions and proto-economic 
unions. Paperwork unions waste state resources while serving no state interest. 
Proto-economic unions possess the collective action power to challenge 
managerial authority and to pressurize the state. Obviously, neither of these 
two outcomes is what the Leninist state would anticipate. If enterprise unions 
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are managerial tools irrelevant to workers, we are also unlikely to see 
managerial unions supporting the rights-based claims of employees and 
proto-economic unions their interest-based claims as well.  
 
  Further, this research seeks to explain the intra-case variance within 
managerial unions and proto-economic unions. Some managerial unions are 
more active and successful in expanding employees’ welfare whereas others 
are less capable of doing so. Some proto-economic unions have led successful 
collective actions whereas others fail. The intra-case variance points to an 
essential role of agents in shaping the development of labor organizations, 
albeit in a politically confined environment. Explaining the intra-case 
difference provides an effective means to isolate the causal impact of agency 
of union leadership on union efficacy from the two structural variables, the 
state and capital. In return, the intra-case comparison strengthens the thesis 
argument that state-sponsored unionization is not a state intrusion, but a 
contested and negotiable process in which the Leninist state and societal actors 
compete and compromise to shape union development. 
 
1.4 Thesis Argument 
 
In a market economy, the Leninist state has to abandon coercive and violent 
means to remedy social problems and transform the society. Instead, state 
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organs such as the official unions use persuasion or generate incentives on the 
part of private sector actors to achieve their intended outcomes in the process 
of unionization.  
  
  I argue that enterprise unions created by state-sponsored unionization are 
neither state apparatus nor managerial tool. In order to facilitate policy 
implementation at the grassroots level, the Leninist state seeks cooperation 
from capital and union leaders. This means that the outcome of state 
intervention hinges on the responses and reactions from capital and union 
leaders. Unionization is thus a negotiable and contested process between the 
state, capital and union leaders. The three variables – state intervention, 
managerial perception of unionization and agency of union leaders – interact 
at two levels. At the structural level, managerial perception conditions the 
timing and the extent to which the state can intervene in the factory regime. At 
the agent level, I assign causal proximity to the agency of union leaders, 
acknowledging their abilities in expanding union functions and maneuvering 
collective actions in a climate of political uncertainty. When the structural 
factors are held constant, the agency of union leaders accounts for most of the 
inter-case and intra-case variance (for a preview of the causal pathways of 
paperwork unions, managerial unions and proto-economic unions, please 
proceed to p. 69). The causal pathways of three variances in union efficacy 
and their implications are briefly stated as below:   
 17 
 
  Perceiving unionization as an extraction, hostile enterprises tend to reject 
state intervention in their factory regimes and suppress potential union leaders 
or activists. The hostility on the part of the enterprises thwarts state 
intervention and prevents the emergence of union leaders who could be 
responsive to the state. Paperwork unions thus indicate the failure of the 
Leninist state in contesting managerial authority and transforming the internal 
environment of capitalist production in some part of the private sector.  
 
  When the management perceives unionization as a resource, it tends to 
tolerate a limited degree of state intervention in factory regime, which allows 
enterprise unions a space to grow and develop an organizational structure. A 
friendly management thus constitutes a favorable structural condition for the 
emergence of managerial unions and proto-economic unions. The institutional 
divergence between managerial unions and proto-economic unions further 
stems from the agency of their union leaders. In managerial unions, the agency 
of union leaders resembles that of constrained middlemen, who prioritize 
managerial interest over the interests of workers and the state. That means that 
union leaders can only advance employees’ interests and state interest so long 
as they do not run into conflict with managerial interest. Nevertheless, the 
managerial dominance does not suggest that unions do nothing for workers. 
As my research shows, managerial unions display an observable intra-case 
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variance because of the variance in their union leadership. The more 
competent and active union leaders are, the more likely their unions are to 
develop a broader set of functions and promote employees’ fringe welfare.  
 
  Among the three types of enterprise unions, only proto-economic unions 
possess the collective action power to support the interest-based claims of 
their employees. This power stems from their distinct and effective union 
leadership. In proto-economic unions, union leaders are labor representatives 
and tend to see workers’ interests on par with managerial interest. This 
leadership enables proto-economic unions to mobilize conciliatory or 
confrontational collective actions to support the interest-based claims of their 
employees. Intra-case variance is also a prominent feature of proto-economic 
unions. This variance, as my research shows, is attributable to differences in 
union leadership, which are manifested most in interest aggregation, 
organizational discipline, and state-union relations management during 
union-led confrontational collective actions such as strikes and petitions. 
 
  In short, I argue that state intervention and union leadership co-determine 
the outcome of union-led confrontational collective actions. While state 
intervention expands and contracts the operational space of union 
mobilizations, union leadership steers their directions. In this process, union 
leadership is strategic in eliciting state support to a union’s cause, while at the 
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same time avoiding state repression. Union leaders need to carefully maneuver 
their mobilizations in a narrow safety zone, the boundary of which is vaguely 
defined but vigilantly patrolled by the Leninist state. Well-organized collective 
actions led by competent and state-recognized union leaders are more likely to 
elicit state sympathy and support to the union’s cause. Poorly-organized ones, 
led by union leaders with ambiguous legitimacy in the eyes of the state, are 
less likely to elicit state support to their causes and are more likely to fail. 
 
 
1.5 Research Significance 
 
  My study can contribute empirically and theoretically to the existing body 
of research on factory regime transitions in Leninist states such as China and 
Vietnam. The primary empirical contribution of my research is identification 
of proto-economic unions, the mechanism of their formation, and their 
intra-case variance. As mentioned above, previous research, which primarily 
relied on single-case studies, failed to observe the existence of such unions 
(Yu, 2008; Friedman, 2014; Zhang, 2015). While a very recent research by Li 
& Liu (2016) is able to discern the traces of proto-economic unions, its 
single-case investigation does not leave much space for the conceptualization 




  Theoretically, my research ventures into an underexplored terrain in labor 
politics research: factory regime transitions in transitioning Leninist states. 
Although scholars have extensively theorized on factory regimes in liberal 
democratic states and Socialist states, limited work has been done to explore 
factory regime transitions in post-Socialist states such as China and Vietnam. 
In particular, the existing research has not placed its focus on the 
transformation of enterprise unions, one of the most important 
institution-building efforts of Leninist states to intervene in the internal 
environment of capitalist production where state authority and capacity are 
heavily eroded by market force.  
 
  The lack of scholarly attention to enterprise unions stands in stark contrast 
to the important status they are assigned by the party-state. Enterprise unions 
are designated as the only legitimate labor organizations to represent labor and 
have remained as the basic units of labor organizing even after these Leninist 
state embraced market economy. The development of enterprise unions is a 
gauge of the degree of the transformation in the state-society relations in 
post-Socialist states. If the state-sponsored unionization fails to produce 
enterprise unions serving the interest of the state, it may indicate a failure of 
state intervention in the private sector. If the unionization can produce some 
outcomes in favor of the state, we may claim that the Leninist state is adaptive 
to market economy and responsive to the new demands arising from the 
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society. If the unionization produces militant unions which challenge the 
management as well as the state itself, we can claim that the Leninist 
institutions (or social and political institutions with a Leninist root) can 
potentially be transformed into representative social organizations reflective of 
societal interests rather than the interest of the state. Thus, the development of 
enterprise unions indicates not only the extent to which Leninist states have 
been able to transform the factory regime in a market economy, but also 
suggests the direction towards which Leninist institutions have been morphing 
in response to the market reform.  
 
  Further, by theorizing state-sponsored unionization as a contestation 
between the state and societal actors, my research complements Chan’s 
conceptualization of “contested despotism”. Chan (2010) argues that the 
factory regime in China has been in a state of transformation from localistic 
despotism to contested despotism. However, he fails to provide an account of 
the development of enterprise union as an essential part of this contestation 
between the state and societal actors. In response to this, my research 
contributes to the conceptualization of factory regimes in China by 
incorporating an aspect of union evolutions into the existing research.
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1.6 Thesis Organization 
 
The thesis is organized into 7 chapters. Chapter 2 provides the historical 
background of the research topic, conceptualizes the phenomenon under 
investigation, locates the gap in the existing literature, and presents an 
explanatory framework to explain the variance in union efficacy, the 
dependent variable. Chapter 3 introduces the research strategy and methods. 
Through examining 17 enterprise unions, Chapter 4, 5 and 6 elaborate on my 
explanatory framework in detail. In Chapter 4, I examine paperwork unions 
and their mechanism of formation. In the last part of this section, I present an 
alternative argument on union weakness to complement the state-centric view. 
In Chapter 5 and 6, internal diversity of managerial unions and 
proto-economic unions are explored through intra-case comparisons. In 
Chapter 5, I examine managerial unions and their mechanism of formation and 
their intra-case variance. I emphasize the role of their union leadership in 
making their intra-case diversity possible. In Chapter 6, I focus on two kinds 
of collective actions mobilized by proto-economic unions to support the 
interest-based claims of their employees. I argue that union leadership is 
crucial in steering union mobilization to a success. Chapter 7 is the thesis 










CHAPTER 2 STATE-SPONSORED UNIONIZATION: HISTORY, 
CONCEPTUALIZATION, LITERATURE REVIEW, AND THE 
EXPLNATORY FRAMRWORK  
 
This chapter situates the union movement in China in its historical and 
theoretical contexts before providing an explanatory framework to explain the 
variance in union efficacy (DV). Section 2.1 introduces the history of union 
movement in China and spotlights the union-state relations in the earliest 
period of the communist China and the subsequent transformations of the 
union system in the reform era. Section 2.2 constructs the state-sponsored 
unionization as a conceptual alternative to socialist corporatist unionism and 
liberal unionism. Section 2.3 reviews literature and locates the gap. Section 
2.4 lays out the explanatory framework. Section 2.5 is the conclusion.        
 
2.1 Lineage of Union Movement in China2 
 
The union movement in China originated with the nationalist liberation 
movement. From the very beginning, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
subsumed labor interest under national interest (Friedman, 2014) in order to 
                                                        
2 Some information presented in this section is selected from Contemporary China: Working Class and 
Trade Union Movement I, published in 1997 by Contemporary China Publishing House. It is an official 
chronicle issued by the ACFTU. The main editor is Ni Zhifu (倪志福), who was the secretary of the 
party committee of the ACFTU from 1978 to 1983.    
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serve its political agendas. The national peak labor organization, the ACFTU, 
assisted the CCP to realize its political goals of national liberation and socialist 
transformation of Chinese economy and society. During the pre-1949 period, 
the grassroots units of the ACFTU developed into multi-purposes 
organizations, engaging not only in economic struggles against capitalists but 
also in war preparation and mobilization. 
 
2.1.1 Creation of the Union System 
 
After the communist regime was established, the ACFTU was designated by 
the CCP to facilitate a socialist transformation of economy. Between 1953 and 
1955, the ACFTU mobilized its grassroots units to facilitate the nationalization 
of private enterprises. The party-state also entrusted the ACFTU to cultivate a 
modern working class, who were organized, skilled, and politically loyal to 
the communist regime.3 The CCP anticipated this class of Socialist workers to 
become its base of support in the newly consolidated state-owned industrial 
sector.      
 
  Thus, in the first decade of the communist rule (1949-1959), the ACFTU 
quickly expanded its branches at the regional and local levels. During this 
                                                        
3 The twofold tasks of trade union were mentioned by Liu Shaoqi (刘少奇) in the Political Report of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the 8th National Congress of the CCP, September 
15, 1956. An English translation can be assessed from the Liu Shaoqi Reference Archive, 
https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/cpc/8th_congress.htm.       
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expansion period, the ACFTU established two principles of union organizing: 
the principle of industry and the principle of region. The principle of industry 
required that grassroots unions to include all employees in a single work unit 
(danwei) regardless of trade (工种) and occupation (职业). Under this 
principle, an enterprise union should include all employees as union members 
regardless of their occupations. 4  The principle of region required the 
organizational structure of the official unions to match the structure of the 
administrative units of the government. Under this principle, the official 
unions at all administrative levels constituted a union system (FIGURE 2.1), 
which was hierarchically organized in order to strengthen the ACFTU’s 
leadership over its regional, sub-regional, and grassroots units. As FIGURE 
2.1 shows, in the 1950s the ACFTU-led union system had an organizational 
coherence. The lower-level unions were answerable to their immediate 
higher-level unions. They all worked under the directives of the ACFTU.     
 
  
                                                        
4 In theory, socialist enterprise unions represent the whole working class, regardless of occupational 
differences between line workers, line leaders, technicians and managers. 
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  During this period, the state-union relationship cozy, as the CCP was 
enthusiastic in supporting the ACFTU-led union movement. Many competent 
party cadres were designated to assist unionization or directly involved in 
expanding the scope of union functions and activities. The local party 
committees were actively involved in facilitating the functioning and 
operation of the union system. Party cadres convened meetings of worker 
representatives, created grassroots union committees, and called upon workers 
to participate in the operation of enterprise unions. With these concerted 
efforts, by the mid-1950s the membership of the ACFTU had reached 10 
million, which covered 90% of industrial workers in China. However, the cozy 
relationship between the CCP and the ACFTU did not last for long, as the 




















2.1.2 Ideological Conflicts between the ACFTU and the CCP and the 
Purge of the ACFTU 
 
In the 1950s, the ACFTU came into a series of ideological skirmishes with the 
CCP, which eventually led to its own purge in the Cultural Revolution. The 
cleavage came in a time when the ACFTU’s leadership began to articulate a 
different voice from the party’s leadership. Two top union leaders, Li Lisan 
(1948-1952) and Lai Ruoyu (1952-1957), insisted that the party leadership did 
not preclude the ACFTU from maintaining its autonomy and from serving the 
interest of the working class as its primary organizational task. As a former 
union activist, Li Lisan (李立三) advocated the ACFTU to carve out a distinct 
institutional identity from the party-state. He asserted that the unions existed 
to safeguard the interest of the working class. His successor, Lai Ruoyu (赖若
愚), expressed a similar view. He suggested that the task of the unions was to 
unite the whole working class and to safeguard their material interests and 
democratic rights. Both leaders implied that the ACFTU was distinct from 
other state organs because of its connection to the working people.   
 
  The union ideology of Li and Lai brought them into political clashes with 
the top leader of the CCP, Mao Zedong (毛泽东), which had simmered since 
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the very beginning of the communist rule. Back in 1951, Mao had charged Li 
with advocating syndicalism (工团主义) within the party. The devastating 
blow to the ACFTU came in 1958. In March of the year, the Central 
Committee of the CCP convened a meeting at Chengdu, which excluded Lai 
(the then top union leader), to reshuffle the ACFTU-led union system under 
the name of “destruction of solidarity and unity of the CCP”. The meeting 
reasserted the CCP’s leadership and dominance over the ACFTU. A 
reshuffling of the union organization took effect immediately after the 
Chengdu meeting. The CCP was determined to abolish the autonomy of the 
ACFTU accrued from the earlier years and sought to retighten its control over 
the official unions. For that purpose, the CCP managed to completely 
subordinate the ACFTU to the party-state. The meeting was soon followed by 
the purge of a large number of senior union cadres, who were accused of being 
aligned with Li and Lai.5 The Chengdu meeting signaled the downturn of the 
ACFTU. The purge significantly weakened the organizational coherence of 
the ACFTU-led union system and the morale of union cadres.  
 
  Then came in 1966 was the most severe blow to the AFCTU, the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976). In 1968, the ACFTU was forced to cease all its 
functions and activities due to the destruction caused by the Red Guard. Many 
                                                        
5 Chen Yongwen, Dui jianguo chuqi gonghui ruogan wenti de huigu (A review of several questions on 
unions in the early period of the CCP). 
http://www.zgdsw.org.cn/BIG5/n/2015/0527/c244516-27064241-2.html. (May 27th, 2015). Accessed on 
May 5th, 2016. 
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experienced union cadres and activists, who rose from the rank-and-file and 
were dedicated to the union movement, were violently purged. The ACFTU 
was paralyzed.  
 
2.1.3 Rehabilitation of the ACFTU after the Cultural Revolution 
 
In 1977, the 11th Congress of the CCP announced the end of the Cultural 
Revolution and has since sent China onto the path of modernization. In order 
to reestablish control and order in a society revenged by violence and 
anarchism, the CCP rehabilitated mass organizations such as the ACFTU, the 
Youth League, and the Women’s Federation. A new political task was assigned 
to the rehabilitated ACFTU. A year later, the 9th Trade Union Congress was 
convened in Beijing a year later to announce that the task of the unions in the 
reform era, which was to assist the economic reform. On the one hand, it 
seemed that the rehabilitation set a pragmatic goal for the ACFTU in China’s 
modernization. One the other hand, the rehabilitation by no means indicated 
that the CCP was willing to embrace liberal unionism. Rather, unionization 
became a new means for the party-state to garner support from the new 
working class – migrant workers.  
 
  In particular, the political turbulences in 1980s within and beyond China 
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finally led the CCP to tighten industrial relation policies in a much more 
conservative direction. The collapse of Socialism in the Soviet Bloc and the 
1989’s pro-democracy demonstration signaled to the CCP that the prerequisite 
for the reform was political stability rather than political pluralism (Wilson, 
1990). The CCP drew three lessons from the Soviet Bloc. First, the communist 
party must retain its leadership in governing social organizations amid the 
reform as “the final arbiter of decisions in Chinese society” (Wilson, 1990: 
276). Mass organizations such as the ACFTU shall “function as a bridge” 
between the party and social groups to facilitate the grassroots penetration of 
the party. Second, Deng Xiaoping believed that the communist leaders in the 
Eastern Europe were too soft to handle popular unrests triggered by the 
economic and political reforms, which led to their own demise (p.272). Thus, 
in order to avoid the same fate befalling the CCP, Deng sought to restrict the 
associational space of social groups. As reflected in industrial relation policies, 
the CCP dropped the right to strike from the Constitution, which delegitimized 
any form of confrontational industrial actions. 6  Third, the Solidarity 
movement in Poland indicated that the independent labor organizations posed 
a political threat to the CCP. As a countermeasure, the CCP has been 
repressive in dealing with labor NGOs. It manages to diminish the 
organizational space of independent labor organizations while granting the 
official unions a monopoly on labor representation at the same time.   
                                                        
6 As we will see in Chapter 6, the withdrawal of constitutional protection effectively leaves strikes in a 
political limbo, in which the state reserves the authority to arbitrate the legality of confrontational 
collective actions in industrial conflicts. 
 32 
 
2.1.4 Transformation of the Union System in Market Economy 
 
Despite the party-state’s rhetoric to garner support for the regime from the 
working class, the state-initiated economic reform de facto dislodged state 
workers from their previously privileged status. The SOEs reform abolished 
“socialist social contracts” (Lee, 2007, p.12) that were guaranteed to state 
workers, under which they enjoyed the life-long employment, housing, 
medical welfare, and pensions. The reform caused a significant shrinkage of 
union membership in the state sector, which was the traditional organizational 
base of the ACFTU. With the hosting enterprises dissolved, the organization 
rate of the ACFTU plummeted from 72% around 1995 to between 50-60% at 
the end of the 1990s (Chinese Trade Unions Statistics Yearbook, 1994; 1997; 
1998; 1999; 2000 & 2001). According to a report from International Labor 
Organization (ILO), the ACFTU was threatened both functionally and 
organizationally during 1997-2000 when there were estimated 17 million 
union members struck off the registration list (Traub-Merz, 2011). 
 
  With the decline of the state sector, the official unions have to rebuild their 
organizational base in the private sector, mainly constituted by privately 
owned enterprise (POEs) and foreign owned enterprises (FIEs). Hypothetically, 
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unionization in the private sector, if succeeds, brings three major benefits to 
the ACFTU and the CCP. First, the private sector has replaced the state sector 
as the primary contributor to the national economy. In 2006, POEs and FIEs 
together contributed to 68.8% of industrial outputs, whereas SOEs 31.2% 
(Brink, 2012). Unionization in the private sector would likely to bring more 
enterprises to contribute to the coffers of the official unions. Second, 
unionization in the private sector has brought the ACFTU to contact with the 
new working class – migrant workers, who have constituted the majority of 
urban workforce since mid-2000s (Wang, 2013). Enlarging union membership 
among migrant workers allows the ACFTU to broaden its organizational base 
in the private sector to compensate its loss in the state sector. Third, for the 
CCP, unionization in the private sector serves to contain labor-capital conflicts 
and alleviate the pressure on the state in maintaining social stability. 
Enterprise unions could facilitate state intervention in labor disputes, which 
reduces labor unrests and creates a investment-friendly environment (Taylor & 
Li, 2010). 
 
  The state-sponsored unionization has produced a dramatic increase in union 
registration rate in the private sector. All the grassroots union cadres whom I 
met during my fieldwork confirmed that the unionization rates in their 
jurisdictions were very high. Around 80-90% of enterprises have been 
unionized. By 2013, the number of grassroots union has reached 2.6 million. It 
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is fair to claim that a new layer of primary unions has been created with the 
advancement of unionization in the private sector. Meanwhile, the union-state 
relationship has also been recreated at the primary level. In the private sector, 
enterprise unions and the official unions are in a de facto non-authoritative 
relationship. As shown in PICTURE 2.2, enterprise unions hosted by private 
enterprises have come to constitute the majority of primary unions in the 
ACFTU-led union system nowadays.  
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  PICTURE 2.2 visualizes the transformation of the ACFTU-led union 
system at its primary level. The interrupted lines connecting the official unions 
to enterprise unions represent the non-authoritative nature of their relationship. 
Enterprise unions in private sector are de facto independent from the official 
unions and the state. That means, they are genuine social organizations, 
though not independent from enterprise management. In order to promote 
unionization, the official unions have to use incentive-generating measures to 
                                                        
7 The official unions refer to all unions above enterprise unions. Together, they constitute the union 
system, the organization of which resembles the top-down administrative pyramid of the government. 
The official unions are hierarchically organized according to the geographic principle. By law, the 
ACFTU (headquarter) represents all official unions and enterprise unions at the national level. Moving 
down the union hierarchy, official unions are created in every administrative-geographic unit. All 
provinces and autonomous regions have their own provincial-level union, so does every city. In each city, 
union federations at district and sub-district levels are located further down the hierarchy. At the bottom 
of the pyramid, community-level union federations (社区工会联合会) are established in urban districts 



















promote unionization. Thus, in a market economy, the state-sponsored 
unionization is a process full of contestation, negotiation, persuasion, and 
compromise between private enterprises and the official unions.   
 
2.2 Conceptualization: Liberal Unionism, Socialist Corporatist Unionism 
and State-sponsored Unionization 
 
I create an alternative conceptualization, state-sponsored unionization, to 
capture the essence of the transformation in the Leninist union system and 
industrial relations in the reform China (or Vietnam). As shown in TABLE 2.1, 
a conceptual differentiation is made between state-sponsored unionization, 
liberal unionism, and Socialist corporatist unionism. The table compares the 
three major ways of conceptualizing union movements in the world in terms 
of five dimensions: union-state relation, dominant players in industrial relation, 
organizing mode, interest representation, functions, and nature of the 
organization. The comparison reinforces the central argument that the 
state-sponsored unionization creates neither state apparatus nor managerial 
tool, the outcome of which is a contestation between the state, capital and 
union leaders. The comparison further shows that, despite political constraints 
imposed by the Leninist states, enterprise unions in China have evolved 
similarly to unions in liberal democracies in terms of function. In a market 
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economy, enterprise unions increasingly face the interest-based demands of 
workers, which were rare in the Socialist period. 
 
TABLE 2.1 Conceptualization: Liberal Unionism, Socialist corporatist 
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  Liberal unionism refers to the union movements in liberal democracies such 
as the Anglo-American states which hold to liberal market principles. It 
originated from the craftsman unions in the 19th century. Historically, 
craftsmen leveraged their superior knowledge and skills to exert control over 
the production process, which enabled them to obtain a certain degree of 
autonomy at work (Montgomery, 1979). As the collective autonomy of 
craftsmen grew, they demanded for not only wage increases but also 
workplace rights. By staging sympathetic strikes, craftsmen supported workers 
in other trades to resist exploitation. Crafts unions thus played a crucial role in 
advocating state legislation on workplace relations. For example, the 8-hour 
daily work and the prohibition of child labor were originally union demands 
and later were incorporated into state laws in most liberal democracies.  
 
  There are several notable features of liberal unionism. In liberal 
democracies, unions are organized along the line of occupation, industry or 
sector. They advocate interest-based claims of employees such as wage 
increase, work hour reduction and pension welfare. Thus, unions are interest 
groups. What affects unions most is not state intervention, but market force. 
Labor market conditions and industrial relation policies are the major 
determinants of the rise and decline of unions. Unions accrue more collective 
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bargaining power, when economy booms. When economy shrinks, unions 
have less leverage in bargaining with employers. Since the 1980s, the 
ascendance of neo-liberalism has led to de-unionization in developed countries. 
The members of Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) suffered an irreversible union decline, and union density8 in these 
countries dropped from 40% in 1990 to 29% in 2010 (OECD, 2012). On the 
other hand, the global dispersion of production procedures, the rise of informal 
sector and the proliferation of precarious work have created new barriers for 
traditional unions to recruit new members.  
 
Socialist corporatist unionism 
 
  Socialist corporatist unionism refers to the communist union movements 
which held to the Marxist-Leninist principles. Three ideological principles 
underlie Socialist corporatist unionism, which are classic dualism, party 
leadership and socialist interest consensus (Pravda & Ruble, 1986). Classic 
dualism means the socialist unions have dual functions at best. The primary 
function of the unions is to promote labor productivity through mobilizing 
workers in production process. Unions are also the guardian of workers and 
shall protect their legal rights. In practice, however, productivity function was 
often prioritized above protection function. Party leadership suggests that 
                                                        
8 According to OEDC (2012), union density refers to “the number of trade union members as a 
percentage of wage and salary earners”.  
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Socialist unions are politically subordinate to their ruling communist parties. 
Designated by the party as “transmission belts”, unions convey party policies 
to the working class and send shop-floor information back to the party 
(Sorenson, 1969, p.122-123). Socialist interest consensus means that the 
communist states perceive no fundamental interest cleavage between 
employees and employers in a state-owned economy. Industrial conflicts 
indicate the failure of the unions in making a consensus between employees 
and employers. The role of the unions is to alleviate industrial conflicts and to 
preempt strikes. Unions shall maintain industrial harmony by facilitating an 
alignment between individual and group interests and the policies of the 
communist parties.   
 
  There are several notable features of Socialist corporatist unionism. Unions 
are organized at the enterprise level and are incorporated into work units, 
danwei. The symbiosis between unions and their hosting enterprises suggest 
that Socialist unions are state apparatus which serves the goals of the 
communist parties. The unions supervise the enterprises’ compliance with the 
party policies and directives, namely the rights-based claims of employees. 
However, they do not possess collective bargaining power to support the 
interest-based claims of employees. In a state-owned economy, workers’ 
short-term economic demands were subsumed under labor productivity, which 
was deemed as the long-term interest of the party-state and the working class 
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(Tanzer, 1960). Thus, Socialist unions are state organs by nature. Their 
functions and operations are subsumed under the communist party-states. 
State policies, rather than labor market conditions, are the major determinants 
of the rise and decline of unions.  
 
  As these Leninist states started to embrace market economy since 1970s, 
some scholars suggest that corporatism, which emphasizes state dominance in 
industrial relations, can capture the essence of this transformation (Chan, 1993; 
White, 1996; Unger & Chan, 1995). Corporatism means that the state and 
society interact in an organic and coordinated yet unequal way (Williamson, 
1989). In order to organize the society as an organic whole, the state does not 
yield to pressure and demands of various interest groups. Instead, it entrusts 
state-affiliated peak organizations to aggregate and represent societal interests 
to itself. The state delegates regulatory power to these peak intermediary 
organizations, which grants them a significant degree of autonomy in 
governing their membership. This corporatist arrangement of industrial 
relation facilitates state ideology to indoctrinate labor as well as disciplinary 
power of the state to restrict interest representation and articulation of labor 
(Buchanan & Nicholls, 2004).  
 
  I argue that neither socialism nor corporatism is a valid conceptualization of 
the unionization campaign in a post-Socialist context. The term “socialism”, 
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on the one hand, is too obsolete to capture the nature of enterprise unions in 
private sector as social organizations. Corporatism, one the other hand, too 
focused on the state-labor relation at the national level, which pays scant 
attention to the grassroots transformation of the union system. Both 
conceptualizations regard the state as the sole dominant player in industrial 
relations and overlook the role of capital in shaping the industrial relations in a 
market economy. In response to this inadequacy, I thereby propose a 
conceptual alternative to Socialist corporatist unionism in order to capture the 
nature and new dynamics in the industrial relations in the private sector since 




  The term, state-sponsored unionization, denotes a unionization process in 
which the Leninist state attempts to create enterprise unions in favor of itself, 
but the actual outcome is so contested that unions develop towards unintended 
directions. The new conceptualization recognizes that the Leninist state has a 
strong institutional imprint on the formation and operation of enterprise unions. 
At the same time, it admits that in a market economy the unionization has 
become a contested terrain because of the rise of the new powerful player – 
capital. The state intends to build unions as social organizations which are 
responsive to state interest. It anticipates these unions to protect workers 
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against exploitation and promote their economic and social welfare in the 
private sector. By doing so, unions not only advance labor interest but also 
serve to maintain social stability. However, the quality of the unionization 
depends on managerial cooperation as well as activism of grassroots union 
leaders. Since the state can no longer rely on administrative directives or sheer 
coercion to transform the society, it needs to cultivate the incentives of 
enterprises and union activists in cooperation with the state to realize the dual 
goals of workers protection and social control. Thus, the proliferation of 
enterprise unions, as expected by the state, serves to establish its connection 
with private sector, increase its responsiveness to the rights-based and 
interest-based claims of workers and its vigilance to labor protests. 
Nevertheless, the uneven development of enterprise unions suggests that, aside 
from cooperation, societal forces emerging from the market economy could 
compromise or evade state intervention.  
 
  One notable feature of state-sponsored unionization is that enterprise unions 
are expected by the state to support the rights-based and interest-based claims 
of employees. That means, at least in terms of function, enterprise unions in 
the transitioning Leninist states are converging towards unions in liberal 
democracies. Now, their very survival in a market economy depends on to 
what extent they could satisfy the increasing demands from workers.  
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2.3 Literature Review on Factory Regime Politics and Unions 
 
This section reviews the literature on the factory regime transition in China. In 
particular, it reviews the transition from bureaucratic despotism and localistic 
despotism to contested despotism. The literature on bureaucratic despotism and 
localistic despotism is too structural-centric to reflect the nature of factory 
regime transformation in China’s Polanyian countermovement. The literature 
of bureaucratic despotism argues that the Leninist state’s totalitarian control of 
the factory regime makes enterprise unions nothing but part of state apparatus. 
The literature of localistic despotism argues that managerial dominance in the 
private sector turns unions into managerial tools, which are of little relevance to 
workers. The literature of contested despotism does look beyond structural 
factors and explores the role of workers’ agency in their resistance at the shop 
floor and on the street. However, contested despotism fails to account for an 
institutional aspect of this contestation, the evolution of enterprise unions in a 
market economy. This insufficiency enables me to locate a gap in literature of 
contested despotism (TABLE 2.2). I argue that this conceptualization 
is incomplete without systematically investigating the evolution of enterprise 
unions in a market economy, where the state has to balance growth and equity, 
and the rise of societal actors such as capital and union leaders complicates state 
intervention in factory regime which lead to unintended outcomes.  
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TABLE 2.2 A Categorization of Literature on Factory Regime 
Politics and Unions 
 The Leninist State 
  
Intervention refrained 
















(Burawoy, 1985);  
Socialist corporatist 









Localistic despotism  
(Lee, 1998); 







unionization: unionization as 
state resource or extraction 
 
NOTE: Historically, the intervention of Leninist states in labor process was totalitarian. One 
cannot find an instance of the Leninist states refraining from intervening in the factory regime. 
Therefore, the upper-left hand corner of this table is left unfilled. 
 
  Burawoy (1985) conceptualizes two major types of factory regime: a 
hegemonic regime and a bureaucratic despotic regime. Hegemonic regime 
refers to the factory regime in industrial democracies, in which factory politics 
and state politics are disconnected (not shown in TABLE 2.2). Liberal 
democracies only intervene into the external environment of capitalist 
production, where the state institutionalizes labor laws and social welfare 
systems to insulate the reproduction of labor power from factory work. Liberal 
democracies primarily rely on legal instruments to regulate the external 
environment of capitalist production (Kim, 2008), while leaving the internal 
environment of production to the discretion and discipline of capital at the 
same time.   
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  In Socialist states, the dominance of communist parties created another 
paradigm of factory regime and shop floor politics, which Burawoy 
conceptualized as bureaucratic despotism (TABLE 2.2). In this regime, factory 
politics and state politics were connected, which means that the conflicts in 
factories could spill over into politics (Burawoy, 1985). The interconnection 
between the two arenas necessitated the Leninist states to suppress workers’ 
struggles and to directly intervene in shop-floor relations. The state exerted total 
control over the external and internal environment of production. Andrew 
Walder (1986) once described the labor relation in this factory regime as 
“organized dependence”, which was an all-encompassing dependence of 
workers on the state in all aspects of economic, social and political life. This 
dependence rooted in the Leninist state’s monopoly of resources which were 
essential to workers’ livelihood and its political control within the factory (Lee, 
1999, p. 45). Thus, the political role of unions was to reinforce the leadership of 
communist parties in the industrial sector, which strengthened the 
communication between workers and management and ultimately between the 
working class and the party-states. In a nutshell, the research on bureaucratic 
despotism sees unions as state apparatus and attributes union impotence to the 
political dominance of the Communist party-states. These studies also show a 
proclivity to underestimate labor’s agency and activism (Lee, 1999, p. 45). 
Labor agency was often disregarded as it was considered being unable to 
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overcome state dominance and therefore as having no obvious causal power. 
Nevertheless, writing in the 1980s, Burawoy could not foresee the economic 
reforms in some Leninist states such as China and Vietnam, which dislodged 
the state as the sole player in shaping industrial relations. 
 
  Extending on Burawoy, Lee (1998) traced the transformation of the factory 
regime after the economic reform in China. She argued that a new factory 
regime had emerged in the private sector and referred it as localistic despotism 
(TABLE 2.2). The regime was characterized by a despotic managerial control, 
intertwined with a gendered control exerted through localistic networks. A 
notable feature of this regime was that state intervention was nearly absent in 
both the external and internal environment of capitalist production. The 
Leninist states were laissez-faire and deliberately refrained from intervening in 
the internal environment of capitalist production. In the external environment of 
production, the state created neither a social insurance system nor sophisticated 
labor laws to protect workers.  
 
  A number of scholars sought to further explore the laissez-faire Leninist 
state and explain its impact on labor regime transitions. Two distinct lines of 
explanation were offered. The first group of scholars focused on the source of 
local economic development (Walder, 1995; Oi, 1995; Wank, 2001). They 
attributed the reform’s success to a particular kind of state-society nexus at the 
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local level: the local developmentalist states and their entrepreneurial clients. 
The fiscal reform fostered a strong pro-growth incentive among these local 
states, which encouraged local officials to act like market-oriented agents (Oi, 
1992; Oi, 1995; Walder, 1995). Henceforth, the officials developed a 
symbiotic and clientelistic relation with societal actors, mostly private 
entrepreneurs, who shared with them the same interest in accumulation (Wank, 
2001). This close relationship between the local states and capitalists thus 
made the former advocates, rather than regulators, of local economies and 
enterprises (Oi, 1995).  
 
  The second group argued that in their pursuit of growth local states had 
compromised their responsibility in labor protection (Hsing, 1998; Gallagher, 
2005; Feng, 2006; Gallagher, Lee & Kuruvilla, 2011). In fact, they viewed 
local states as pursuing growth at the expense of labor (Hsing, 1998; Chen & 
Zhang, 2004; Gallagher, 2005; Feng, 2006; Gallagher, Lee & Kuruvilla, 2011; 
Xu, 2011). In order to attract and retain investments, the local states developed 
a vested interest in maintaining labor flexibility (Gallagher, Lee & Kuruvilla, 
2011) and acquiesced managerial domination at the workplace. In the 
meantime, for most FIEs and township-village enterprises (TVEs), cutting 
labor cost was the most effective strategy to survive and remain profitable 
(Hsing, 1998; Gallagher, 2005). Therefore, they tended to evade labor laws 
and regulations in order to maximize labor exploitation. Because of the shared 
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interest in accumulation, local states acted laissez-faire towards capital. As Ma 
(2011) contends: “Government regulation, monitoring and enforcement 
capability have seldom been in place, and employers have exercised active 
and decisive power in their interactions with employees, at least at the 
enterprise level.”(p.156). In particular, Gallagher (2005) argued that the 
central government and the official unions had largely failed to contain the 
overwhelming power of management in determining labor practice. As a result, 
unions were largely absent in the private sector, and when they did appear in a 
few enterprises, they were no more than decorative (Ma, 2011).  
 
  Some do acknowledge that the official unions are empowered by the 
party-state to participate in labor legislation9, to spread unionization, and to 
represent workers in individual legal actions (Chen, 2003, 2009; Friedman, 
2014; Clarke & Pringle, 2009). However, they believe that these pro-union 
initiatives are half-hearted, serving mainly to stabilize industrial relations 
rather than to mobilize labor and unions. The official unions’ unwillingness to 
empower enterprise unions leaves the latter at the mercy of the management. 
Because of the cooptation by the state and capital, enterprise unions become 
shell unions (Chen, 2003) or managerial tools irrelevant to workers (Mingwei 
Liu, 2010). As He & Xie (2012) contend, enterprise unions face a dual 
cooptation from both enterprises and the state, which are content with weak 
                                                        
9 It was a similar move in the union reforms in some other post-Socialist states such as Vietnam and 
Russia.  
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grassroots unions. For enterprises, maintaining weak unions reduces the threat 
to managerial autonomy. For the official unions, union quality does not matter, 
because they only need to report union quantity to state authority in order to 
fulfill their unionization quotas. On the whole, the above literature on 
localistic despotism suggests that the interest alignment between the state and 
capital allowed the latter to maintain a despotic factory regime, in which labor 
interest was compromised and unions were turned into managerial tools which 
were irrelevant to workers. Weak unions are seen as intended outcomes of the 
state.    
 
  However, these scholars did not anticipate the interest divergence which has 
meanwhile emerged between the state and capital. The divergence is triggered 
by the economic reform and the social unrests it has caused, which the state 
finds eroding its legitimacy greatly. As Polanyi (2001) contends, in a modern 
market society a laissez-fair movement always exists in opposition to a 
protective countermovement. The former seeks to expand the scope of the 
market autonomy, whereas the latter resists the disembedding of the economy 
and seeks to recreate stability. In China, the Polanyian countermovement was 
first driven by grieved citizens who resisted the socio-economic dislocations 
caused by the market reform, and subsequently by the Leninist state itself, 
which sought to address these grievances and to contain social unrests in order 
to maintain regime legitimacy. In the 2000s, social unrests exploded as a result 
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of the economic and social dislocations triggered in the reform process. 
Between 1993 and 2008, the number of social unrests in relation to labor 
disputes, land acquisitions, corruption and other kinds of social grievances, 
increased ten times (Shirk, 2007, p.57). Among these, collective protests made 
the CCP particularly concerned, as they exerted political pressure on the 
party-state and eroded its legitimacy (Xie, 2012). Moreover, the accelerating 
urbanization and population concentration in major cities have made an easier 
access for citizens to mobilize social unrests while increasing the difficulty for 
the state to persecute them (Wallace, 2014).     
 
  The tipping point finally came in the mid-2000s, when the Leninist state 
elevated social stability to an equal position as growth in local governance 
(Wang & Minzner, 2015; Xie, 2012). In the 2000s, the state launched a series 
of institution-building measures to address social grievances and enhance legal 
and administrative mechanisms for their resolution and prevention. In labor 
governance, the state has actively sought to (re)-intervene in industrial 
relations. Since then, China has gradually developed a complementary set of 
legal and administrative institutions to regulate industrial relations, mostly in 
the external environment of capitalist production, which covers labor contract, 
reproduction of labor power, labor dispute resolution, and other dimensions of 
employment relation. Legal scholars have extensively investigated the 
enforceability of these labor institutions and their social impacts (Guan, 2001; 
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Thireau & Hua, 2003; Tsui, 2009; Ho, 2009; Cooney, Biddulph & Zhu, 2013). 
They find that, though far from perfect, these labor institutions have worked to 
a varying degree (Ho, 2009; Cooney, Biddulph & Zhu, 2013). A very recent 
research documents that the 2007 Labor Contact Law has made significant 
strides in increasing the coverage of written contracts, reducing the likelihood 
of wage arrears, and eliciting a greater compliance from firms across 
ownership (Li & Freeman, 2015). Moreover, as Ho (2009) argues, “Indeed, 
the legal framework governing employment in China is already quite 
protective, and many basic labor standards more resemble European practice 
than that of the United States.” (p. 39). Thus, it can be concluded that China’s 
factory regime has departed from localistic despotism (Lee, 1998). In the 
external environment of production, workers nowadays have various 
interlocking and relatively effective formal channels to lodge complaints 
against employers.  
 
  Nevetheless, state regulation of the external environment of production 
alone is insufficient to stem labor unrests. This is evident from the fact that 
labor disputes have continued to rise (China Labour Statistical Yearbook, 2009; 
2010), overloading formal labor institutions such as labor arbitration system 
and courts. At the same time, labor protests have started to display new features 
and momentum. In 2010, a strike wave hit the auto industry in South China, 
where the workers demanded not only a wage increase but also a representative 
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labor organization. For some scholars, the strike waves signal “the germination 
of political consciousness” (Friedman, 2014, p.159). For others, they indicate 
the inadequacy of collective rights on the part of labor (Chen, 2007, 2015; 
Friedman, 2014). For the state itself, these strikes points to a deficiency in its 
industrial relation institutions, namely a lack of firm-level mechanisms for 
communication, negotiation and dispute resolution between labor and capital. 
This institutional deficiency constitutes the rationale for the state to sponsor 
unionization in the private sector, which can serve as a mechanism to monitor 
industrial relations and to preempt larger-scale protests within specific firms.       
 
  The rising worker protests and state intervention in industrial relations have 
led Chan (2010) to argue that China’s factory regime has transited to contested 
despotism (TABLE 2.2). He has studied how informal networks of skilled 
workers empower them to resist managerial decisions which undermine their 
authority and autonomy at the workplace. While he acknowledges that some 
progressive changes in legal institution of the state and in managerial practice 
have occurred because of the power of worker protests, he regards worker 
resistance as incapable of producing a labor movement due to the absence of 
effective workplace representation. This lack of capacity is manifested in the 
state-affiliated, malfunctioning enterprise unions. Thus, worker protests are 
“class struggle without class organization” (Chan, 2010, p.145). He attributes 
the absence of genuine worker organizations to the lack of institutional 
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support from the state, namely the state’s denial of the right to strike10 and its 
official unions’ monopoly on labor representation. In particular, the monopoly 
of the official unions on labor representation impedes the formation of 
representative class organizations at the workplace, making individualized 
resistance (e.g. quitting and wildcat strikes) the only option available to 
workers (p.121).  
 
  Chan’s conceptualization of contested despotism may capture the new 
dynamics in factory regime transitions aptly, but his discussion on unions, the 
very means by which the Leninist state intervenes in the factory regime, is far 
from sufficient. The ethnographies he carried out in two union-free enterprises 
cannot adequately explain why enterprise unions fail to become representative 
labor organizations. In other words, Chan’s research suffers from the same 
methodological problem as that of many other researchers. For example, his 
claim that enterprise unions have no associational power is not in line with the 
latest empirical data collected by Li & Liu (2016) as well as in my own study. 
Even though he was unable to investigate a larger number of representative 
cases, he makes an overarching argument on union quality. As I argue, his 
conceptualization of contested despotism is incomplete without a systematic 
investigation of unions under contested despotism. This aspect will allow us to 
understand how factory regime is contested between capital, the state, unions 
                                                        
10 The right to strike was dropped from the Constitution in 1982. 
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and workers in the era of the Polanyian countermovement. 
 
  There is only one study so far which has suggested the unions with 
associational power are viable in Leninist states, and attempts to bring in 
another unit of analysis, the agency of union-led union leaders, to explain the 
success or failure of labor protests. By investigating a failed union-led labor 
protest, Li & Liu (2016) argue that enterprise unions could be transformed into 
genuine labor organizations if their leaders, elected through more or less 
democratic procedures, are affected by managerial decisions. Moreover, 
networking with civil society groups such as labor NGOs and labor lawyers 
can greatly facilitate this transformation. They attribute the failure of the 
union-led protest they have studied to state repression. In their interpretation, 
Li & Liu (2016) adopt a classic dichotomous view of state-society relations. 
Societal groups assist each other to facilitate the resistance of disadvantaged 
groups, whereas the malicious state always attempts to coopt or repress social 
resistance. On the one hand, it is certainly true that Leninist state is repressive 
in some collective actions (Deng & Brien, 2013). On the other hand, as many 
other researchers have argued, state intervention constitutes an important 
resource for grieved citizens to achieve their goals in collective actions (Wang 
& Minzner, 2015; Lee & Zhang, 2013; Lee, 2007). Although Li & Liu (2016) 
shed light on a positive direction of union evolution, the generalizability of 
their research is limited by their single case study method. Why some union 
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mobilizations succeed whereas others fail in transitioning Leninist state? In 
order to answer this question, a cross-case comparison is needed as it can 
explain the variance in the outcomes of the union-led labor protests. It is 
precisely this issue that my research works on through a more sophisticated 
sampling strategy and a representative case comparison.  
 
  Therefore, I intend to build on as well as to supplement existing knowledge 
on factory regime transition in transitioning Leninist states in four major 
aspects. First, my research broadens the empirical scope of extant research by 
identifying proto-economic unions – a new kind of unions with collective 
action power. The lack of empirical data has caused many scholars to see 
union efficacy as largely invariant (Chen, 2003, 2007, 2009; He & Xie, 2012; 
Yu, 2008; Liu, Li & Kim, 2011; Friedman, 2014). Based on more 
representative cases, I will show that enterprise unions do display a variance in 
union efficacy as manifested in three major types of union. 
 
  Second, with regard to state intervention, the existing literature assumes that 
state interest and capital interest are strongly aligned, underestimating the 
possible divergence between them. According to this assumption, the presence 
of paperwork unions is interpreted as an intended outcome anticipated by the 
Leninist state because it wants to preempt the emergence of genuine unions. I 
argue that this assumption requires a re-examination, as it cannot explain why 
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the state has devoted so many resources in unionization. As my analysis will 
show, paperwork unions do not serve state interest. They are unable to 
implement the basic functions of the Leninist state, in particular, grassroots 
penetration and social control, e.g. collecting intelligence from the private 
sector, solving labor disputes, and preempting or defusing labor unrests. Thus, 
it would be irrational for the state to invest a large amount of resources in 
useless social organizations.  
 
  Third, with regard to capital, prior research has assumed that the 
management has a strong incentive in suppressing unions. Undoubtedly, this 
was quite common in the early reform period (1990s), when a regulative labor 
institution was largely absent and most enterprises competed on thin profit 
margins. This assumption becomes less solid when we take account of the 
changing external environment of capitalist production and its impact on the 
managerial perception of industrial relation policies. With the labor law 
reform and enhanced law enforcement (Ho, 2009; Chan, 2010; Cooney, 
Biddulph & Zhu, 2013), nowadays enterprises operate in a much more 
stringent institutional environment and face more labor resistance and state 
pressure than in previous decades. It becomes difficult for enterprises to resist 
unionization. Some researchers continue to suggest that even upon accepting 
unionization enterprises are only content with unions functioning as 
managerial tools (He & Xie, 2012; Liu, Li & Kim, 2011; Liu, 2010). In 
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particular, Liu (2010) contends that grassroots unions dominated by 
management are irrelevant to workers (p.36). I argue instead that viewing 
enterprises as labor-repressive fails to account for the intra-case diversity of 
managerial unions and their roles, though limited, in promoting the fringe 
welfare of workers, facilitating employee-employer communications and 
creating a limited degree of industrial democracy. We need to understand 
under what conditions some enterprises embrace unionization whereas others 
do not.  
 
  Fourth, the need to explain variance brings forth an agent-level variable: the 
agency of union leaders. Previous research has largely concluded that union 
leaders do not matter, because they are controlled by the management or the 
state (Wilson, 1990; Chen, 2003, 2009; Friedman, 2014). Under the dual 
structural constraints, union leaders are unlikely to enact any agency. This 
proposition was valid when the state and the management were merged (e.g. 
bureaucratic despotism), or the two parties had an interest alignment and 
colluded to repress labor activism (e.g. localistic despotism and developmental 
authoritarian states). Nowadays, neither of the two preconditions is any longer 
present. The merger between the state and the management has come undone 
due to the SOEs reform and the rise of the private sector. In the private sector, 
the interest alignment between the two parties has also been significantly 
weakened, as the state has to balance growth and equity where capital pursues 
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profits. Thus, the divergence between state interest and capital interest, as I 
argue, has created a niche in which enterprise union leaders can explore the 
boundary of union activism in response to the state’s unionization policy and 
the management’s reaction to unionization. Facing the transformation in the 
external environment of capitalist production, enterprises need union leaders 
to coordinate corporate interest with industrial relation policies. Furthermore, 
the state relies on them to facilitate policy implementation at the firm level.  
 
  The market reform has created a favorable environment for union leaders to 
enact their agency. First, unlike the union staff of SOEs, enterprise union 
leaders in the private sector are not state agents. They are not embedded in the 
nomenklatura11 and the party-state bureaucracy. Thus, they enjoy a de facto 
independence from the state, which may broaden the scope of their agency. At 
the same time, being close to the employees, enterprise union leaders hold the 
potential to mobilize workers (Li & Liu, 2016). Second, although they are on 
employers’ payrolls, this does not really cut their agency oftentimes. Union 
leaders are appointed or elected because of their reputation among employees 
or their good skills in managing workplace relationships. This quality enables 
them to solve workplace conflicts in a way mutually beneficiary to employers, 
workers and the state. 
 
                                                        
11 The nomenklatura is a system for appointment and dismissal of leading party cadres in the state or 
state-affiliated sector, including the government, universities, SOEs and hospitals.    
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2.3.1 Measurement of State Intervention 
 
This subsection provides a measurement of the three explanatory variables, 
which have been discussed above: state intervention, managerial perception of 
unionization, and agency of union leaders. My explanatory framework will be 
presented afterwards. 
 
  State intervention is the first variable which affects union efficacy. It is 
defined as the extent to which the Leninist state is able to transform the 
internal and external environment of capitalist production regardless of the 
resistance of enterprises. The variance in state intervention is measured 
dichotomously as intervention refrained and intervention exerted. Intervention 
refrained occurs when the state fails to create labor-protective institutions in 
both the internal and external environment of capitalist production (Lee, 1998), 
or when its intervention is effectively compromised by capital. The second 
situation is the more common, as nowadays the state usually possesses the will 
but not enough capacity to intervene in labor relations in private firms. 
Intervention exerted occurs when the state creates protective institutions in 
both the internal and external environment of capitalist production, or when 
enterprises, unions and workers actively seek state intervention in the internal 
environment of capitalist production. For enterprises, state intervention can 
bring beneficiary resources or it can facilitate resolving industrial conflicts in 
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favor of capital. For unions and workers, state intervention is Janus-faced. It 
grants legitimacy to unions and their leaders. In labor protests, it can either 
pressurize capital into making concessions or repress unions and workers.  
      
2.3.2 Measurement of Managerial Perception of Unionization 
 
The second variable, managerial perception of unionization, is measured 
dichotomously as either an extraction or a resource. For the management, 
unionization is an extraction when it incurs substantial costs on or facilitates 
state intervention into the firm. On the other hand, unionization can also be a 
resource, if it brings beneficiary resources, tangible or intangible, to the firms.   
 
  It is likely that enterprises relying on low labor costs to maintain their 
competitiveness are inclined to see unionization as an extraction. If the official 
unions request unionized firms to contribute to union funds, maintaining 
enterprise unions could be costly. For example, Hsing’s investigation of 
Taiwanese-invested small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Guangdong 
in the early 1990s showed that these firms expanded their production capacity 
mainly through deliberate labor exploitation such as reducing labor costs 
(Hsing, 1998). The cost-cutting orientation of these firms is likely to make 
them regard unionization as an extraction rather than a resource, an 
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unnecessary cost on their operation.   
 
  On the other hand, the literature on dual institutional pressure suggests 
some enterprises value social legitimacy and tend to cooperate with industrial 
relations policies. Drawing on the practice of multinational corporations 
(MNCs), this research argues that the subsidiaries of MNCs need to obtain 
legitimacy from local stakeholders (Hillman & Wan, 2005), the local 
government in particular, in order to thrive in host countries. The enterprises’ 
response to industrial relation policies in host countries is influenced by 
managerial interpretation of the local institutional environment as well as the 
national business systems in their home countries (Oliver, 1991; Hillman & 
Wan, 2005; George, Chattopadhyay, Sitkin & Barden, 2006; Kim, 2008; Kim, 
Han & Zhao, 2014). In particular, researchers have found that if the managers 
of MNCs are from countries friendly to collective employees’ representation, 
they are more open to unionization in China (Kim, Han & Zhao, 2014). Thus, 
the legitimacy concern motivates the subsidiaries of MNCs to conform to 
industrial relation policies in their host countries, because social legitimacy is a 
resource for enterprises operating overseas to survive and thrive in a foreign 
environment.  
 
  The above findings hold for domestic private firms as well. Like MNCs, 
domestic private firms do have their legitimacy concerns. Establishing 
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enterprise unions indicates their willingness to cooperate with the government, 
which is another form of acquiring social legitimacy. Nowadays, private 
entrepreneurs are increasingly integrated into the political system and have 
displayed an increasing interest in participating in formal political institutions 
(Dickson, 2007). Thus, they tend to develop incentives to conform to formal 
institutional rules. Moreover, large private enterprises with a long-term 
development goal are likely to develop more sophisticated human resource 
management systems (Ma, 2011, p. 157). As they grow in size, enterprises 
become more socially visible and are more likely to be held to higher labor 
standards. As a result, compliance with industrial relation policies can enhance 
the public images of these firms. Scholars have found a positive correlation 
between the size of an enterprise and its receptiveness to union (Heery & 
Simms, 2010; Yao, Li & Han, 2009). Further, as labor governance in China 
becomes more rigid, domestic private firms are likely to view unionization as 
an intangible resource, which can enhance their social legitimacy. Lastly, 
enterprises are likely to have unions, if unionization brings them tangible 
resources without incurring any substantial cost. In a nutshell, private firms 
tend to embrace unionization if they are to benefit from it in a tangible or 
intangible way.  
 
 64 
2.3.3 Measurement of Agency of Union Leaders 
 
The third variable, agency of union leaders, is the most proximate explanation 
of the variance in union efficacy, when the structural factors, state intervention 
and managerial perception, are held constant. Agency of union leaders is 
defined as the capacity of union leaders to expand union functions regardless 
of management’s resistance. The variable is measured as varying between 
subdued agency, constrained middlemen and labor representatives. The agency 
of union leaders is subdued in hostile enterprises. Constrained middlemen and 
labor representative-type leaders only appear in friendly enterprises.   
 
  Union leaders are most likely to see their agency subdued in hostile firms. 
Private enterprises which stick to low labor standards tend to reject 
unionization or tolerate paperwork unions only (Ma, 2011). These enterprises 
can compromise state intervention in their factory regime. Without the 
empowerment from the state, union leaders in these firms are suppressed and 
unlikely to enact any agency.   
 
  In friendly enterprises, enterprise union leaders can act as constrained 
middlemen to coordinate industrial relation policies of the state with corporate 
interest. Enterprise unions depend on their hosting enterprises for future 
existence and their union leaders for salaries and promotions (Luo, 2013). 
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Thus, union leaders tend to prioritize managerial interest above the interests of 
employees and the state. For example, Zhang (2015) observes that enterprise 
unions in SOEs and joint ventures have little bargaining power and tend to 
cooperative with the management. In these firms, union cadres emphasize the 
common interest shared between workers and the management but are 
reluctant to talk about the conflict of interests between the two parties. When 
union leaders mobilize workers against the management, they are soon 
neutralized (Friedman, 2014). In order to avoid potential retaliation, union 
leaders act as constrained middlemen to avoid a confrontation with the 
management.  
 
  Union leaders who act as labor representatives can emerge in transitioning 
Leninist states. As compared to authoritarian developmental states, Leninist 
states were much less repressive in labor governance (Anner & Liu, 2016; 
Chen, 2015, p. 26). Even the most repressive authoritarian state – South Korea 
under Park Chung-hee – failed to contain the rise of labor movements (Koo, 
2001). Grassroots union leaders emerged, either voluntarily or involuntarily, to 
lead labor resistance. Thus, state violence does not necessarily dissuade labor 
activists from representing workers and struggling on their behalf in any 
non-democratic contexts. Furthermore, the transitioning Leninist states’ 
concern about social stability can be favorable to the emergence of labor 
representatives. Indeed, Leninist states have been shown to rely on grassroots 
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leaders to contain social unrests and maintain social stability (Lee & Zhang, 
2013). For the state, identifying responsive grassroots leaders is the key to 
restore order and to re-establish communications and negotiations with 
grieved citizens. Grassroots leaders can aggregate the interests of grieved 
citizens and facilitate the bargaining between them and the state. Thus, in 
labor protests, the activism of union leaders may not be contradictory to the 
interest of the state, so long as it assists the state to solve labor disputes and 
restore social stability. Aside from their roles in labor protests, labor 
representatives can facilitate workers and labor to reach mutually beneficiary 
compromises. Facilitating compromises is as important as staging industrial 
actions. Even in industrial democracies, unions are inclined to reach 
compromises and enter negotiations with employers and the government 
(Littler & Palmer, 1986, p.264). Unions exchange their bargaining for the 
delivery of peace and worker cooperation. Workers themselves also have an 
interest in maintaining “the continued viability of the units of capital which 
employ them” (Littler & Palmer, 1986, p.265). Thus, the agency of union 
leaders being labor representative is manifested not only in staging industrial 
actions but also in interest aggregation which seeks compromises and 
negotiations with capital and the state. 
 
  In this section, I reject the null hypothesis that individual agency does not 
matter in an institutionally restricted environment. Previous research on labor 
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movements in an authoritarian context suggests that even the most repressive 
authoritarian states did not preclude the emergence of labor movements led by 
charismatic leaders. Thus, it is logical to assume that agents do matter in a 
transitioning Leninist state which has been concerned about labor protection 
than. In China, structural variables have become favorable to the emergence of 
union leaders who can facilitate policy implementation in the private sector. 
The state anticipates union leaders to be responsive agents to create a 
counterbalancing point in the factory regime of private firms. Moreover, a 
more stringent institutional environment of labor governance also creates a 
stronger incentive on the part of management to comply with industrial 
relation policies. Even in labor protests where the Leninist state places 
stability above all other concerns, union leaders have latitude in aggregating 
citizens’ complaints and in seeking a solution to social unrests in favor of the 
state.             
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2.4 Explanatory Framework 
 
My framework combines two structural-level factors (state intervention and 
managerial perception of unionization) and one agent-level factor (agency of 
union leaders) in order to explain the variance among paperwork union, 
managerial unions and proto-economic unions. I argue that neither state 
intervention nor managerial perception alone is sufficient to explain this 
variance. Agency of union leaders needs to be incorporated into the 
framework to explain not only inter-case differences (between paperwork 
unions, managerial unions, and proto-economic unions) but also any intra-case 
variance in the same type of union. When the structural factors are held 
constant, agency of union leaders accounts for much of the inter-case 
difference and intra-case variance.   
 
  TABLE 2.3 shows the causal pathways of the variance in union efficacy. 
The causal pathway of paperwork unions is the most straightforward among 
the three. Paperwork unions emerge in enterprises which perceive unionization 
as an extraction. Due to the resistance of capital, the state refrains, deliberately 
or involuntarily, from intervening in the factory regime of these firms. When 
state intervention is absent in empowering union leaders or activists, any 
activism of these agents is unlikely to be tolerated by enterprises.  
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TABLE 2.3 Explanation of the Variance in Union Efficacy (N=17)  
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  The causal pathways of managerial unions and proto-economic unions are 
more complicated. They share the structural-level precondition: a management 
that perceives unionization as a resource. This managerial perception then 
opens up operational space for union leaders to expand union functions and 
activities. In managerial unions, union leaders act as constrained middlemen, 
straddling between enterprises and the state. Without collective action power, 
these leaders tend to prioritize managerial interest above the interests of the 
state and workers. As a result, managerial unions are only able to develop a 
limited set of functions, as these unions are incapable of challenging 
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managerial authority to support interest-based claims of employees.  
 
  Proto-economic unions diverge from managerial unions with regard to the 
agency of union leaders. In these unions, union leaders act as labor 
representatives, who tend to see the interest of employees on par with that of 
management. Union leaders in proto-economic unions have an ability to 
aggregate the interest of employees and discipline their behaviors. Thus, under 
their leadership, unions can organize collective actions, conciliatory or 
confrontational, to bargain with their employers. In confrontational collective 
actions, state intervention can be a resource for unions to achieve some 
success in their mobilization, if their leaders successfully leverage state 




This chapter starts from reviewing the history of union movement in China. 
Historically, the party-state kept a tight control on unions, subordinating them 
to its political goals. However, the economic reform has transformed the union 
system from the below and replaced its grassroots units with enterprise unions 
hosted by private enterprises. Distinct from liberal unionism and socialist 
corporatist unionism, state-sponsored unionization seeks to spread 
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unionization in the private sector in order to represent the new working class 
and recreate stability in China’s industrial relations.  
 
  The literature review suggests that the state-sponsored unionization in 
China occupies an underexplored terrain in the labor politics literature. I argue 
that a gap has existed in conceptualizing and explaining the dynamics of 
enterprise unions in the transitioning Leninist states. No systematic research, 
largely due to the lack of empirical data, has been done to explore the 
intervention of the Leninist states in internal environment of capitalist 
production through institutionalizing enterprise unions. I argue the 
conceptualization of contested despotism (Chan, 2010) incomplete without a 
systematic analysis of union evolution in a market economy. My research thus 
complements the conceptualization of contested despotism by showing how 
unionization outcomes are contested between the state, capital and union 
leaders. 
 
  I argue that state-sponsored unionization has created a variance in union 
efficacy, rather than the invariance as assumed in previous research. Then, I 
introduce an explanatory framework to explain this variance by combining 
two structural-level factors, state intervention and managerial perception of 
unionization, with one agent-level factor, agency of union leaders. When the 
structural variables are held constant, the inter-case and intra-case variance is 
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largely explained by the variance in agency of union leaders. 
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CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH STRATEGY AND METHODS 
 
The research is based an eight-month fieldwork in China between December 
2014 and July 2015, as well as a follow-up fieldwork in May 2016. The 
primary site of investigation is the Shenzhen municipality in the southeastern 
Guangdong province. Supplementary fieldwork was conducted in Hong Kong 
and Beijing. 
 
  I aimed for collecting data with diversity and randomness in order to 
achieve a higher level of generalizability. Case diversity was achieved through 
a diverse case method. The goal of the method is to “capture the full range of 
variation along the dimensions of interest” (Gerring, 2007, p.97-99). In my 
research, it was implemented through combining random sampling and 
convenience sampling in order to capture a fuller range of variance in union 
efficacy. The sampling strategies created a limited diversity and randomness in 
my case selection, which avoided case selection on the dependent variable. 
  
  I used semi-structured interview and participant observation as the primary 
methods. The primary data was from my interviews with enterprise union 
leaders, grassroots union cadres, labor NGOs activists, labor lawyers, and 
workers. I joined eight rounds of labor inspection at two industrial parks in 
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Shenzhen, where I visited more than 20 firms. Participant observation has an 
advantage in opening researchers access to specific economic and social 
environment in which unionization and labor inspection were implemented on 
a daily basis. As for the secondary data, I delved into the documents of 
Shenzhen’s political economy, which were housed in the Shenzhen Library at 
University Town. These documents, mostly consisted of yearbooks, cover the 
history of all municipal districts of Shenzhen, which offers an invaluable 
source of data on the developmental trajectory of the municipality. In Hong 
Kong, I interviewed two labor NGOs and a labor scholar from the Hong Kong 
Baptist University. They helped me contact some labor activists who were 
willing to share their views on unions and worker mobilization in Shenzhen. 
In Beijing, my focus was on library research at the China University of Labor 
Relations. 
 
  The research strictly abides by the NUS-IRB procedure to ensure a 
maximum protection of informants. A consent form was given to each 
informant before the interview (Appendices 1a). Interviews were conducted 
only after written or oral consent was obtained from informants. Each 
interview lasted for 45 minutes or less; but in some cases, with informant’s 
consent, it was extended to one hour. Audio-recording was used only with 
informant’s consent. All individual and institutional identities were concealed. 
Symbolic gifts bearing the NUS logo were given to informants as token 
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appreciation for their participation and support of the research.  
 
  This chapter constitutes three sections. Section 3.1 introduces the selection 
of research site. Section 3.2 introduces the selection of informants. Section 3.3 
introduces the selection of gatekeepers. Section 3.4 is the conclusion.  
 
3.1 Selection of Research Site: the Shenzhen Municipality  
 
The Shenzhen municipality is located at the estuary of the Pearl River Delta, 
bordering Hong Kong (PICTURE 3.1). In the late 1970s, the municipality was 
selected as the first experimental zone in China’s path-breaking economic 
reform. In its early years, Shenzhen pursued an export-driven industrialization, 
which utilized China’s rural labor surpluses and land resources to seek an 
entry into the global capitalist market. The recent years saw Shenzhen actively 
seeking a path of industrial upgrading in order to develop a 
technology-intensive economy.  
 
  In the short period of 35-years, Shenzhen has grown from a frontier town to 
a world-class metropolis with a population of more than 12 millions. In the 
1990s, the city attracted foreign direct investment (FDI) only in processing 
trade industry, whereas in the 2000s it has progressed to produce sophisticated 
manufacturing products such as electronics. Thus, Shenzhen exemplifies a 
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complete circle of industrialization from traditional manufacturing to high 
value added-manufacturing. This unique configuration of different phases of 
industrialization in one location makes the city an ideal site for studying 
factory regime transitions. 
 
PICTURE 3.1 Shenzhen and The Pearl River Delta 
 
 
  Shenzhen is highly representative as a research site for studying 
late-industrialization and its impact on labor relations. In academia, a 
significant portion of industrial relation literature was produced based on the 
fieldwork in Shenzhen. Theorization on factory regime transitions such as 
Lee (1998) and Chan (2010) would have been impossible without empirical 
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data collected from this city. Following this research tradition, I select 
Shenzhen as the research site of my research on enterprise unions in China, 
as the city has been and will continue to be a breeding ground of labor 
politics theories.  
 
  The factory regime in Shenzhen is in a transition from localistic despotism 
to contested despotism. In the 1990s, the city was notorious for the prevalent 
labor exploitation in its industrial parks. The local government, similar to its 
counterparts in other late-developing countries, sacrificed labor welfare for 
industrial growth. This was especially so when manufacturing migrant 
workers in Shenzhen were mostly recruited from the inland provinces. 
However, as labor conflicts have became a primary source of social instability 
since the mid-2000s, labor governance in the city tilts towards protectionist. 
FIGURE 3.1 shows the per capita labor dispute  (the number of registered 
labor disputes per 100 million GDP, measured by CNY) of Guangdong and the 
national average between 2001 and 2012. As it shows, the per capita labor 
dispute of Guangdong is far above that the national average, indicating that the 
industrial relations in Guangdong are far more confrontational than those in 
the other provinces of China. As most labor disputes in the province 
concentrate in Shenzhen, FIGURE 3.1 indicates the high intensity of labor 
disputes in Shenzhen as well. Now, the local state of Shenzhen faces multiple 




FIGURE 3.1 A Comparison of Guangdong and National Average in Per 
Capita Labor Disputes, 2001-2012 
 
SOURCE: China Labour Statistical Yearbook, 2002-2013; Du, 2008, 2010; compiled and 
calculated by the author 
 
3.2 Selection of Informants 
 
The informants were selected first through random sampling and then 
convenience sampling. As for random sampling, 32 unionized enterprises were 
selected from the database of the Statistics Bureau of Shenzhen. The 
municipal official union – the Shenzhen Federation of Trade Unions (SFTU) 



















December of 2014, among which two agreed to participate in my research. 
Due to the limited results produced by the random sampling, convenience 
sampling was used to recruit more informants. 15 more enterprise unions 
agreed to participate in my research. They were recruited, in a snowballing 
manner, through gatekeepers. Apart from enterprise unions, the official unions, 
labor NGOs, and workers were contacted for interviews.  
 
  Two strategies were used to reduce selection bias in convenience sampling. 
First, I increased the diversity of gatekeepers (as elaborated in section 3.3) to 
reduce the reliance on any single gatekeeper. Second, I tried to have my case 
selection spread out geographically to represent different urban districts of 
Shenzhen. Instead of treating Shenzhen as a homogeneous site, I recruited 
informants from all six urban districts of the municipality. TABLE 3.1 is the 
breakdown of informant information in terms of type and geographic location. 
As the table shows, my interview data was collected from 17 enterprise unions, 
9 official unions and 4 labor NGOs. In total, I interviewed 34 individual 
informants (Appendices 1b).    
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TABLE 3.1 Selection of Institutional Informants in Shenzhen: 
geographic distribution 
District  Enterprise unions Official 
unions 
    Labor NGOs 
Futian 4 2 0 
Luohu 1 1 0 
Nanshan 8 3 0 
Longgang 1 2 1 
Bao’an 2 1 3 
Yantian 1 0 0 
In total 17 9 4 
 
3.3 Selection of Gatekeepers 
 
Gatekeepers are the knots tying with informants. An increase of diversity in 
gatekeepers helps reduce selection bias in convenience sampling. I recruited 
informants through five types of gatekeeper: the official unions, labor office, 
vocational training agencies, tax bureau, and labor NGOs. They were selected 
to demonstrate a greater diversity of the relationships between the state and 
private sector actors in union governance. The official unions, labor offices 
and tax bureaus are the state organs which have contacts with enterprise 
unions at various stages of unionization. Vocational training agencies are 
private social organizations which provide services to unionized enterprises. 
Labor NGOs are bystanders to enterprise unions, which they regard as 
state-coopted and useless. Thus, gaining access to informants through this 
diverse group of gatekeepers is highly likely to yield more robust data.    
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  The official unions have a regular contact with enterprise unions. They are 
in charge of union registration, union recordkeeping, and supervising 
enterprises in law compliance. Labor office is an agency of sub-district 
government, which is in charge of labor inspection and labor dispute 
resolution. Taxation bureau supervises tax records of enterprises. Tax officers 
work closely with financial staff of enterprises. Two officers from a local 
taxation bureau helped me contact 6 informants, most of which were 
public-holding enterprises. Vocational training agencies provide educational 
services, which are funded by the official unions, to enterprises. Since these 
training agencies tend to have an amicable relationship with enterprises, they 
offer an easier access to enterprise unions than the official unions. I included 
labor NGOs from Shenzhen and Hong Kong as gatekeepers. In Shenzhen, in 
addition to interviews, I attended seminars and joined outreach activities 
organized by labor NGOs. These independent labor organizations provided 
legal consultation to migrant workers and assisted them in litigation. Because 
of their “illegal” nature, labor NGOs had to operate under the specter of state 
repression. Thus, they were the most critical informants in my research. In 
Hong Kong, I interviewed two labor NGOs in May 2015, which were Worker 




This chapter lays out the research strategy and methods of my research. 
Random sampling and controlled convenience sampling allowed my case 
selection to have a limited diversity, randomness and a higher level of 









CHAPTER 4 PAPERWORK UNIONS 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
Researchers have shown little interest in paperwork unions, as the name 
suggests, they do not really qualify as unions. However, paperwork unions 
represent an important part of the variance in union efficacy and their 
mechanisms of formation can reveal how the state-society relations have been 
transformed in a market economy. Paperwork unions suggest that state 
intervention has failed in some part of the private sector due to the resistance 
of the strongest societal action – capital.  
 
  Past research suggests that the Leninist state is rendering enterprise unions 
ineffectual (Chen, 2003; Mingwei Liu, 2010). I argue otherwise that the union 
weakness is caused by a weak state intervention. At the structural level, the 
Leninist state has failed to provide effective legal and political institutions to 
govern unionization. The institutional deficiency is manifested in the lack of 
enforcement authority on the part of the official unions in their 
implementation of the 2001 Trade Union Law. Without an authority to enforce 
the law, the official unions are placed in an inferior position when bargaining 
with enterprises. At the agent level, the official unions are too weak to empower 
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union leaders to counteract capital. As a result, paperwork unions have become 
prevalent in some parts of the private sector.  
 
  In order to make my argument, the chapter is organized as follows: section 
4.2 explicates the transformation of the economic sector and the prevalence of 
paperwork unions. Section 4.3 shows that paperwork unions are unintended 
outcomes of state-sponsored unionization. Section 4.4 explains the 
mechanisms of formation of paperwork unions. Section 4.5 provides an 
alternative explanation of the union weakness by taking into account of the 
characteristics of Chinese migrant workers. Section 4.6 summarizes the main 
arguments of this chapter.      
 
4.2 Transformation of the Economic Sector and Prevalence of Paperwork 
Unions 
 
In a command economy, unions were established in nearly every state-owned 
firm as a mechanism to coordinate employee-management relations, to 
encourage production, and to provide welfare to state workers (Tanzer, 1960; 
Aczel, 2005). Enterprise union was an embedded institution of the 
state-owned firms. In China, the economic reform since the 1970s has 
fundamentally transformed the economic sector, upon which the socialist labor 
 85 
institution was based. Efficiency concerns precipitated the Chinese state to 
initiate the reform of SOEs, which forced most medium- and small-sized 
SOEs into privatization or bankruptcy and subsequently caused an irreversible 
decline of unions in the state-owned sector. According to a report from the 
International Labor Organization (ILO), during 1997-2000 the enterprise 
unions in China were threatened both functionally and organizationally, as it 
was estimated that 17 million union members were struck off the registration 
list (Traub-Merz, 2011). As a result, the SOEs reform dislodged the 
state-owned sector as the primary base of unionization. After the reform, the 
ACFTU sought to boost unionization in a burgeoning private sector beyond its 
traditional base of organization.  
 
  Although state socialism once eradicated the private sector, this sector has 
gradually reemerged due to private farming, the SOEs reform, foreign 
investments and private entrepreneurship. Today, the private sector in China 
has displaced the state-controlled sector to become the major source of 
economic and employment growth and the major contributor to the global trade 
(Lardy, 2014). Private firms have become the dominant players in industry, 
construction and the service sector. Up until 2011, they have contributed 74% 
of industrial output of industry and construction sector (China Statistical 
Yearbook, 2012) and have employed 2/3 of urban workforce in 2011 (Lardy, 
2014, p.84). Among all kinds of private ownership, FIEs have made a huge 
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contribution to the expansion of China’s global trade. In short, the private sector 
has become of strategically important to China’s economic growth.   
 
  Thus, strengthening union presence in the private sector becomes crucial for 
the party-state to regain a representation monopoly of the new working class. 
This comprises migrant workers (Friedman, 2014) as well as the urban 
population employed by private enterprises. However, the private sector 
operates by a different logic, which is a prioritization of profitability over any 
other social concerns. This logic has created an enormous obstacle to 
unionization. In the private sector, profitability and market share dominate the 
calculation of firms, conditioning their response to state policies. Unlike SOEs, 
private firms are not politically subordinate to the state and have not yet (and 
may never have) institutionalized unions as part of their organizational 
structures. Unionization have to rely exclusively on the persuasive ability of 
the official unions and the consent of enterprises, rather than the coercive 
power of the state. If unionization appears to be costly, private firms are likely 
to evade unionization or institute paperwork unions for window-dressing 
purposes.  
 
  Although there has been no official or academic estimation of the ratio of 
paperwork unions, my fieldwork suggests that their numbers are huge. The 
prevalence of paperwork unions can be glimpsed from the recruitment process 
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of my fieldwork. In my initial random sampling, only 3 out of 32 enterprises 
accepted my request for an interview. Most rejected. Some told me they were 
union-free, despite the fact that they were registered as unionized according to 
the record of the SFTU. The rest of the sampled enterprises constantly delayed 
their response to my request by telling me that their union leaders were on 
business trips or on leave. When I asked when they would be coming back, the 
replies from these unions were opaque, saying that the date was unknown or 
confidential. These initial contacts with enterprise unions suggested a great 
deal of reluctance on their part to promote the publicity of their unions or to 
admit that their unions had done little.  
 
4.3 Ideal Enterprise Unions and their Premises 
 
My central argument is that paperwork unions are unintended outcomes of 
state-sponsored unionization, because they deviate greatly from the ideal 
union envisioned by the state. Historically, Leninist states expected all social 
organizations to serve state interests such as facilitating the implementation of 
state policies, surveillance of society, and information and resource transfers 
between the state and the society (Harding, 1997; Yang, 1996). It is irrational 
for the state to sponsor a campaign to create useless organizations to itself. 
Thus, how far is a paperwork union deviate from an ideal union?  
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  The 2001 Trade Union Law provides a sketch of this “ideal” union. 
According to the law, a union shall serve three purposes which reflect the 
interest of the state and that of the employees. First, enterprise unions have an 
obligation to protect workers’ legal rights (Article 2, 20 & 22). Second, 
enterprise unions should promote industrial democracy by representing 
workers to management (Article 5, 6, 21 & 38). Third, the law specifies two 
initiatives which a union can undertake amid industrial conflicts in order to 
bring back industrial peace. Enterprise unions can organize conciliatory 
collective actions such as signing collective contracts on behalf of workers 
with management (Article 20). When confrontational collective actions such 
as stoppages or slow-downs take place, enterprise unions can negotiate with 
hosting enterprises on behalf of their workers and represent their demands to 
management (Article 27). In short, the law anticipates enterprise unions to be 
active coordinators of shop floor relations, who can reconcile 
labor-management conflicts in a prompt manner. As paperwork unions fulfill 
none of these purposes, they are a far cry from what the state has envisioned 
as ideal. 
 
  Thus, the discrepancy between the ideal union and paperwork unions makes 
an assumption held by the law at odds with the reality in a society undergoing 
a significant transformation. The law’s enforcement is premised on one 
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precondition: enterprises operate on a bona fide manner, cooperating with 
state policies. Under this assumption, the law expects the management to 
provide resources essential to union functioning (Article 38), to respect and 
listen to opinions and suggestions from unions, especially amid industrial 
conflicts (Article 27), and to make relevant changes upon receiving lawful 
requests for correction from unions (Article 22). The enterprises which 
conform most closely to this image are state-owned or state-affiliated 
enterprises12. These enterprises retain many key features of SOEs in terms of 
governance structure, enterprise culture and employment policy. Many 
state-affiliated firms were state-owned in the days of the pre-reform era but 
transferred part of their shares to private hands or foreign investors in order to 
conform to the reform policies. Thus, these firms with a state origin are much 
more law-abiding than private enterprises, as most of them have integrated 
enterprise unions as an integral part of their governance structure. For example, 
in an interview with the union chair of a public-holding enterprise, I was 
amazed at the rigidity with which his firm complied with the trade union law 
(Interview 21). When I asked about the reason for such rigid compliance, the 
union chair was startled to be asked such a question and replied simply: “it is a 
legal obligation.” (Interview 22).      
 
                                                        
12  State-affiliated enterprises refer to joint adventures (shared ownership between state-owned 
enterprises and foreign investors) and public-holding enterprises（公众型上市公司）. I call these firms 
“state-affiliated” instead of “state-owned” because legally they are not state-owned firms in terms of 
their share-holding structure.    
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  However, this assumption of bona fide enterprises does not hold beyond the 
state-owned or state-affiliated sector. First of all, in the private sector, bona 
fide enterprises are relatively uncommon. It is more rational for enterprises to 
evade strict labor laws. Second, the law assumes enterprise unions to be 
capable of absorbing industrial conflicts at the firm level and thus fails to 
anticipate the escalation of shop floor conflicts into large-scale industrial 
conflicts such as strikes and petitions, which the ideal union is incapable of 
handling. As will be elaborated in the following sections, hostile enterprises 
have become realities which confront union cadres in their attempts to 
unionize private firms. Moreover, the law’s failure to address confrontational 
industrial actions leads to another unintended outcome. Some enterprise 
unions have outgrown the state’s expectations and begun to get involved in 
strikes and labor petitions. This will be more fully discussed in Chapter 6 on 
proto-economic unions.  
 
4.4 Explaining Paperwork Unions 
 
In accounting for paperwork unions, I intend to show that their causal pathway 
is constituted by two structural-level factors (hostile enterprises and refrained 
state intervention) and one agent-level factor (subdued agency of union 
leaders or activists). At the structural level, paperwork unions emerge when 
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hostile enterprises are determined to compromise unionization. Their 
weakness is further aggravated by weak legal and political institutions created 
the state which ineffectually intervene into the factory regime. At the agent 
level, hostile enterprises are least likely to tolerate union leaders’ activism. 
This is aggravated by the state which refrains from empowering union leaders 
to counteract capital due to its weak capacity.    
 
4.4.1 Refrained State Intervention 
 
According to Ching Kwan Lee’s conceptualization of localistic despotism 
(Lee, 1998), when the Leninist state refrains from intervening into the factory 
regime of capitalist firms, it is a deliberate act of the state being laissez-faire 
in order to encourage accumulation. The state lacks the will but not the 
capacity to intervene in the factory regime. As the factory regime in China has 
transited to contested despotism (Chan, 2010), this has changed. Nowadays, it 
is the lack of state capacity, rather than the lack of state will, which makes the 
Leninist state refrain from intervening in the key domains of factory regime 
such as enterprise unions. As the following subsections will show, three 
institutional dimensions of (refrained) state intervention create the 
preconditions for paperwork unions and perpetuate their existence. The three 
dimensions constituting refrained state intervention are a weak legal institution 
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in governing unionization, a weak political institution in supporting 
unionization, and weak state agents in implementing unionization.  
 
A weak legal institution in governing unionization 
 
  A weak legal institution undermines the capacity of the state to elicit 
compliance from hostile enterprises. The primary legal instrument, the 2001 
Trade Union Law, lacks teeth to sanction noncompliance, as it is extremely 
vague on enforcing the agency of unionization and legal sanctions against 
noncompliant enterprises. The law does not designate enforcement authority 
to any state organ, including the official unions, to sanction noncompliant 
firms. Although in practice the official unions are in charge of spreading 
unionization, they are not granted any administrative authority to enforce it. 
For example, under the law, enterprises employing more than 25 persons are 
obliged to establish enterprise unions. However, despite the stipulation of 
unionization as a legal obligation, it is not uncommon for enterprises to ignore 
it. In reality, enterprises seldom unionize without being “prodded” by the 
official unions.  
 
  Thus, the law has created a dilemma of enforcement. On the one hand, the 
official unions are not given enforcement authority within their own 
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professional jurisdictions. On the other hand, for other state organs, such as 
the labor bureau, which have enforcement authority, implementing the Trade 
Union Law is not their primary duty and these agencies have little incentive to 
do so. As a result, this weak legal institution has made it very difficulty for 
grassroots union cadres to be effective, placing them in a weak bargaining 
position with enterprises. A union cadre shared with me how the law’s 
weakness allows some managers to manipulate the consent of employees in 
order to evade unionization:  
 
“The official unions have no authority to enforce the law, so 
enterprises can choose not to unionize. The Trade Union Law can 
do nothing about it. Last year, there was an enterprise which 
refused to be unionized. I informed the management that they 
were required to provide a consent letter to me, signed by 
employees, to prove that they had no interest in establishing a 
union. What else could I do? Employees in private enterprises 
would sign the letter if they wanted to keep their jobs. Others 
might not even think about it [union] at all. So, promoting 




A weak political institution in supporting unionization  
 
  A weak political institution is another factor perpetuating paperwork unions. 
It is manifested in the weak intra-agency collaboration between the official 
unions and other state organs in implementing the laws and policies with 
regard to unionization. In general, inter-agency collaboration among 
government agencies with overlapping jurisdictions and shared responsibility 
can improve effectiveness in policy implementation and reduce policy 
fragmentation (Kaiser, 2011). China is no exception to this, as many 
administrative tasks such as unionization require collaborations between 
various state organs and social organizations. However, in union governance, 
the official unions often find themselves in an isolated situation. While state 
laws and policies designate them as the only legitimate representative organs 
of labor, these legal and policy instruments do not grant them an enforcement 
authority nor provide an effective political institution to support their work. 
The weak inter-agency collaboration greatly reduces the deterrence effect of 
the Trade Union Law on noncompliant enterprises.  
 
  The current laws and policies provide two instruments to the official unions 
in order to strengthen their control of enterprise unions. The first instrument 
grants the official unions the right to collect union dues from unionized 
enterprises in collaboration with local tax bureau. The legislative intention is 
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to give the official unions a better financial means of controlling grassroots 
unions. However, in reality, the union due collection is largely ineffective due 
to a weak inter-agency collaboration between the official unions on the one 
hand and the courts and the tax bureau on the other hand. The Trade Union 
Law designates local courts to enforce union due payment upon the request of 
enterprise unions or the official union at the next higher level, if the hosting 
enterprises refuse to pay dues without a proper justification (Article 43). In 
practice, however, local courts have never enforced union dues collection, nor 
have any other state organs done so. In the few fortunate cases when 
enterprises consent to pay, there still arises a problem due to the weak 
inter-agency collaboration. As an administrative procedure, the union dues 
collection goes through the local taxation system. The local tax bureau can 
only proceed to collect union dues from a unionized enterprise after it has 
signed up for payment on its tax forms. However, the lack of inter-agency 
collaboration undermines the efficiency of the union dues collection. The local 
tax bureau does not ask or remind a unionized enterprise to sign up for 
payment. Since the tax bureau does not benefit financially from the collection, 
it has little incentive to use its administrative resources for this kind of 
non-beneficiary duty and sometimes even ignore it altogether. Without the 
mandatory collection of union dues, many enterprise unions are unable to 
function due to the absence of funding. A union cadre told me that many new 
enterprise unions would not end up as paperwork unions, if the collection was 
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properly enforced, as she explained:   
 
“If the Trade Union Law is enforced, it can save a lot of our 
energies. If so, there is no need for us to persuade enterprises to 
pay union dues. [Once union dues are collected mandatorily] 
enterprises will want to establish enterprise unions and make them 
work.” (Interview 11) 
 
  The second instrument available to the official unions to strengthen 
enterprise unions is through supervising the operation of the latter. As 
designated in the Trade Union Law, the parent official unions are the 
immediate supervising agencies of enterprise unions (Article 50). In theory, 
the official unions have the right to visit enterprise unions, convene meetings 
of union chairs, and organize training sessions for union leaders and 
employees. In reality, it is difficult, if not impossible, for the official unions to 
supervise enterprise unions due to their resource limitations. Enterprise unions 
far outnumber their supervising official unions, making de facto supervision 
impossible. For example, given its very limited staffing, a sub-district union 
federation is responsible for “supervising” hundreds and thousands of 
enterprise unions in its geographic jurisdiction. The low-level official unions 
is only equipped with very poor staffing. Usually, one union office has one 
civil servant and 3-4 grassroots union cadres who are contract employees. 
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They are responsible for unionizing all qualified enterprises in the whole 
sub-district. With this overwhelming load of work, what union cadres can do 
is mostly just bureaucratic paperwork such as compiling basic information of 
enterprise unions. With limited staffing and resources, the official unions are 
unable to keep an eye on most enterprise unions on a regular basis. Given the 
lack of regular and effective supervision from the above, it is not surprising 
that many enterprise unions only exist on paper. Since employers and 
employees in the private sector tend to have little knowledge on unions, they 
are unlikely able to operate unions without an input from the state that 
familiarizes them with union ideology.  
 
  My interview at a paperwork union, TAI-1, supports my argument that the 
union weakness is caused weak, rather than strong state intervention. In the 
interview, the informant, a human resource manager who was also in charge of 
union affairs, insisted that the weak disciplinary power of the government was 
responsible for TAI-1’s status quo (Interview 1). Since TAI-1’s registration, its 
parent official union had never visited the enterprise union nor had it provided 
any guidance on how to run TAI-1. Thus, the informant suggested that more 
intrusive state intervention and more stringent legal sanctions against 




“The government does not discipline. We were asked to establish 
a union, but no one required us to perform any union duty. No one 
is in charge of this…the government does not pay much attention 
to this [unionization]. I think the primary responsibility lies with 
the government. Our parent official union has never visited us to 
ask how the union works and what activities we have organized. 
They have never come.” (Interview 1) 
 
  The above sections examines two policy instruments, union dues collection 
and supervisory right, which the current legal and policy institutions have 
granted to the official unions. Despite the good intentions of these instruments, 
their effectiveness has been undermined by the weak inter-agency 
collaboration between the official unions and their collaborative state 
agencies.    
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Weak state agents in implementing unionization  
 
  Due to the lack of support from the legal and political institutions outlined 
above, the state agents who are in charge of implementing union policies –  
grassroots union cadres (基层工会干部) – find themselves disempowered. 
These union cadres work at the front line of unionization and come into direct 
contact with enterprises. Every year, they receive unionization quotas from 
their employers – the official unions – and then set out to persuade targeted 
enterprises to comply with union policies.  
 
  Despite being dubbed as “cadre”, these grassroots union officials are not 
public servants but contract employees of the official unions. Employed as 
contract workers, they have to assume a much heavier workload and are paid 
much less than civil servants of the union system. Zhang (2015) refers this 
dual employment practice as “labor force dualism”. This mechanism draws a 
boundary between formal employees, who have stable tenure, a higher salary 
and more generous welfare, and temporary employees, who are employed on a 
short-term basis through labor agencies with a much lower salary and fewer 
benefits. Since the 2008 financial crisis, this employment practice has spread 
globally in response to the demand for labor flexibility. Workers are 
increasingly stuck in short-term contract work and are unable to convert their 
employment relationship with their employers into a formal and regular one 
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(Nair, 2016, p. 129-130). In China, this situation has spread from the private 
sector to the public sector. Nowadays, most employees in state-owned 
enterprises and low-level state organs such as sub-district offices and 
community service stations work on a contract basis. Grassroots union cadres 
belong to this group of temporary employees of the state.   
 
  In Shenzhen, grassroots union cadres comprise mainly two groups of people. 
The first group consists of young college graduates, who have migrated from 
rural areas or inland cities of Guangdong. After graduation, most of them 
choose to stay in regional metropolitan areas such as Shenzhen and 
Guangzhou and refuse to return to their relatively under-developed 
hometowns. Initially, they are willing to work as grassroots union cadres, 
because these positions confer them urban hukou (household registration 
status). At the same time, however, they consider their work as transitory. With 
their higher education, they have a greater chance of moving upward on the 
occupational ladder than people without qualifications. Hence, union work is 
only instrumental. The second group consists of local residents, who are 
uncompetitive in the local job market. They work for the official unions 
simply because they have no other options. For them, working as union cadres 
is more stable than private sector employment. At least, the official unions 
offer them decent social insurance plans to compensate for their low wages. 
Although most of them are unsatisfied with union work because of its dim 
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career mobility and low remuneration, they stick to their jobs. As a result, the 
strong instrumental motivation held by many union cadres certainly has a 
negative impact on their attitudes at work.      
 
  As grassroots agents of the state, union cadres have to handle pressures 
from both the official unions and enterprises. On the one hand, private 
enterprises have no legal obligation in cooperating with the official unions, as 
both laws and policies grant no enforcement authority to them. One the other 
hand, the unionization quota set by the official unions affect the career of 
union cadres. The official unions evaluate cadre performance to decide 
whether to renew contracts with them. Thus, in order to meet the assigned 
quota, union cadres have to use every possible means to persuade enterprises 
to cooperate with them. Union cadres have to bargain with private enterprises, 
and sometimes even beg for their cooperation, which makes law enforcement 
a de facto negotiation between state agents and capital. Unfortunately, in this 
negotiation, they are in a very weak position vis-à-vis the stronger societal 
actor, capital. 
 
  My fieldwork observations at various union offices show that union cadres 
fear enterprises and this fear erodes the quality of unionization from its root. 
Each time when I asked a union cadre to introduce members of some 
enterprise unions as my informants, the reply was “it may be OK if we have a 
 102 
good relationship with them”. The phrase, “good relationship”, was used very 
frequently and appeared to signal that the relationship between the official 
unions and enterprise unions is non-authoritative. At the same time, though, it 
also indicates a lack of confidence on the part of union cadres with regard to 
their relationship with enterprises. This mentality was evident among union 
cadres from both the higher and the lower level of the union system. When 
visiting a district-level union federation13, I asked a high-ranking union cadre 
to put me in touch with people from some enterprise unions who could serve 
as my informants. He immediately called a staff of a local enterprise union. 
After a friendly exchange of greetings with the latter, he told me that he could 
do nothing because the enterprise union did not allow research. If he continued 
to press on the enterprise union, their “good relationship” might be 
jeopardized.  
 
  Union cadres who bear the hostility of enterprises tend to harbor a strong 
resentment against enterprise unions, in particular those which are 
uncooperative. For many of them, doing work for unions fails not only to 
bring them empowerment but also respect. When I visited a sub-district union 
office, a union cadre made an utterly blunt complaint to me, venting that the 
official unions were “disadvantaged” groups which enterprises disregarded 
totally. Another union cadre from a community-level union office complained 
                                                        
13 In terms of administrative rank, district union federation is only one level below than municipal union 
federation. 
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that some enterprises did not grant her a door entry when she approached them 
for simple paperwork, showing no respect of her work. Some others felt their 
efforts were fruitless, no matter how hard they had worked. A disillusioned 
union cadre had resigned after working for three years for the official unions. 
She told me that she would soon start work as a legal assistant at a law firm, a 
career path which she regarded as more promising than union work. Aside 
from complaining about the low pay, she said that her work as a union cadre 
had failed to bring her any fulfillment. Her disillusion began when she realized 
that her hard work was doomed to be fruitless:   
 
“Between 2012-2015, I worked at this union office. Could you 
understand…as if I had done a lot work but with no obvious 
outcome. We worked very hard on organizing union 
activities...contacted union chairs…I remembered in 2012 when I 
just started my work, I visited enterprises one by one. I worked 
really hard. In the end, I felt my hard work produced no satisfying 
outcome.” (Interview 17) 
 
  As a result, some union cadres have developed an almost cynical attitude 
towards their work, which further compromises the quality of unionization. 
One union cadre hinted that she tried to reduce her face contacts with 
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enterprise unions as much as possible.14 She did not approach them unless it 
was necessary. When she was required to pass policy documents to enterprise 
unions, she inserted them into their mailboxes and then left straight away.  
 
  As the following subsection will show, the frustration of grassroots union 
cadres is rooted in the transformation in the relationship between the official 
unions and the private sector it seeks to represent. The economic reform has 
greatly empowered capital to dominate the factory regime at the expense of 
the state. 
 
4.4.2 Managerial Perception: Unionization as An Extraction 
 
A private enterprise’s rationale to cooperate with the state is contingent on its 
assessment of cost and benefit associated with the cooperation. Hostile 
enterprises tend to see unionization as an extraction imposed by the state, 
which incurs costs on them or invites an excessive amount of state 
intervention in their corporate governance. They also tend to perceive the 
costs of unionization as outweighing its benefits. Enterprises perceive 
unionization from two angles: financial burden and ideological resistance. 
Some enterprises reject unionization or maintain paperwork unions because 
they regard unionization, when it involves union due collection, as a financial 
                                                        
14 Field visit at a community union office (Bao’an District), March 19th, 2015.  
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liability. Others justify their resistance on ideological grounds, believing that 
unionization can empower labor to confront the management within their 




  Hostile enterprises see union dues as heavy burdens. Union due collection 
was an established practice in SOEs. After state-sponsored unionization spread 
to the private sector, the policy had been suspended for a long time because of 
enterprises’ resistance. Since the early 2000s, the ACFTU and the State 
Administration of Taxation (国家税务总局) have sought to enforce union due 
collection among private enterprises. As briefly mentioned in section 4.4.1, a 
new system of union due collection has been created to encourage 
inter-agency collaborations between the official unions and the local tax 
bureau in collecting union dues. The new system has three purposes. First, it 
involves the local-level tax bureau as a collaborative agency in union due 
collection. Second, the system integrates union due collection into a 
local-level taxation system to make its procedure more streamlined and 
transparent. Third, it encourages enterprises to pay taxes in tandem with union 
dues, which simplifies the collection procedure. Since 2002, the official 
unions in 29 provinces have started to collaborate with their local tax bureaus 
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to collect union dues.15 By 2013, most provinces, including Guangdong, were 
covered by the new collection system. These measures embody a renewed 
effort of the state to control in seeking to gain a financial control of enterprise 
unions. However, in a market economy, when a Leninist state attempts to 
translate intent to control into action, sometimes difficulty arises. Perceiving 
union due as a state-imposed extraction, many enterprises have resisted or 
evaded unionization. Their resistance has been quite effective. A union cadre 
from a sub-district union federation told me that among hundreds of unionized 
enterprises there were only 7-8 enterprises which paid their union dues 
(Interview 17).    
 
  Enterprises view their non-compliance justifiable. Union dues come from 
employers’ contributions, which constitute 2% of the monthly payroll of a 
firm. If fully enforced, it can become a financial burden on many SMEs with a 
tight budget. A human resource manager from a unionized enterprise told me 
that many enterprises resisted unionization because they are reluctant to pay 
union dues:  
 
“Money is the primary reason. Nowadays, enterprises are heavily 
burdened. [She then started to talk about union dues.] The total 
                                                        
15 Guangdongsheng shuiwu daishou gonghui jingfei gongzuozhengce jieda (The explanation to policies 
on tax bureau collecting union dues in Guangdong province). 
http://sd.gdltax.gov.cn/portal/site/site/portal/fzgb/sd/nrpage.portal?categoryId=GTNGFLAZ6DK5G97X
EIYBN37Z9FVJKE77&contentId=3BUZ6ETZXY973E0TJ6O6GR9BKHE7VBK1. (August 13th, 2013). 
Accessed on January 8th, 2017. 
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wage bill of our company exceeds RMB 3 million. 2% of it is 
RMB 160,000 per month and RMB 720,000 per year. How can it 
be possible?! The enterprise has been burdened too much. To be 
honest, I am not the boss and do not care about the high cost. The 
only concern we have is what if such a high cost crushes our 
enterprise?” (Interview 6) 
 
  The informant went on associate union dues with government corruption, 
arguing that union dues were just a miscellaneous extraction imposed by a 
corrupt government. Thus, her company purposefully kept their union at a 
paperwork status in order to avoid future union dues. As she remarked: 
 
“Although our firm has an enterprise union, we do not want our 
employees or outsiders to know its existence. We do not want to 
admit that we have a union. The primary reason is that we do not 
want to pay union dues. The money, if it stays in our own account, 
is nothing bad, right? Why should we pay union dues to the 
government? The government is so corrupt. Who knows where 





  Other enterprises see the union-induced extraction through an ideological 
lens. They dread that unionization may rally employees to confront the 
management in their firms. Unionization can complicate corporate governance 
by giving a voice to employees in the decision-making process of an 
enterprise. Thus, they try to minimize the space of union development. When 
interviewing the union chair of a paperwork union, who was appointed by the 
management, the informant informed me that his enterprise prevented its 
union from turning into an “authentic” labor organization. He worried that as 
the union developed it induced conflicts between employees and the 
management and created pressure on their human resource management:        
 
“An authentic union generates pressure on enterprises. From the 
perspective of human resource managers, unions represent 
employees’ interests and unite them in making demands. When 
their demands focus too much on wages and welfare, our human 
resource department will be put under pressure. It will become 
more difficult for the department to handle these claims. Thus, we 




  A union cadre from a community-level union federation in the downtown 
area of Shenzhen echoed the above informant. At the time of my visit, this 
part of the downtown area had almost completed its industrial upgrading from 
an industrial park to an entertainment hub. Newly-built restaurants had began 
to dominate the landscape by replacing factories at an accelerating pace. 
However, the industrial upgrading did not seem to promise a better future for 
unionization, as it became even more difficult for the official unions to 
organize workers in the tertiary sector whose work and life patterns were 
atomized and enterprise owners were unreceptive to unionization. The 
informant told me that it was extremely difficult to unionize enterprises if their 
management was aware of the union’s potential to mobilize employees to 
contest managerial authority. Thus, for many enterprises, avoiding 
unionization was a way out of this dilemma, as she commented:      
 
“You can see those private firms. Their bosses know nothing 
about unions. Some do know, but they will not unionize. They 
fear their employees would defend their rights through unions, 
just like those foreign unions did…enterprises are wary of this 
possibility.” (Interview 3) 
 
  An interesting observation from my fieldwork was that my informants often 
referred to “foreign unions” as ideal. In their imagination, foreign unions were 
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genuine labor organizations, whereas unions with “Chinese characteristics” 
were weak and useless. They saw unions in industrial democracies as adamant 
in defending labor rights and confronting bosses, but Chinese unions as 
unwilling to confront capital and the government. In reality, however, 
enterprises are wary of “unions with Chinese characteristics”. Once an 
enterprise is unionized, there is indeed a possibility for the state or employees 
to activate their union, when circumstances allow. A recent study of Vietnam, 
another Leninist state, suggests that the presence of enterprise unions, 
regardless of their qualities, increases the incidents of strikes in plants (Anner 
& Liu, 2016). Thus, for some enterprises, evading unionization or maintaining 
paperwork unions is the best means to halt any mobilization from within and 
outside.  
 
4.4.3 Subdued Agency of Union Leaders/Activists 
 
Whether a union leader or activist is present determines the likelihood and 
quality of unionization. Enterprise union leaders are the gatekeepers between 
enterprise and the official unions. They are the key agents, who can act as 
points of contact between enterprises and the official unions. Without the 
active cooperation from union leaders, it is difficult for the official unions to 
establish contact with enterprises. Responsive union leaders can facilitate the 
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compliance and cooperation of enterprises with the union policies. If union 
leaders are uninterested in facilitating information transfers between their 
enterprises and the official unions, it is very difficult for the official unions’ 
policies to reach the grassroots.        
 
  The connection between union leaders and the state poses a threat to 
enterprises which are hostile to unionization. As a result, they seek to suppress 
the emergence of potential union activists in order to counteract unionization. 
They do so often by appointing their loyal agents to “play” the role of union 
leaders. The appointed personnel are unlikely to represent their unions because 
they know the intent of their employers. These management-appointed union 
chairs have a strong incentive to shirk their responsibilities. A union cadre 
recounted to me a failed case of unionization, in which her attempts to identify 
union activists were eventually thwarted by the hostile management. 
According to her account, the management appeared to be cooperative at the 
beginning and agreed to appoint a union chair. However, the cooperation was 
merely nominal and soon gave a way to a chaotic situation. All appointed 
union chairs resigned after a few months and new employees were appointed 
to replace them. This circle repeated itself, as each newly appointed union 
chair tried to shirk his or her responsibility as soon as possible. This frequent 




 “He [the boss] let an administrative personnel to meet me…then, 
the union chair of the enterprise changed more than ten times. 
Every one pushed the issue away…the changes of union chairs 
were so frequent that neither signing collective contracts nor 
establishing an enterprise union was possible. ” (Interview 3) 
 
  Hostile enterprises not only attempt to control the appointment of union 
leaders but also actively suppress union activists who are responsive to state 
policies. When visiting a labor office16, I met a union chair who initially had 
been quite enthusiastic about his work for the union. He worked at a local 
rubber factory as a general worker. After unionization spread to the industrial 
park where his factory was located, his boss decided to create a paperwork 
union to stave off the pressure from the local government. In order to make the 
union compliant, the boss appointed our informant to be the union chair. 
Because they came from the same hometown, the boss seemed to trust him 
more than other migrant workers. Then, about a year ago, the official unions 
started to encourage the union chair to promote the fringe welfare of their 
employees such as organizing a few recreational activities for workers. The 
union chair was willing to set the initiative in motion, as it posed no harm to 
the firm and also gave him the chance to move his union a step forward. 
                                                        
16 Labor office is a grassroots branch of the sub-district government.   
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However, when he approached the boss with his proposal, the latter 
immediately rejected him responding sarcastically: “This is not a Socialist 
firm! We don't do union things!”. The blunt rejection from the boss forced the 
union chair to drop his proposal and the enterprise union remained a 
paperwork union. This event shows that in hostile enterprises it is highly likely 
that the agency of union leaders is suppressed.   
 
  In the above I have suggested that paperwork unions are unintended 
outcomes of state-sponsored unionization. As manifested in its causal pathway 
outlined in the preceding three sections, managerial perception is the 
predominant variable in explaining the impotence of unions, which preempts 
two other variables to activate union function. It seems that, when the 
enterprise management is determined to obstruct unionization, neither state 
intervention nor union leaders can overcome this structural barrier. The weak 
legal and political institutions further compound union weakness. The official 
unions are neither given any authority to enforce union laws and policies, nor 
can they empower union leaders to counteract the management’s hostility. 
Oppressed by a hostile management, enterprise union leaders are unable to 
activate union functions at the micro-level.      
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4.5 An Alternative Explanation: Workers’ Atomized Work and Life 
Patterns and Their Apathy towards Labor Organizations 
 
Most prior research attributes union weakness to the state, arguing that the 
state’s monopoly of union representation has disenfranchised the working 
class, which leads to labor’s apathy towards the official unions (Chan, 2010; 
Friedman, 2014). In particular, Friedman (2014) contends that the monopoly 
of the state on labor representation is the fundamental cause of the weakness 
of enterprise unions. Rather than organizing and mobilizing workers to 
become a countervailing force to capital, the state seeks to contain labor 
mobilizations through incorporating labor into enterprise unions affiliated with 
the official unions. This appropriated representation leaves workers 
disillusioned, as enterprise unions are too weak to represent labor and address 
labor grievances. The absence of representative organizations forces workers 
to resort to insurgency rather than “rationalized, legal channels” (p.20) such as 
enterprise unions to resist exploitation. Other research maintans that for 
migrant workers labor NGOs present an organizational alternative to 
enterprise unions and the official unions (Xu, 2013; Li & Liu, 2016). However, 
all these arguments rest on the questionable assumption that the formation of 
class organizations is a voluntary process, which takes workers’ participation 
in collective organizations for granted. Thus, it assumes that the repressive 
state is the only hindrance to the formation of genuine and autonomous labor 
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organizations. Once the state is removed, labor movements will thrive. 
 
  I argue that this state-centric explanation is inadequate because it fails to 
explain the weakness of labor organizations in China in two major ways. First 
of all, the existing literature has been inaccurate in its characterizing of 
manners in which Leninist states govern labor organizations. Leninist states do 
not repress labor movements but seeks to incorporate them into their Leninist 
institutions such as the official unions. Secondly, the extant literature fails to 
take account of the characteristics of the Chinese workforce when explaining 
the weakness of labor organizations. I argue that Chinese workers, most of 
whom are young migrant workers, are far from constituting a solidary class 
due to their atomized and highly fluid work and life patterns. They show little 
interest in collective organizations, and even if they do, their apathy toward 
associational life makes them unlikely to sustain any kind of labor 
organization, official or autonomous, at least at the current stage. 
 
  To elaborate on the first of the above, portraying the Leninist state as utterly 
repressive towards labor is not in line with the reality. In a market economy, 
communist parties seldom resort to hyper-repressive measures to handle 
worker unrests. Instead, the state tends to appease grieved workers by offering 
them compensations while dispersing radical mobilizations at the same time 
(Chen, 2003, 2009b, 2010). Moreover, the transitioning Leninist states have 
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been institutionally adaptive to the transformed industrial relations brought 
about by the economic reform and have demonstrated a strong capacity in 
improving labor institutions to absorb labor grievances (Clarke & Pringle, 
2009; Thireau & Hua, 2003; Tsui, 2009; Ho, 2009; Cooney, Biddulph & Zhu, 
2013). As Feng Chen points out, the Chinese Leninist state has succeeded in 
using two institutional means to preempt the emergence of a labor movement 
(Chen, 2009a). First, the state has maintained an effective governance of 
organizational behaviors and collective actions of workers, which weakens 
their ability to organize labor protests. Second, the state has engaged in a 
series of pro-labor legislation to address labor grievances which historically 
prompted labor movements to rise. Thus, if workers are disenchanted by the 
ineffectiveness of the labor institutions, they can actively seek support from 
NGOs or participate in labor organizations which are autonomous from the 
state. However, I find that workers are not devoted to the cause of NGOs as 
well. In fact, the new generation of Chinese workers is apathetic towards an 
associational life, whether it is organized by the official unions or any labor 
NGOs. Their apathy, as I argue, is caused by their atomized work and life 
patterns, which are antithetical to the workplace conditions conducive to the 
rise of a class awareness and identity as described in the classic literature.        
 
  In the literature on class formation, working class formation is portrayed as 
a rather linear and voluntary process (Marx, 1982). In this process, workers 
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develop class interests and acquire a working class identity first, before they 
participate in struggles and mobilization, and finally develop their own 
organizations (FIGURE 4.1). Sharing a common interest and identity makes 
workers aware of their social and economic difference from other social 
groups. Cementing a common identity encourages them to mobilize against 
exploitation. Mobilization in turn cultivates a solidarity among workers, which 
eventually leads to the formation of class organizations such as trade unions.  
 
FIGURE 4.1 A Classic Narrative of Working Class Formation 
 
  This narrative is based largely on the industrial life of workers of the past. 
The question that arises then it to what extent does this classic account capture 
the experience of contemporary Chinese workers? Historically, industrial 
work constituted an important part of individual and collective identities of 
workers (Bauman, 1998). Starting work in their youthful years and finally 
becoming veterans, workers gradually acquired the knowledge to control the 
production process after accruing skills from their work (Montgomery, 1979). 
Their superior industrial knowledge enabled them to acquire a degree of 
autonomy in factories (Montgomery, 1979), which formed the basis of their 




Formation of class 
organizations
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organizations and mobilization. A distinct feature of early factory work was 
the stability of workplace and the long tenure of workers. Their lifelong tenure 
at a single workplace allowed these early industrial workers to accumulate 
knowledge and skills and to develop a strong attachment to their fellow 
workers, thereby creating the possibility of collective resistance and identity. 
However, this prototypical workplace condition ceased to exist after the 
spread of global capitalism to the developing world after the Second World 
War. 
 
  What dominates the industrial landscape of China nowadays (as well as that 
in other developing countries) are SMEs. These firms compete with each other 
on low labor costs and thin profit margins. They tend to have a very short 
lifespan which usually lasts around 2 years, because of fierce market 
competition and their precarious market shares. The cost and market 
competitions wipe out eliminated firms quickly. Because SMEs make up the 
majority of employers in the private sector, the precarious nature of their 
production renders workplaces and workforce today highly unstable. For 
example, Li (2014) studied the job mobility of young migrant workers, who at 
present constitute 60% of migrant workers in China. He found that these 
workers work stay an average of 2-4 years at a single workplace. They 
frequently move among different low-paying and low-skilled jobs and have 
hardly any opportunity of upward mobility. This occupational immobility 
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further exacerbates their horizontal mobility in an increasingly hopeless search 
for better jobs. Their precarious employment patterns, as I argue, are 
detrimental to the formation of a class identity and organizations, discouraging 
them from developing an emotional attachment to a single workplace and to a 
relatively stable group of co-workers.  
 
  Moreover, as compared to the older generation of migrant workers, young 
workers are much more elusive and less physically resilient. Research 
ethnographies, media biographies 17  and my own fieldwork confirm that 
young workers quit their jobs easily due to their physical frailty and also 
because they have less subsistence pressure (Chan, 2010; Li, 2014). 
Immediately after arriving at Shenzhen, I rented a studio flat in the heart of its 
metropolitan area. My rental included an in-room cleaning service. Twice a 
week, a janitor came to clean my room, collected my trash, and changed my 
bed sheets. Soon, I got acquainted with her and got to know the story of her 
family. Her family’s situation was typical among migrant workers. All her 
family members – her husband and two sons – were working or had 
previously worked in cities. After she learned that I was a doctoral student 
with teaching experience, she started to complain about the laziness of her 
younger son to me. According to her, her younger son was not hardworking at 
                                                        
17 Ding Yan, Wangyi renjian (163 in the world). 
http://renjian.163.com/16/0628/16/BQLLB1CN000153N3.html. (June 28th, 2016). Accessed on 
December 12th, 2016. The columnist, Ding Yan (丁燕), has written extensively on young migrant 
workers’ work and life in the Pearl River Delta. She has published two novels and several biographies 
about young migrant workers in Guangdong. 
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school and showed little interest in learning workplace skills. Through his 
mother’s connection, the boy entered a local factory but quit his job soon 
thereafter. After his withdrawal, instead of looking for a new job, the boy 
wandered around the town and spent his leisure time in Internet bars. When 
his money was used up, he returned to his mother and asked for more. The 
janitor described her son as “playing with his cellphone all the time; having no 
interest in work or learning workplace skills; reliant on his parents”.  
 
  Thus, compared to their parents, young migrant workers have more freedom 
and less subsistence pressure, but their work and life patterns seems not 
promising for the germination of class power. Fluid and alienating workplaces 
diminish the possibility of young workers to form an emotional attachment to 
a single workplace and co-workers, which can develop only after a long and 
stable tenure. In the day, exhausting factory work consumes all their energy. 
Many of them do not even have a chance to talk to fellow workers who live in 
the same dormitory. On weekends, cellphones and Internet bars occupy most 
of their leisure time.18 As their factory work becomes more impersonal, their 
life becomes more atomized.  
 
  The fluidity and atomization of the life of young workers make any 
organizing efforts of official unions and labor NGOs largely ineffective. The 
                                                        
18 Ding Yan, Dongguan gongchang de nangong sushe (Male dormitory in a factory of Dongguan). 
http://renjian.163.com/16/0628/16/BQLLB1CN000153N3.html. (June 28th, 2016). Accessed on 
December 12th, 2016. 
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official unions specialize in providing educational services to workers 
(Chapter 5), while labor NGOs provide them legal assistance. Both parties 
attempt to organize migrant workers under their own banners, but neither of 
them can claim a success. The apathy among workers has left a strong 
impression on union cadres and NGOs activists. They feel disheartened by the 
lack of interest the workers show for their services and programs, even though 
these were created for their benefit. One grassroots union cadre complained to 
me as follows:     
 
“We have no way to force them – those kids aged 17 or 18, so 
called ‘born in 1990s’. They don’t think our programs are 
interesting. It is very difficult for us to absorb them into our 
programs. If they feel that attending seminars or vocational 
training sessions is uninteresting, they will not come. We can do 
nothing about it. Then, we asked them – what kind of training 
sessions would you like to see in the future? They replied – 
‘nothing, just nothing’.” (Interview 11) 
 
  Similarly, a labor NGOs activist told me that it was difficult to organize 
young workers on weekends because they preferred individual entertainment 
to group activities:   
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“Young workers have more entertainment options now, unlike 
workers in the previous decades who only had some books to read 
in their free time. For example, we had some training sessions to 
educate them about the labor law. Although we told them these 
sessions were free and relevant to their work, they showed no 
interest. They have more choices to have fun instead.” (Interview 
20) 
 
  Some workers do utilize the services provided by labor NGOs, but display 
no commitment to the long-term agendas of these organizations such as 
building up the associational power of labor. I asked two NGOs activists to 
respond to the same interview question: did they think that migrant workers 
constituted a class, or did they have the potential to develop class solidarity? 
Their answers were almost identical but negative. Both informants suggested 
that workers were highly rational and tried to maximize the short-term utility 
of NGOs. However, they had little interest and commitment to promote the 
long-term interests of workers similar to them. After these workers addressed 
their own grievances with the help from NGOs, few of them stayed to assist 
other workers. Workers are not only apathetic to labor organizations, but also 
to other workers. Thus, it is too early to claim that Chinese workers have 
created a class solidary. The working class formation in China is still 
underway. The responses of the two informants to my question can shed 
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further light on this important interpretation: 
 
“Class is a deep [concept], which means workers have a 
self-aware identity, a collective and common [identity]. Most 
workers came to us to seek help on individual grievances and they 
left after having their own problems solved. This is a group, but 
not yet at the level of a class.” (Interview 20) 
 
“I regard the Chinese working class today as a disadvantaged 
group. I have seen many workers only concern about their own 
individual interests. After solving his own problem, he will no 
longer care about this group [migrant workers]. He will continue 
his life in another environment. Many workers have this problem 
– the lack of solidarity. Only a handful of them will show concern 
about other migrant workers or other groups of disadvantaged 
people. Most of them cease to be concerned about this group after 
solving their own problems. We help a lot of workers every year. 
Only a handful of them continue to show interest on the group of 
migrant workers and most do not.” (Interview 18) 
 
  To summarize, this section triangulates the different sources of data to 
re-examine the weakness of labor organizations in light of the characteristics 
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of workers themselves. I argue that the fluidity and atomization of workers’ 
life and their apathy can account significantly for the weakness of unions in a 
market economy. Although I do not intend to displace the state-centric 
argument which pins union weakness to the representation monopoly of the 
official unions (Friedman, 2014), I argue that this argument is far from 
sufficient to explain why it is equally difficult for labor NGOs to organize 
workers. My data suggests that when the structural condition is held constant 
it is workers’ apathy towards labor organizations, official or non-official, that 
can be held accountable for the weakness of these organizations. 
 
  A broader argument I can make is that the working class formation in China 
stalls at the first stage of the classic model (see, FIGURE 4.1). Chinese 
workers have not been able to form a common interest and identity. Lacking 
unification by a common identity, workers’ resistance is largely exercised 
through their individual pursuit of justice (e.g. utilizing legal institutions) or 
unorganized insurgencies (e.g. wildcat strikes). Without a class identity, 
workers are unlikely to identify labor organizations as their base of resistance 
and struggles. As a result, the official unions and labor NGOs become two 
among many utilitarian instruments for them to pursue their individual justice. 
 
  The 30 years of rapid industrialization in China has not been promising in 
the making of proletariats and their organizations. Migrant workers have come 
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and left. They have barely left any trait on the urban political landscape, 
although they have transformed the physical landscape in cities with their 
sweats and blood. They contribute to the majority of registered labor disputes 
and labor unrests but seldom attempt to institutionalize their resistance 
through sustainable organizations. They have become active in leveraging 
litigation to pursue their individual justice (Lee, 2007), but few of them have 
shown an interest in pursuing collective justice through organizational means. 
Both the state and independent labor organizations attempt to organize them, 




This chapter has investigated how the Leninist state fails to create effective 
labor organizations in some part of the private sector. I argue that paperwork 
unions are unintended outcomes of the state-sponsored unionization. The 
emergence of paperwork unions is associated initially with a refrained state 
intervention, hostile enterprises, and subsequently the subdued agency of 
union leaders. I have drawn on interview data from enterprise union chairs and 
union cadres to show that hostile enterprises can overcome the pressure of 
unionization from the state and insulate their factory regimes from state 
intervention. The weakness of the state is further demonstrated by its 
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reluctance to supply a supportive legal and political institution to the official 
unions in their governance of enterprise unions. Without an authority to 
enforce laws and policies, the official unions have to negotiate unionization 
with capital from an inferior position. At the micro-level, the official unions’ 
weakness cripples their ability to empower enterprise union leaders or activists 
to counteract management’s hostility. Nevertheless, paperwork unions do 
reflect an attempt of the state to contest managerial despotism in order to 
recreate stability in the society. For that purpose, the state has abandoned its 
laissez-fair policy and become increasingly pro-active in intervening in 
industrial relations in the private sector. Thus, the emergence of these unions 
indicates the state’s intention to promote labor rights in tandem with economic 
growth, rather than a state-capital conspiracy. 
 
  On the other hand, the presence of paperwork unions suggests that the 
Leninist state has failed to transform the internal environment of capitalist 
production in some part of the private sector, where capital has created its own 
domain of dominance to compromise state intervention. Perceiving 
unionization as an extraction, hostile enterprise owners are unlikely to accept 
enterprise unions being established within their firms, which hold the potential 
to undermine managerial authority and invite state intervention into their 
factory regimes.  
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  At the end of this chapter, I offer an alternative explanation of union 
weakness. I argue that the state-centric view is not sufficient to explain 
workers’ apathy to labor organizations, official or non-official. I contend that 
the characteristics of migrant workers – fluidity, atomization and apathy – 
account for a significant part of the union weakness. The root causes are that 
Chinese workers do not yet constitute a solidary class and acquire a strong 
identification with labor organizations of any sort. They are more interested in 
pursuing individual justice, rather than collective justice which demands 
higher personal costs and commitment. 









This chapter investigates the mechanism of formation of managerial unions 
and their intra-case variance. Managerial unions19 are the unions, which 
acquire a basic organizational structure and are capable of promoting fringe 
welfare of employees. The past research regards managerial unions as 
irrelevant to workers because of managerial dominance (Liu, 2009, 2010). 
Based on my research, I argue that managerial dominance does not make 
managerial unions irrelevant to workers. With a managerial consent and an 
active union leadership, these unions can improve fringe welfare 20  of 
employees and promote a limited degree of industrial democracy within their 
firms. However, managerial unions share an institutional weakness. They are 
incapable of supporting the interest-based claims of employees, because they 
do not possess collective action power.  
 
  The chapter is organized as following. Section 5.2 describes the institutional 
                                                        
19 Managerial union has the largest share in my samples. 9 out of 17 enterprises are categorized as 
managerial unions.  
20 Fringe welfare marginally improves employees’ economic wellbeing and increases their identification 
with employers. It refers to mini-benefits distributed by or through enterprise unions such as recreational 
activities and festival gifts. 
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features of managerial unions. Section 5.3 explains their mechanism of 
formation. Section 5.4 investigates the intra-case variance of these unions. 
Section 5.5 is the conclusion.     
 
5.2 Institutional Features of Managerial Unions 
 
Two institutional features mark managerial unions from two other variances of 
union efficacy. As compared to paperwork unions (Chapter 4), managerial 
unions represent a significant institutional departure. They are more 
organizationally and functionally developed. They transfer state resources to 
enterprises and seek to promote fringe welfare of their employees. Sometimes, 
they can even support their rights-based claims such as supervising enterprises 
in law compliance. As compared to proto-economic unions (Chapter 6), 
managerial unions are unable to confront the management in supporting the 
interest-based claims of their employees, because they do not possess 
collective action power.      
 
  First of all, managerial unions establish points of contact between the state 
and private enterprises, allowing the two parties to exchange information and 
resources. Through managerial unions, the official unions transfer union 
resources to unionized enterprises (Interview 25). Second, managerial unions 
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promote a limited degree of industrial democracy, which can eventually 
increases the fringe welfare of employees. When staffed by competent union 
leaders, these unions can become a platform for their employees and the 
management to discuss and debate issues relating to the implementation of 
union policies. Third, as a distinct institutional weakness, managerial unions 
are incapable of supporting the interest-based claims of their employees. 
Namely, they are unable to support their employees’ claims which are beyond 
what the law has stipulated. Making interest-based claims requires unions to 
leverage their collective action power to pressurize capital and the state into 
concessions. Unfortunately, managerial unions lack the capacity to organize 
collective actions to bargain with management. As a result, they seek 
conciliation, rather than confrontation, with their host enterprises.  
 
5.3 Explaining Managerial Unions  
 
I argue that the emergence of managerial unions is made possible by two 
structural-level factors, an exerted state intervention and friendly enterprises, 
and one agent-level factor, a constrained, middleman-type union leadership. At 
the structural level, managerial unions emerge in friendly enterprises which 
regard state intervention in a form of unionization as a resource. The contacts 
between the state and the unions thus allow information and state resources to 
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be transferred to unionized enterprises. At the agent level, friendly enterprises 
tend to tolerate a union leadership which can make unionization beneficiary to 
their firms, but without incurring excessive costs.  
 
5.3.1 Exerted State Intervention 
 
In the private sector, if the Leninist state wants less resistance and more 
cooperation with unionization, it has to exert its intervention in a delicate 
manner. The delicacy can be seen in the ways in which the official unions 
increase incentives on the part of private enterprises, which induce the latter to 
cooperate with unionization. Nevertheless, whether or not an incentive is 
created depends on the ways in which the official unions approach these 
private firms. The primary means for the official unions to do so is to increase 
material incentives of unionization. The official unions approach these 
enterprises as a provider of services and resources. Aside from service 
provision, the official unions provide technical support to enterprise unions’ 
organizational development.  
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Doling out material incentives to enterprises 
 
  Since the current legal and political institutions are not supportive of the 
enforcement of the Trade Union Law (Chapter 4), the official unions have to 
rely on incentive-generating measures to retain enterprises’ cooperation. One 
major means of doing so is to dole out material incentives to unionized 
enterprises by transferring union resources to enterprise unions, which 
eventually benefits their host enterprises. Thus, it is not surprising to see that 
many enterprises welcome unionization because they can receive resources 
from the official unions (Interview 29). Among the most important resources 
provided by the official unions are educational ones. Educational resources are 
welcomed most among enterprises. 
 
  The ACFTU had tradition of providing educational services to workers 
from the early 1950s (Ni, 1997). The early Chinese working class, largely 
illiterate and unskilled, failed to match the image of the most advanced class 
as depicted in Marxism. The problem of workforce quality compelled the 
ACFTU to create a system of education and vocational training in the 1950s. 
The education system sought to guarantee workers a sufficient amount of time 
for an elementary-level education and vocational training. Unions were in 
charge of mobilizing and organizing workers to participate in these 
educational and training programs. For example, many large enterprise unions 
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had their own schools and teachers, which delivered literacy courses to 
workers (Interview 4). After the Cultural Revolution, the ACFTU resumed its 
educational function, which had been suspended during the ten-year turmoil. 
However, the problem of workforce quality has not been alleviated, if not 
aggravated. A 2009 research shows that the average year of school attainment 
in China was 8.5, indicating that most Chinese have attained only a junior 
high-level of schooling (Chen, 2011). What makes this problem even more 
acute is the 2008 financial crisis. The economic crisis has triggered a wave of 
relocation of labor-intensive industries from South China to Southeast Asian 
countries where labor cost is lower. Since then, China has started to lose its 
comparative advantage and is compelled to find an alternative path of 
economic growth.  
 
  The financial crisis has exposed a weak spot of Chinese economy: an 
overreliance on cheap, unskilled and undereducated labor and a lack of 
technological innovation. In order to address this structural weakness, the 
central government has initiated a series of policies to promote workforce 
quality since 2008.21 In this initiative, the ACFTU-led official unions are 
given a special attention and are designated as the key to promote workforce 
quality of the whole country. According to a 2008 resolution of the ACFTU, 
                                                        
21 State Council, Guowuyuan guanyu jiakuai fazhan xiandai zhiyejiaoyu de jueding (The decision of the 
State Council on accelerating the development of vocational education). 
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2014-06/22/content_8901.htm. (May 2nd, 2014). Accessed on May 
26th, 2016. 
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the official unions are committed to promote unions as “big schools” (工会“大
学校”) for cultivating an army of high-quality workforce to meet the new 
international competition on human resources.22 The initiative serves four 
groups of labor: employees from the enterprises struck by the financial crisis, 
migrant workers, unemployed, and new labor force.23 Migrant workers are 
particularly targeted. Through a project called “Dream Action” (求学圆梦行
动), the official unions aim for assisting these migrant workers to acquire 
college degrees or polytechnic diplomas. According to the ACFTU’s reports, 
the official unions in various provinces have actively expanded the scope and 
coverage of Dream Action since the first half of 2010s. For example, since 
2011, the Beijing Federation of Trade Unions starts to fund college tuition fees 
of migrant workers, helping more than 1,500 migrant workers obtain college 
degrees.24 The Guangzhou Federation of Trade Unions has invested RMB 
10-20 million in subsidizing employees’ expenses in pursuing higher 
degrees.25 
 
  As the manufacturing hub of China and the world, Shenzhen was heavily 
struck by the financial crisis. After the crisis, the city’s comparative advantage 
                                                        
22 AFCTU, Guanyu chongfen fahui gonghui”daxuexiao” zuoyong tigao zhigongduiwu zhengtisuzhi de 
jueyi (The decision with regard to the role of union “big school” in promoting workforce quality). 
http://ghxj.acftu.org/template/10001/file.jsp?cid=86&aid=2527. (December 30th, 2008). Accessed on 
January 15th, 2017. 
23 ACFTU, Kaizhan “qiuxue yuanmeng xingdong” youguan qingkuang (With regard to the Dream 
Action). 
http://www.moe.edu.cn/jyb_xwfb/xw_fbh/moe_2069/xwfbh_2016n/xwfb_160324_02/160324_sfcl02/20




gradually worn away, as its export-driven and labor-intensive sector declined. 
It has become increasingly urgent for the local government to bail the city out 
of its economic downturn by seeking an alterative and sustainable path of 
development. Shenzhen has thus embarked on an industrial upgrading in order 
to create a technology-based economy. In this effort, the municipal official 
union, the Shenzhen Federation of Trade Unions (SFTU), becomes an 
important ally of the local government. Since 2008, the SFTU has invested 
more than RMB 35 million in vocational training, assisting 5,300 migrant 
workers to obtain college degrees.26 By 2015, the SFTU has provided 607 
training sessions and workshops to enterprises, benefiting more than 70,000 
employees.27 
 
  The SFTU provides two kinds of educational resources to unionized 
enterprises and union members, which are free or heavily subsidized.28 The 
first one (as mentioned above) is diploma/degree training (学历培训). The 
second one is skills training (技能培训 ). The diploma/degree training 
provides tuition subsidies to migrant workers and local residents, enabling 
them to acquire college degrees or polytechnic diplomas at a very low cost. 
                                                        
26 Ibid. 
27 SFTU, Shenzhenshi zonggonghui 2015 niandu fagui shishi qingkuang de baogao (The report on law 
implementation of SFTU in 2015). 
http://www.szrd.gov.cn/UserFiles/File/%E9%99%84%E4%BB%B610%EF%BC%9A%E5%B8%82%E
6%80%BB%E5%B7%A5%E4%BC%9A.doc. Accessed on January 3rd, 2017.    
28 Ibid. However, the policy places some limitations on the status of applicants. In order to be eligible 
for the subsidies provided by the SFTU, an enterprise must satisfy two conditions: 1) acquiring union 
registration, and 2) paying union dues according to the law and regulations. For individuals, an eligible 
applicant must be 1) a union member and 2) having a labor contract with an employer for at least one 
year. Although the policy requires enterprises to pay union dues, in practice this requirement is relaxed to 
benefit enterprises which have not paid.    
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Successful applicants are required to attend weekend courses at SFTU’s 
vocational training schools. The program lasts for three years but costs only 
RMB 2,000 (USD 290) per person (Interview 17). Upon completing 
coursework and passing final exams, students will be conferred degrees or 
diplomas in business management or accounting by reputable public 
universities. Because of its low cost and long-term benefit, the program has 
become very popular among employees. It provides not only an opportunity 
for them to obtain an upward mobility but also fosters their interest and 
awareness in continuing education. A union cadre who was in charge of this 
program told me a case in which a union member benefited greatly from the 
program:  
 
“At the beginning, she [the union member] told me that she was 
interested in attending the entrance exam. However, she was not 
confident. An applicant must pass the entrance exam before he or 
she can submit his or her application…for those people who have 
left school for more than a decade, [the exam] is really a painful 
endeavor. This is common among company employees…I 
encouraged her to try…[in the end] she benefited enormously 
from the program. For her, the most important thing during the 
3-year program was of knowing a large group of middle-aged 
students similar to her. The education experience had broadened 
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their horizons.” (Interview 17) 
 
  The above personal experience shows that the union-funded education not 
only provides an affordable experience of continuing education to employees 
but also challenges their old perceptions of education. Many believed that one 
should stop studying after having left school. It is embarrassing for 
middle-aged people to pursue education, which is often stigmatized, as the 
society regards education as a young man’s endeavor.  
 
  The second kind of educational resource which the official unions provide 
to unionized enterprises is skills training. Unlike the degree/diploma training 
program which targets individual employees, the skills training program 
serves enterprises directly. This program responds to an increasing demand for 
skilled labor from enterprises after 2008, and addresses this demand through 
offering a series of short-term skills training sessions, workshops and lectures 
to enterprise employees. It aims to impart hands-on skills and 
occupation-related knowledge to employees in the fastest manner. I attended 
one of their workshops on teamwork building in May 2015. The workshop 
was held at the SFTU’s school. The participants came from unionized 
enterprises. The workshop adopted an innovative measure to teach the essence 
of a modern corporate culture. The lecturer used games to train participants in 
workplace relations management and teamwork. The workshop’s creativity 
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impressed many participants, as one union member from a local state-owned 
enterprise told me that the session was much more interesting than she 
assumed.    
 
  The skills training sessions are organized in two ways, which are tailored to 
specific needs of enterprises. These sessions are held at private vocational 
training schools or at enterprises, depending on enterprises’ demands and 
convenience. On the one hand, the SFTU has contracted with private training 
agencies to provide services to enterprises. These contractors tend to try their 
best to find lecturers capable of delivering lectures with quality and 
enthusiasm, because they want to secure their contracts with the state in the 
future. Delivering state resources through private sector actors allows market 
selection to weed out ill-performing agencies, which improves the quality of 
the union-funded educational service. On the other hand, many workshops and 
lectures are held directly at particular enterprises. Enterprises can select 
among a variety of sessions/workshops which match the needs and interests of 
their employees and then apply to the official unions for the delivery of 
selected services. What enterprise unions need to is to solicit logistical support 
such as venues and stationery from enterprises and to encourage employees to 
participate.  
 
  Nevertheless, a precondition exits for those enterprises which intend to 
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utilize state resources. The precondition is unionization. Having a minimally 
functioning union is the precondition for an enterprise to receive state 
resources. The exclusion indicates an intention of the state to increase the 
incentive of unionization among enterprises while at the same time keeping 
out free riders. State resources can be offered to enterprises for free, if the 
latter consents to establish enterprise unions in their firms. PICTURE 5.1 
shows the latest flyer of SFTU’s skills training program. The flyer states: “we 
train employees in teamwork, innovation, efficient communication, and 
self-management. We provide door-to-door services with pragmatic contents, 












PICTURE 5.1 2017 Flyer for Skills Training Program of the SFTU 
 
 
  As unionization brings resources, it is reasonable for many enterprises to 
take the “bite”. Hence, the incentive for an enterprise to have a functioning 
union increases as it expects unionization to channel resources from the state. 
Thus, in friendly firms, enterprise unions are allowed to develop a limited set 
of functions and a basic organizational structure so as to facilitate the transfer 
of resources and information from the official unions.     
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Organizational guidance from the official unions 
 
  Through doling out material incentives, the official unions implicitly 
encourage enterprises to develop the organizations of their enterprise unions. 
After acquiring more developed forms, enterprise unions can better facilitate 
resource and information transfers between the state and enterprises. However, 
the organizational development of unions is never an easy task, if the technical 
support from the official unions is absent. This is because most employers and 
employees in the private sector lack a basic knowledge of unions. They have 
no idea of any technical aspect of union operation such as union’s organization, 
union finance, union election, and so on. Thus, the official unions monopolize 
the spread of union knowledge.  
 
  In terms of developing union organization, the official unions do provide a 
template to enterprise unions and expect them to adapt. In this template, an 
enterprise union consists of 5-6 union committees. 29  Each of these 
committees takes charge of a specific area of union activity related to work 
and live of employees. In terms of staffing, an enterprise union is led by a 
chair and a vice-chair. Union committee members lead their respective 
committees. These people form the core of a union. Union chairs and 
                                                        
29 The full title of the document is “notice with regard to strengthening the formalization of grassroots 
union committees” [关于加强基层工会委员会规范化建设的通知]. The document offers a glimpse of 
what the official unions expect from enterprise union chairs in strengthening union organization. I 
obtained this document from a union chair.  
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vice-chairs designate specific tasks to committee members and coordinate 
with them to achieve specific goals. PICTURE 5.2 shows the full-fledged 
organization of an enterprise union. The union consists of a chair, a vice-chair, 
and five committee members. The chair and vice-chair are main union leaders 
and lead the committee of labor dispute resolutions. In each committee, 
sub-organizations are created to perform specific functions. The committee for 
entertainment, for example, has two sub-organizations – dance team and choir 
– to organize recreational activities for their employees. “Workers home” (职
工之家) is housed by the committee for workers’ life, which is a venue for 
workers to communicate their workplace concerns to their union in order to 
seek a suggestion or solution. The informant who showed me this 
organizational chart is one of the union’s committee members. She told me 
that the union’s organization was developed under the guidance of its parent 
official union.  
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PICTURE 5.2 Organization of A Full-fledged Enterprise Union 
  
  In reality, the organizational development of managerial unions is highly 
uneven due to the differences in degree of managerial consent, size of their 
host enterprises, number of their employees, and commitment of union leaders. 
In my research, enterprise unions with a relatively developed form tend to 
appear in large, foreign-invested enterprises. For many other nascent unions, 
their organizations are primitive and, oftentimes, their union chairs are the 
only union staff. 
 
  The development of a union’s organization facilitates state surveillance of 
industrial relations at the firm level. First, the more organizationally developed 
a union is, the more it needs to maintain contacts with the official unions. 



















and knowledge from the state to private enterprises. They set up a model for 
other less developed unions to adapt. For a toddler union, the process of 
learning may take years and require a huge effort and commitment from union 
leaders. Sophisticated union functions such as making union budgets and 
holding union elections require a technical support from the official unions as 
well as an active learning on the part of union leaders. In other words, 
ordinary people tend to have no idea of what unions are and what they do. 
Only the state, as represented by the official unions, has the legitimacy to 
impart union ideology to employees and employers. Although the 
state-sponsored unionization aims to create unions which are responsive to 
state policies, the very process itself has facilitated the spread of union 
ideology to people who were previously ignorant of labor organizations. A 
union committee member told me that their enterprise union has evolved 
institutionally throughout these years because he and other union leaders have 
constantly learned from its parent official union:    
 
“We have learned gradually. Since this year we’ve started to learn 
how to make a union budget. In the past, our union budget and 
our company budget were merged…now we start to consider 
union budgeting, which means we will spend what we have. Thus, 
this is a slow learning process.” (Interview 29) 
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  Second and the more important, the more organizationally developed a 
union is, the more it becomes legible to the state. As a union becomes more 
legible to the state, the more its functions and activities are exposed to state 
surveillance and require the latter’s legitimization. It also means that the more 
a union becomes organizationally and functionally developed, the more its 
staff needs state recognition. For example, the election of union leaders 
requires the endorsement from the official unions. Without state endorsement, 
union election is illegal by law. The official unions also keep particulars of 
union committee members. This allows the state to more effectively monitor 
industrial relations in the private sector through enterprise union leaders who 
have a regular contact with the official unions.   
 
5.3.2 Managerial Perception: Unionization as A Resource 
 
When enterprises perceive state intervention as channeling resources into them, 
they tend to be open to unionization. This section identifies two kinds of 
resource which incentivize enterprises to embrace unionization. Some 
enterprises perceive unionization as an intangible resource, which confers 
legitimacy and social recognition on them in a survival-stricken market. Some 
others perceive unionization as a tangible resource, which channels state 
resources such as union-funded education and training into them.  
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Unionization as an intangible resource 
 
  My research suggests that most enterprises conform to the unionization 
policy out of a concern of legitimacy, instead of being driven by material 
incentives. As my later intra-case analysis will show, 8 out 9 union leaders 
whom I interviewed regarded legitimacy as their firms’ primary reason to 
unionize, which is followed by the concern of corporate development (see also 
at TABLE 5.1). In particular, FIEs and public-holding enterprises tend to see 
unionization as a legal necessity. This is not surprising that FIEs are subject to 
a much more stringent monitoring and supervision from the local state 
authority than domestic enterprises (Interview 1). Thus, unionization 
demonstrates their willingness to conform to laws and regulations in their host 
country. My interview with a union leader was revealing of this serious 
concern of legitimacy held by FIEs. When comparing the operating 
environment of FIEs to that of domestic enterprises, the informant said that the 
operating environment of FIEs was more rigid than that of domestic firms:   
 
“In general, FIEs tend to be relatively law-abiding. In order to 
survive and develop here, FIEs usually have to do this [abiding 
the law]. FIEs are concerned more about the long-term corporate 
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development here, so they tend to be more attentive to 
[maintaining] a harmonious labor relation.” (Interview 9) 
 
  While FIEs see unionization as a legal requirement to comply with, 
public-holding enterprises internalize this concern of legitimacy. 
Public-holding enterprises 30  are former SOEs which restructured their 
ownership in conformity with the market reform. These enterprises feature an 
ownership structure in which the state holds less than 50% of their total shares 
while the rest are sold to the public. However, even after these enterprises go 
listed on stock markets, they retain enterprise culture and employment practice 
of their SOE predecessors. Thus, in these firms, unions are created by default, 
meaning that enterprise unions are almost at the same age as their hosting 
enterprises (Interview 26). Union laws and policies are strictly followed, union 
elections highly routinized, and held on a 3 or 4 years basis (Interview 26; 
Interview 21). These enterprises pay union dues regularly to fund the 
recreational activities of their employees (Interview 26; Interview 22). Their 
willingness to abide by the law is best demonstrated in case of PHU-1. 
PHU-1’s hosting enterprise is a leading producer in the glass industry of South 
China. In 2006, the ACFTU issued a policy to ban the deputy director of an 
enterprise from concurrently holding the position of union chair, which seeks 
to reduce managerial interference in union operation. The enterprise 
                                                        
30 I consider public-holding enterprises, as broadly defined, private enterprises, because they are not 
controlled by the state and their operation conforms to the market. 
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immediately complied with the new policy, removed its deputy director from 
the union, and re-elected a new union chair (Interview 21).  
 
  Enterprises embrace unionization also because of the need of corporate 
development, which is often intertwined with their concern of legitimacy. In 
my research, corporate development seems to be a strong internal factor which 
incentivizes enterprise’s management to support its union’s operation. For 
some managers, union development is compatible with their enterprises’ 
long-term corporate development. Sometimes, the support from the 
management is so decisive that it can transform a paperwork union into a 
managerial union. TAI-2 offers a typical example of this management-driven 
union development. TAI-2’s hosting enterprise is Taiwanese-invested, which 
specializes in providing catering service. The company employs more than 
1,000 employees in Shenzhen. In 2012, it established TAI-2 after being 
persuaded by a local official union. In the first two years since its creation, 
TAI-2 was nothing more than a paperwork union. Nevertheless, the turning 
point came in 2014, when the general manager – one of the shareholders of the 
company – decided to appoint a full-time union chair to run the union. The 
general manager anticipated TAI-2 to play a role in cultivating employees’ 
loyalty to the hosting enterprise. The management soon appointed a full-time 
union chair and started to pay union dues, which allowed TAI-2 to have a 
regular amount of funding. As commented by TAI-2’s union chair, the 
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management was supportive of union activities because it expected the union 
to serve employees and the enterprise’s long-term interest:    
 
“Our general manager is one of the bosses. The creation of the 
union and the appointment of a full-time union chair were 
supported by him…He was hoping that…the enterprise had been 
overwhelmingly focusing on work, profitability and operation, but 
there was no single [organ within the firm] to promote welfare, 
training and career development of employees. As a consequence, 
it has led many things to happen. Employees’ complaints, high 
turnover rates, and some bad ‘habits’ [of employees]…for 
example, everyone wanted to claim some money from the firm 
when he or she was leaving. They confronted the firm without 
showing any gratitude. Thus, he hoped that the union could take 
care of these issues which were beyond what the enterprise had 
anticipated.” (Interview 24)    
 
Unionization as a tangible resource  
 
  In my research, a small number of enterprises perceive unionization as 
purely a tangible resource which they can opportunistically utilize. For these 
firms, a modicum of state intervention is welcome so long as it provides them 
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needed resources while incurring no cost. Thus, in order to become the 
recipients of state resource, these enterprises tend to cooperate with the official 
unions upon any beneficiary condition. A union chair mentioned to me that 
union registration was the prerequisite of acquiring resources from the official 
unions (Interview 8). The firm was quite satisfied with the free educational 
resources provided by the official unions, but was unwilling to pay union 
dues. 
 
5.3.3 Agency of Union Leaders: Constrained Middlemen 
 
As compared to paperwork unions, union leaders in managerial unions have 
stronger agency. Thus, I conceptualize their role as constrained middlemen. 
Being middlemen means that these leaders have a dual loyalty at best. On the 
one hand, they have to be loyal to their enterprises’ management, because they 
are on their employers’ payrolls and their appointments are often supported or 
acquiesced by their management. On the other hand, the official unions expect 
them to be responsive to union policies, since the state relies on enterprise 
unions to transfer information and resources to unionized enterprises. 
Moreover, the official unions expect union leaders to promote industrial 
democracy and maintain industrial peace within firms. For example, a union 
chair is expected to acquire basic abilities such as convening union meetings, 
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participating in democratic management, signing collective contracts on behalf 
of employees. 31  In collective labor disputes, union leaders shall solicit 
information from employees and report to the official unions.32  
 
  However, one rarely finds managerial unions confronting management to 
support interest-based claims of employees in practice. As constrained 
middlemen, union leaders are tethered to prioritize managerial interest over 
the interests of employees and the state. On the other hand, although the Trade 
Union Law prohibits employers from retaliating union chairs who represent 
employees in labor disputes (Article 17), in reality employment relationship 
between the two parties gives employers an authority over union leaders. As a 
result, these leaders tend to refrain from confronting the management in 
advancing the interest of employees beyond the law. Since they do not seek to 
challenge managerial authority, they are unlikely to acquire collective action 
power.  
 
  In the next two subsections, I identify two perceptual barriers, managerial 
mentality and legalistic interpretation of rights, which have led union leaders 
in managerial unions to prioritize managerial interest above the interests of 
                                                        
31 Heyuan Federation of Trade Unions, Guanyu jiaqiang jiceng gonghui weiyuanhui guifanhua jianshe 
de tongzhi (Notice with Regard to Strengthening the Formalization of Grassroots Union Committees). 
http://zgh.jiyuan.gov.cn/zlzx/ggtz/201609/P020160929558634117665.doc. (August 30th, 2016). 
Accessed on December 12th, 2016. 
32 Union Federation of Guangdong Province, Zhonghuaquanguo zonggonghui guanyu xinxingshi xia 
jiaqiang jicenggonghui jianshe de yijian (The ACFTU’s opinion on strengthening the grassroots unions 
under the new circumstances). http://www.gdftu.org.cn/xx/wj/201606/t20160603_773802.htm. (June 3rd, 
2016). Accessed on October 4th, 2016.  
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  There is a particular disposition among union chairs to place their loyalty to 
management above that to the employees and to the state, which I call 
“managerial mentality”. Union leaders see the major functions of enterprise 
unions as assisting corporate governance by creating and maintaining a 
harmonious shop-floor relation and that the interests of employees are 
subsumed under managerial interest. This managerial mentality is manifested 
in that, most obviously, managerial unions will not seek to promote the 
interests of employees and the state when these interests conflict with 
managerial interest. A typical example is that these union chairs refrain from 
supporting the interest-based claims of their employees, which requires them 
to bargain with their employers. In my research, when union chairs were asked 
whether their unions had initiated wage bargaining with their enterprises, they 
often told me that it was the management and the market which decided 
employees’ wage levels, and that their unions had no right to interfere with 
such decisions (Interview 9).     
 
  One way to explain this managerial mentality is union leaders’ strong 
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identification with management. This may be due to the fact that these union 
leaders are themselves managerial personnel. In my research, union leaders 
are concurrently managerial personnel in human resource management, 
administration, logistics or accounting. For them, holding a union position is 
only a part-time voluntary work, which is supplementary to their main 
positions in corporate governance. Two interviews with union chairs are 
particularly testifying to this proposition. Both union leaders sought to 
maintain a harmonious labor relation between their unions and the 
management, rather than seeking a confrontation with the latter. The first 
informant was a human resource manager, who concurrently held the position 
of union chair of her enterprise union. I paid two visits to her company in 
order to interview her. The first visit was not successful because she was very 
busy at the time and had to drop her appointment with me. I finally met her in 
my second visit. After I entered her office, she explained that her absence from 
our first appointment was due to her busy and irregular work schedule as a 
human resource manager. During the interview, she frankly told me that she 
regarded her position at the union as the least important one among all other 
positions she held in the company. Although she cooperated with the official 
unions in organizing many union-funded activities, she did not show any 
enthusiasm for her work as a union leader. When I asked how she handled 
labor disputes such as dismissal, she told me that she respected the opinions 
from other managerial departments at first. Namely, the union was not obliged 
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to speak on behalf of the employees in every labor dispute. Instead, it needed 
to balance different opinions from managerial departments. Obviously, she 
prioritized her identity as a manager above as a union chair, as she commented 
as following: 
 
“The union serves to maintain a harmonious labor relation, 
rather than to make a fuss…although I am the union chair, I am 
also a mid-level manager of the company…I deliberate from the 
perspective of the enterprise at first.” (Interview 25) 
 
  The second informant came from a public-holding enterprise, where she 
was the manager of comprehensive administration (综合管理) department. 
Her department managed union, party’s affairs, security, logistics, and human 
resources. As a typical practice of public-holding enterprises, the enterprise 
union was established from the very beginning. The company also had a 
separate budget for the union. With this budget, the union was able to make a 
generous distribution of fringe welfare to their employees, which included 
movie tickets, vegetables and fruits, moon cakes, and recreational activities. 
However, when it came to handling labor disputes, the union chair showed her 
strong identification with the management. In our conversation, she tried to 
make a distinction between their union and foreign unions. While foreign 
unions tended to leverage strikes to bargain with the management, their union 
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sought to maintain a workplace harmony. She tried to balance managerial 
interest and the interests of employees in the case of labor disputes: 
 
“For us, labor-capital conflict is not a zero-sum game. We 
handle interest conflicts between the company and the 
employees harmoniously…our union is to coordinate [with the 
two sides]. Is it the problem of the employee? Or is it the 
company acting improperly? Actually, I have dual identities. If it 
is indeed the company’s fault, I will examine our institutions to 
make amends. If it is the employee’s own fault, I will tell the 
person that his justification is not sufficient…right? To placate 
the person…like this way.” (Interview 26) 
 
  The interviews above suggest that managerial mentality prevents union 
leaders from engaging bargaining with the management and from acquiring 
collective action power. These union leaders tend to perceive unions as 
“lubricants” (Interview 26), rather than rallying points of workplace 
contestation for promoting labor standards. In addition, some union leaders 
tend to see the interests of employees as parochial, which stem from their 
inability to transcend their self-interests and to integrate them with corporate 
interest (Interview 10).  
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  State interest is also compromised when it runs into conflicts with 
managerial interest. This is most manifested in union due collection. Because 
union leaders have a strong identification with the management, they tend to 
sympathize with their enterprises’ causes. For them, if unionization creates an 
excessive cost on their hosting enterprises, it is justifiable for their hosts to 
evade. Among many union chairs I interviewed, some recalled that they were 
at least once persuaded by the official unions to negotiate with the 
management on union due collection. In the end, they refused to pressurize the 
management to make such as a move. For example, one union chair reacted 
passively to this request. When I asked whether she had informed her 
enterprise about the policy, she replied cautiously that she hadn’t notified her 
boss yet and she company was highly unlikely to afford it. Thus, she withheld 
the information in order not to pass a piece of “irresponsible” information to 
her employer. Some other union leaders displayed more enthusiasm, but they 
respected their employers’ choices. Another union chair told me that she had 
tried several times to persuade her company to pay union dues. Despite her 
efforts, the management did not give a response. In my interview, she told me 
that she personally hoped to see her union to have its own funding. On the 
other hand, she fully understood the reluctance on the part of the management 
because union funds were paid by the enterprise:         
 
“We really hoped that the enterprise could have paid union due. 
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If it did, our union would have money on its own. However, 2% 
of the payroll is a large sum of money. Even if the official 
unions refund us 50% of union dues, the other half goes 
nowhere. Eventually, it is the boss who pays union dues, so we 
can understand it. Anyway, union dues are paid out of his 
pocket.” (Interview 10) 
 
Legalistic interpretation of rights 
 
  The second perceptual barrier is that union chairs consider abiding the law 
as paramount. Their interpretation of labor rights is restricted to the 
compliance with minimum legal standards, which excludes the right to contest 
higher labor standards through collective actions. So long as enterprises 
conform to laws and policies, there is no need for enterprise unions to take any 
initiative to promote employees’ welfare further. Thus, union chairs have little 
incentive to support interest-based claims of employees which have gone 
beyond what the law has stipulated. From their perspectives, it is unreasonable 
for employees to make above-law demands when enterprises are strictly 
law-abiding. My research shows that this perception is shared among union 
leaders of both FIEs and public-holding enterprises, indicating that it might be 
an institutional feature of managerial unions across ownership. I asked a union 
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chair of a FIE whether her union had bargained for wage increases for their 
employees. She told me that the wage standards of the firm were adjusted 
according to the municipal wage regulations and she did not see any necessity 
for the union to initiate a collective wage bargaining which would bring wages 
above the legal requirements:                
 
“Our company is very law-abiding…the annual wage 
adjustment is made according to company’s regulation. This is 
not union’s job. For example, we will immediately adjust the 
minimum wage after the municipal government issues its annual 
wage adjustment scheme…[our adjustment] is higher than the 
minimum legal standard. Thus, the company, not the union, 
makes the adjustment according to the labor law. We do not 
have collective bargaining.” (Interview 7) 
 
  Another union chair from a public-holding enterprise held a similar view. In 
the interview, he emphasized many times that there was little the union was 
obliged to do once the enterprise was law-abiding. From his perspective, he 
had no obligation to support the interest-based claims of their employees such 
as wage increase, severance pay and reduced work hours. This was manifested 
most in his company’s annual meeting of employee representatives. During 
these meetings, employee representatives sometimes came into conflicts with 
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the management on work hour arrangements. The representatives demanded 
the management to reduce their hours of work and overtime shifts. However, 
the union chair never supported their interest-based claims in these 
circumstances because he considered their claims as “unrealistic”. Instead, he 
suggested to these workers that they could talk to the management directly 
with regard to their claims, which the union could not support:   
 
“The union hadn’t taken any action. It was totally unnecessary 
for us to handle this…the workers’ demands were above the law, 
above the society’s average standards. If they required legal 
protection under the law, we could support them. Overtime is 
voluntary. Workers can choose not to work overtime shifts. 
However, these representatives asked for zero overtime…that is 
impossible…they can try to get an approval from the company 
if they do not want. If the company does not approve, they have 
to do overtime shifts. The characteristics of the enterprise and 
their occupations [as assembly line workers] make overtime 
shifts mandatory…this is a mutual choice. They can choose 
those companies which allow them to work only in the day…” 
(Interview 22) 
 
  This section identifies two perceptual barriers which have constrained the 
 160 
agency of union leaders in managerial unions: managerial mentality and 
legalistic interpretation of rights. Managerial unions refrain from supporting 
the interest-based claims of their employees in order not to confront the 
management. As a result, managerial unions function as supplementary 
departments of enterprises. They are unable to challenge managerial authority 
in setting wage standards, work hours, and other key aspects of employment 
relation.  
 
5.4 Union Leaders and the Intra-case Variance of Managerial Unions 
 
The constrained leadership does not mean that managerial unions are 
irrelevant to workers. This section explores the intra-case variance of 
managerial unions in order to shed light on the impact of union leaders on 
union development in a management-dominated environment. Based on an 
intra-case comparison of 9 managerial unions, I argue that union efficacy 
varies with the variance in the agency of their union leaders, when structural 
factors are held relatively constant. The more competent and active union 
leaders are, the more likely it is that managerial unions develop a broader set 
of functions in favor of employees.  
 
  TABLE 5.1 compiles the data of 9 unions which has been used in this 
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chapter to provide a birds-eye view of the intra-case diversity of managerial 
unions. The intra-case analysis seeks to isolate the causal impact of union 
leadership on union efficacy. The control variables include ownership of 
hosting enterprises, industry, number of employees, year of and reasons for 
union registration, relation between enterprise unions and their parent official 
unions (union-state relations), and condition of union due contribution. Their 
ownership encompasses private, public-holding and foreign-invested. These 
enterprises specialize in various industries and sectors, ranging from 
manufacturing to tertiary industry. As the table shows, the lifespans of these 
unions vary significantly. The unions hosted by public-holding enterprises 
tend to have a much longer lifespan than those hosted by private enterprises 
and FIEs. The unions with a more developed form tend to be hosted by the 
enterprises with more than 1000 employees, whereas the enterprises with a 
smaller size such as employing a few hundreds tend to host less 
organizationally developed unions. The concern of legitimacy is the primary 
reason which drives these enterprises to accept unionization. Most enterprises 







TABLE 5.1 An Intra-case Analysis of Managerial Unions 
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  The state variable, the frequency of contact between enterprise unions and 
their parent official unions, has an ambiguous impact on union efficacy. There 
are only two cases (PHU-1 & PHU-2) in which the correlation between state 
intervention and union efficacy is positive, as the infrequent contacts between 
the enterprise unions and their parent official unions correlate with lower 
levels of union efficacy. In three other cases (TAI-2, JAP-2 & SIN-1), the 
infrequent contacts between the enterprise unions and their parent official 
unions do not seem to affect union efficacy. This might suggest that, when 
enterprises abide by the law and enterprise unions acquire a stable 
organization and functions, the impact of the state variable seems to be 
attenuated. The state might have fewer justifications to intervene in factory 
regime of unionized enterprises. As a result, the causal weight tilts towards 
agency of union leaders, when the two structural factors are held constant. 
Without an active union leadership, the state variable alone cannot create 
better unions. I encountered a case of weak union leadership which 
undermines union efficacy. The union chair was concurrently a logistics staff 
of her company. Her daily duty was managing workers’ dormitories and 
maintenance. Thus, it became very difficult for the official unions to empower 
her because of her position as a mid-lower staff in her company. The union 
chair had to carefully handle the relationship between her enterprise and the 
official unions and she could not afford annoying the enterprise owner, her 
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boss, over issues such as union due contribution.  
 
  The agent-level variable, the agency of union leaders, stands out as it 
correlates strongly with the variance in union efficacy. In 5 out of 9 cases 
(TAI-2, JAP-2, SIN-1, PEU-3 & PHU-3), the active agency of union leaders is 
correlated with a higher level of union efficacy. As the following subsections 
will show, union leadership boosts union efficacy in a management-dominated 
environment. These union chairs are capable of making their unions an 
institutionalized platform for discussing and debating industrial relation 
policies to promote a limited degree of industrial democracy within their 
enterprises. Some others have undertaken initiatives to create 
sub-organizations within their existing unions in order to reach out to 
grassroots employees. Staffed by competent union leaders, enterprise unions 
can also supervise their hosting enterprises to comply with state policies.  
 
Promotion of a limited degree of industrial democracy  
 
  Competent union leaders can promote a limited degree of industrial 
democracy by institutionalizing their unions as a platform for discussing and 
debating union policies within their enterprises. As mentioned before, union 
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due collection often generates tensions between unions and management. 
Hence, union leaders tend to be very reluctant to raise the issue to the 
management. Nevertheless, competent union leaders can handle this sensitive 
issue properly to allow a democratic discussion before the final decision is 
made. A union staff recalled that their union chair once summoned a meeting 
of their union committee to discuss union due contribution (Interview 9). 
During the meeting, the committee was divided between the junior managers 
who were close to the assembly line workers and the mid-level managers who 
aligned closely with the management. The junior managers were enthusiastic 
about having an independent union fund, which would allow the union to fund 
its own activities. The mid-level managers, on the other hand, showed a 
greater concern on the cost which would be born by the enterprise. Although 
in the end the union adopted the opinions from the mid-level managers to 
decline union due contribution, the democratic discussion itself did provide an 
opportunity for soliciting the opinions from different stakeholders and a 




Supervision of law compliance 
 
  In public-holding enterprises and large FIEs, unions are institutionalized as 
a part of corporate structure.33 These unions can play a role in supervising the 
compliance of enterprises to state laws and policies. In public-holding 
enterprises, this union function has been weakened since the SOEs reform, 
which elevated managerial authority above party committees and enterprise 
unions (Cai, 2006). Nevertheless, we can still find that some union chairs have 
managed to preserve their unions’ independence from managerial 
encroachment by leveraging their institutional status as guaranteed in the law. 
A union chair from a public-holding enterprise told me of a recent incident in 
which he had confronted a general manager of his firm over a union election 
(Interview 27). The general manager stayed overseas for many years and knew 
little about the Trade Union Law in China. Assuming an authority over the 
enterprise union, he attempted to interfere with the upcoming union election 
by nominating a candidate. When the union chair warned him of the illegal 
interference, the manager was very enraged, saying: “The union is this 
enterprise’s union! Why I cannot interfere?!”. The two nearly ended up in a 
fight. In the end, the union chair’s warning took effect on the manager, who 
eventually withdrew himself from the election. The lesson to be learnt from 
this incident, according the union chair, is that union leaders need to act 
                                                        
33 In public-holding enterprises, enterprise unions are led by their enterprises’ party committees. 
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assertively to overcome managerial interference resultant from the market 
reform. Thus, even when structural factors such as market and state 
institutions become unfavorable to unions’ autonomy, agency of union leaders 
can still change the shop-floor dynamics.    
 
  Similarly, in large FIEs, union chairs play a supervisory role in ensuring the 
compliance of their hosting enterprises with the law. JAP-2’s hosting 
enterprise is a Japanese MNC, which employs more than 4,000 employees in 
Shenzhen. JAP-2 was registered in 2007. Throughout the years, the enterprise 
union has acquired a stable development, with 85% of the employees joining 
the union. One of the union committee members told me the union had played 
a consultative role in many of the enterprise’s decision-making processes 
(Interview 7). A recent achievement was the union leadership successfully 
persuaded the Japanese management to comply with a newly enacted policy 
on public holidays. The new policy established September 3rd of every year as 
a public holiday for commemorating the victory of the Anti-Fascist War (the 
Second World War). The company initially attempted to evade the policy. 
Nevertheless, after hearing the complaints from many employees, JAP-2’s 
chair and vice-chair negotiated with the management, which eventually 





   
  Competent union chairs can also facilitate the organizational innovation of 
their unions by creating sub-organizations within the existing unions in order 
to better serve their employees. Some of their initiatives have gone beyond the 
laws and policies. Many enterprise unions are organizationally distant from 
their grassroots employees, because their organizational structures are too 
nascent to reach the lowest echelon of their companies’ hierarchy. Thus, some 
active union leaders managed to overcome this organizational distance 
through brainstorming initiatives to attend to the needs of their employees. A 
union chair told me about her initiative to create union teams in her company’s 
38 chain stores in order to reach out to their grassroots employees. In each 
chain store, a team leader was selected from senior employees to represent 
grassroots employees. The union chair expected these union teams to function 
as the information-exchange knots that connected all the chain stores to the 
corporate headquarter. The structure would encourage grassroots employees to 
participate in union-organized activities such as those related to corporate 
social responsibility. Interestingly, her initiative was neither stipulated in the 
Trade Union Law nor inspired by the official unions. It was her brainchild. 
The union chair believed that the inputs from these team leaders were essential 
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for the proper functioning of the enterprise union and its hosting enterprise, as 
she commented as below: 
 
“The first is to show our attention to our grassroots employees, 
including senior ones. The second is…in the future union 
welfare will be allocated to them. They are on top of the list. 
The third is…since they assume the position, they must make 
good suggestions to the enterprise, collecting [employees’] 
opinions, participating in corporate responsibility 





Managerial unions function as an institutionalized channel for transferring 
resources and information from the official unions to their host enterprises, a 
mechanism for promoting fringe welfare of their employees and a limited 
degree of industrial democracy at the shop floor level. More and more 
enterprises are open to unionization out of their concerns on legitimacy or 
resources. As a result, managerial unions emerge from those enterprises which 
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perceive unionization as a resource, intangible or tangible. However, their 
union chairs’ constrained agency predisposes them to prioritize managerial 
interest over the interests of employees and the state. Most union leaders 
consider the role of their unions as limited to promoting the fringe welfare of 
their employees and supervising the law compliance of their enterprises. They 
refrain from supporting the interest-based claims of their employees. As my 
analysis has shown, managerial mentality and legalistic interpretation of rights 
are the two perceptual barriers to explain the reluctance on the part of union 
leaders in supporting employees’ interest-based claims. In short, managerial 
unions do not possess collective action power, which enables them to bargain 
with employers. Despite their inability to support the interest-based claims of 
their employees, managerial unions are not irrelevant to workers. As TABLE 
5.1 has shown, the more active and competent union chairs are, the more 
likely managerial unions are to have a higher level of efficacy in terms of 
promoting fringe welfare of employees and soliciting their opinions in 
corporate governance.  
 
  Nevertheless, managerial dominance in managerial unions does not 
preclude contestation. As this chapter has shown, managerial unions create a 
platform for low-intensity contestations between capital and the state through 
influencing the direction of union development. These low-intensity 
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contestations inject a modicum of industrial democracy into shop floor 
relations. The official unions often encourage enterprise union leaders to 
contest with the management on some corporate decision-making processes in 
relation to unionization. In many cases used in this chapter, the state relies on 
these grassroots agents to push through its policies in the private sector. For 
example, if the official unions succeed in persuading enterprises to pay union 
dues, both the state and employees will be benefit from an extra source of 
funding. If their persuasion fails, the state still sets off a ripple among private 
firms by informing them labor policies. In the meantime, competent union 
leaders can take up their own initiatives to make their union better serve their 
employees and enterprises. Thus, the internal politics of managerial unions is 
very dynamic, full of contestations and compromises. It indicates that 
managerial unions are not managerial tools irrelevant to workers. They can 
become a platform for low-intensity contestations between capital, workers 
and the state on union development in a management-dominated environment.   
 




CHAPTER 6 PROTO-ECONOMIC UNIONS 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter investigates the mechanism of formation and intra-case variance 
of proto-economic unions. Proto-economic unions34 are enterprise unions 
which have acquired collective action power. This power enables them to 
initiate, organize, and coordinate collective actions to support their employees’ 
interest-based claims such as wage increases and severance pays. Past research 
have suggested that enterprise unions in China are unlikely to acquire 
collective action power because the dual institutional constraints imposed by 
the Leninist state and capital (Chen, 2007, 2015; Friedman, 2014).  
 
  Based on a larger number of and more representative cases, I argue that 
proto-economic unions have emerged in the Leninist state. Both structural and 
                                                        
34 In creating this definition, I add the prefix “proto-” to “economic union” to suggest that some unions 
in China are becoming similar to the economic unions in industrial democracies in terms of their key 
functions. In the past, the Socialist unions were part of state apparatus and were deprived of the right to 
organize collective actions to make economic demands on enterprises. Thus, they were distinct from the 
typical unions in industrial democracies, which represented the economic interests of their membership. 
As I argue, the state-sponsored unionization has led to the emergence of unions that are capable of 
making the interest-based claims on behalf of employees. However, I refrain from calling them 
“economic unions” because their evolution is incomplete due to the institutional confine imposed by the 
Leninist state. The right for the unions to stage industrial actions is still in a political limbo. Thus, I add 
the prefix “proto” to “economic union” in order to show that proto-economic unions have to maneuver 
their collective actions in this political limbo. The Leninist state has the authority to arbitrarily expand or 
contract the space of and shapes the outcome of labor protests. This climate of political uncertainty 
forces union leaders to navigate union mobilization in a narrow safety zone vaguely defined but 
vigilantly patrolled by the state. 
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agent-level factors have contributed to their emergence. These unions emerge 
in enterprises which are friendly to industrial relation policies, because their 
host enterprises value their social legitimacy. Equally important is their 
effective union leadership in interest aggregation, collective bargaining and 
organizational discipline. Especially in protests, this leadership makes a 
negotiation between labor and capital possible and elicits state sympathy and 
support to these unions’ causes. 
 
  Proto-economic unions adopt two mobilization strategies: conciliatory 
collective actions (e.g. collective wage bargaining) and confrontational 
collective actions (e.g. strikes and petitions). Without resorting to strike 
pressures, the unions can organize conciliatory collective actions to support 
employees’ interest-based claims, if their host enterprises are willing to 
cooperate and their union leadership is effective in interest aggregation, 
collective bargaining and organizational discipline. When these enterprises 
refuse to bargain with their unions, these unions have to organize 
confrontational collective actions to elicit state pressure on capital. 
 
  This chapter is organized as following. Section 6.2 introduces the 
institutional features of proto-economic unions. Section 6.3 analyzes 
proto-economic unions in mobilizing conciliatory collective actions. Section 
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6.4 analyzes proto-economic union in mobilizing confrontational collective 
actions in two cases with contrasting outcomes. Section 6.5 is the conclusion.    
 
6.2 Proto-economic Unions: Collective Action Power as An Institutional 
Advantage 
 
Proto-economic unions are distinct from two other variances because of their 
possession of collective action power. Namely, the unions possess an ability to 
mobilize conciliatory or confrontational collective actions to support the 
interest-based claims of their employees. This unique institutional advantage 
arises from their union leaders’ strong agency as labor representatives. These 
leaders regard the interest of employees on a par with managerial interest. 
They are sympathetic to employees. The following section, section 6.3, will 
introduce conciliatory collective actions before turning to confrontational 




6.3 Proto-economic Unions in Mobilizing Conciliatory Collective Actions 
 
Conciliatory collective action becomes a possible strategy for proto-economic 
unions only when two pre-conditions are met. First, host enterprises are 
friendly to collective employees’ representation and regard their enterprise 
unions as representative organs of their employees. In my research, such 
enterprises tend to be headquartered in countries friendly to collective 
employees’ representation or they desire for an indigenous development in 
their host countries. These enterprises tend to be open to the unions’ inputs in 
their corporate decision-making processes. Second, union leaders are capable 
of aggregating employees’ interests and engaging in collective bargaining. 
Unless an effective union leadership emerges, a friendly corporate culture 
alone does not offer a solution to labor-capital disputes. After the two 
preconditions are met, a settlement can be negotiated between the enterprises 




6.3.1 Managerial Perception: Unionization as A Resource  
  
The cases of FRE-1 and KEA-1 are particularly illuminating of the process in 
which proto-economic unions achieve wage increases through mobilizing 
conciliatory collective actions. Their hosting enterprises are union-friendly 
and have supported the institutionalization of union functions, e.g. holding 
regular union elections and contributing to union funds. For these firms, 
unionization is an intangible resource which increases their social legitimacy 
in China.  
 
  FRE-1’s host enterprise, Time Factory, is French-invested and specializes in 
watch manufacturing. The enterprise is a subsidiary of Montrichard Group, a 
watchmaking MNC which has offices in multiple countries and regions. 
Montrichard divides its production between China and Switzerland. While 
most of its products are manufactured in Shenzhen, Montrichard liaisons 
technical supports from its Swiss subsidiary to conduct a quality control & 
inspection of the production in its Chinese factories. In China, Time Factory 
recruits migrant workers, skilled and unskilled, to assembly imported parts 
and components of timepieces and exports all the final products to overseas 
markets. As a supplier of AVON and Walt Disney, the factory’s production is 
inspected regularly to meet the requirements of corporate social responsibility 
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(CSR). AVON, for example, sends labor inspectors to Time Factory before 
placing its orders. If the factory fails to meet the CSR qualification, AVON 
will withhold or cancel its orders. When I visited Time Factory in 2015, I 
noticed that all CSR requirements were posted on the company’s notice board, 
which indicated the stringent CSR principle the company was held to. 
 
  Thus, it is not surprising that Time Factory’s management is open to 
unionization. According to FRE-1’s union chair, the enterprise union was 
established in 2012, after the official unions persuaded the enterprise owner, a 
French national (Interview 30). As a French, the enterprise owner surely had 
some prior knowledge of unions, as France was one of those countries which 
boasted a culture of collective employees’ representation. For him, 
unionization in China seemed attractive, as it could facilitate the 
communications between the management and the workers. Seizing this 
opportunity, the official unions tried their best to propagate the idea that 
unions in China brought industrial peace rather than confrontation, which 
would eventually reduce strikes and other disruptive individual or collective 
actions resultant from workplace miscommunications. With the consensus 
reached, Time Factory’s owner agreed to establish FRE-1.   
 
  The second union, KEA-1, is hosted by Samsung Telecommunication 
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(Shenzhen) Co., a subsidiary of the Korean conglomerate: Samsung Group. 
My fieldwork at KEA-1 would have been impossible without the help from a 
vocational training agency with which the union has worked closely. Unlike 
my visits to most other unions which only allowed me less than one hour to 
interview people, my visit to KEA-1 was quite formal and was warmly 
received. Upon my arrival at the enterprise, two union staff came to welcome 
me and escorted me to their union office where our meeting was held. They 
spent the whole morning with me to answer my interview questions. After the 
interview, they invited me to have a lunch with them at their enterprise’s 
canteen. 
 
  Korean enterprises, especially SMEs, had a bad reputation among Chinese 
workers for their despotic factory regime, which was extremely abusive, 
disciplinary and inhumane (Chan, 2001). However, with their further 
integration into Chinese society, some larger enterprises such as Samsung 
have started to develop a localized management style which aims for creating 
an amicable enterprise-community relationship in China (Won, 2007, pp. 322–
323). Aiming for such an indigenous development, the Samsung Group has 
cultivated a unique enterprise culture among all its subsidiaries in China. As 
commented by Won-Kie Chang, President for Greater China Region of 
Samsung Group, Samsung’s long-term strategy in China is to create “the 
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second Samsung” (China Samsung Social Responsibility Report, 2013). This 
is reflected in its corporate slogan, which states that “to become the enterprise 
loved by Chinese people; to become the enterprise contributing to Chinese 
society”.   
 
  As one path to this goal, Samsung Telecommunication attempts to 
institutionalize a democratic management through supporting the development 
of its enterprise union, KEA-1, to become a bridge between their employees 
and the management. Because of the empowerment from the company, KEA-1 
has initiated and participated in a wide range of union and corporate activities 
such as holding monthly meeting for employee representatives and organizing 
the CSR activities. The union staff whom I interviewed told me that KEA-1 
had played such an indispensible role in corporate governance because of the 
trust between the union and its host enterprise (Interview 32). This mutual 
trust grants KEA-1 a considerable autonomy in performing various functions 
alone or in conjunction with other departments.   
 
  The above information shows that a friendly enterprise culture can provide 
a comfortable space for union development, laying a foundation for union-led 
conciliatory collective actions.   
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6.3.2 Agency of Union Leaders: Labor Representatives 
 
As argued earlier, a friendly enterprise culture alone does not produce union 
activism if an effective union leadership is absent. For proto-economic unions 
to launch conciliatory collective actions, a leadership is required to aggregate 
the interest of employees and engage in collective bargaining with employers. 
I conceptualize the agency of these union leaders as labor representative. 
Being a labor representative means that a union leader regards the interest of 
employees on a par with that of the management. These leaders are strongly 
incentivized to represent their employees to bargain with employers. The 
following comments from one of the these union leaders particularly 
accentuated his mentality of being a labor representative: 
 
“I have so many employees who are from other parts of the 
country. They should have someone to speak on their behalf. 
Otherwise, who protects the interest of such a huge group of 
people? The union is to safeguard their interests. Therefore, there 
must be someone to become the leader; I become the leader.” 
(Interview 14) 
 
  As labor representatives, union leaders aggregate demands of employees 
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and then bargain with management in order to maximize their relative gains. 
In the case of FRE-1, the union chair, Mr. Xu (pseudonym), was pivotal in 
achieving wage increases for the employees. Mr. Xu was a veteran and a 
member of the CCP, who was re-elected last year as the union chair. In our 
conversation, he described his position as a responsibility he was obliged to 
take. In 2014, the statutory monthly minimum wage in Shenzhen was 
increased to RMB 1,800 (USD 275). Although Time Factory’s base salary at 
the time was higher than this minimum wage, Mr. Xu began to hear 
complaints from many employees. Thus, he convened a meeting with line 
leaders and workers to solicit their opinions on the amount of increase they 
expected. After collecting the employees’ opinions and investigating the 
industry-wide wage standards, Mr. Xu proposed an increase of RMB 350 
(USD 54) for skilled workers and RMB 250 (USD 38) for general workers35 
per month. After the meeting, FRE-1 sent its proposal to the management. In 
response to the proposal, the enterprise owner sent a delegate to negotiate with 
FRE-1 and put forward a query to the union: the reasons the employees asked 
for wage increases. Responding to the management’s query, Mr. Xu 
emphasized that the statutory minimum wage was hardly sufficient to sustain 
the livelihood of most employees. A timely wage increase was necessary to 
catch up with the fast increase of living expense in Shenzhen. Thus, he urged 
                                                        
35 General workers are the workers who have no specific set of skills and ready to sell their labor at a 
low price.    
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the management to offer a living wage to its employees, which is, a wage level 
not only sufficient to support the employees themselves but also their families. 
Upon receiving Mr. Xu’s justifications, the management conducted its own 
investigation and finally reached the same conclusion as FRE-1. Commenting 
on the entire experience, Mr. Xu remarked that the creation of the enterprise 
union had brought a remarkable transformation of the shop-floor relations in 
the enterprise. FRE-1 had succeeded in aggregating the individual claims of 
employees into a collective claim of the union. Prior to the union came into 
being, Time Factory had no collective mechanism for wage negotiations. As a 
result, the employees had to negotiate with the management individually. They 
staged stoppages or strikes to pressurize the management, when the latter 
failed to address their demands. Now, under Mr. Xu’s leadership, workers’ 
spontaneous and unorganized resistance had made way to conciliatory 
collective actions led by the union, which significantly reduced the number of 
shop-floor conflicts resultant from wage stagnations and other workplace 
grievances.  
 
  Similarly in KEA-1, collective wage bargaining was made possible because 
of the union leadership. KEA-1’s committee member, Mr. Nian (pseudonym), 
showed me their union’s achievements in collective bargaining in the past four 
years (Interview 32). It showed that Samsung Telecommunication made wage 
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increases on an annual basis. The company’s wage increase rate was 
respectively 9.4% in 2011, 9.88% in 2012, 13.56% in 2013 and 16.52% in 
2014. The 3% increase between 2013 and 2014 was resultant from the 
collective wage bargaining between the enterprise and the union. Mr. Nian 
told me that KEA-1 had disagreement with the rate proposed by the 
management and insisted on their own proposal. Nevertheless, this 
disagreement did not lead the union to confront the management. The two 
parties instead sought to communicate their different opinions and exchange 
evidences with each other in order to decide an appropriate rate of wage 
increase.   
 
  A tentative conclusion can be drawn from the above two cases. It only 
becomes possible for proto-economic unions to organize conciliatory 
collective actions when two pre-conditions are satisfied. First, host enterprises 
are friendly to collective employees’ representation and regard enterprise 
unions as representative organs of the majority of their employees. In this 
scenario, enterprises tend to trust their enterprise unions and are willing to 
listen to their suggestions in order to preempt costly industrial conflicts such 
as strikes. The second precondition is a strong agency on the part of union 
leaders. Unless an effective union leadership emerges to aggregate employees’ 
demands, communicate these demands to, and subsequently negotiate with the 
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management, a friendly corporate culture alone cannot lead to an efficient and 
amicable solution of labor-capital disputes over interest-based claims. 
Nevertheless, in most circumstances, the first precondition often is not present. 
When facing interest-based claims from employees, enterprises often refuse to 
negotiate with workers and unions. As a result, proto-economic unions have to 
mobilize confrontational collective actions such as strikes and petitions to 
pressurize capital and the state into response.        
 
6.4 Proto-economic Unions in Mobilizing Confrontational Collective 
Actions 
 
Most industrial conflicts start when enterprises refuse to bargain with their 
employees and unions. Capital’s arrogance prompts unions to mobilize strikes 
or petitions to wrestle concessions from capital. In the Leninist state, union 
leaders have to weigh state intervention in their calculation of mobilizing 
strategies, because it is the state which arbitrates the legality of their 
mobilization and intervenes in critical moments to either support their claims 
or constrict their mobilizational space. In practice, proto-economic unions and 
grieved workers actively seek state intervention as a source of legitimacy to 
justify their mobilizations. The unions and workers also seek state intervention 
as a source of empowerment, which creates a counterbalancing point to capital 
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in their collective resistance. In short, the central argument here is that the state 
is a key ally sought by proto-economic unions and workers in their 
confrontational mobilizations. The unions mobilize confrontational collective 
actions to pressurize capital while at the same time seeking to elicit the state’s 
support to their causes.  
 
6.4.1 Exerted State Intervention 
 
Once a union mobilization spills over into streets, state intervention becomes 
essential as it significantly shapes their outcomes. In general, the political 
environment in China has not been friendly to collective actions since 1980s. 
Perceiving social unrests as a source of political instability, the CCP has 
attempted to legally and politically constrict the space of collective actions 
resultant from socio-economic dislocations or political dissents. In 1982, the 
right to strike was dropped from the Constitution36, leaving confrontational 
industrial actions in a legal and political limbo. The Chinese government 
categorizes confrontational industrial actions indiscriminately as “collective 
incidents” (群体性事件) along with all other kinds of social unrests. In the 
subsequent years, the state elevated social stability to a top priority of its 
                                                        




national policy and sought to coordinate with all party authorities in containing 
social unrests and crimes (Wang & Minzner, 2015, p.349). As a result, 
preemption, containment and dissipation of collective incidents have become a 
primary task of local governments. Stability maintenance has been given a 
heavy weighing in the performance evaluation of party cadres (Gao, 2015).  
 
  Nevertheless, the withdrawal of constitutional protection has not dampened 
workers’ resolve in resisting the encroachment of market force. The extant 
literature has extensively documented state workers’ and migrant workers’ 
protests which sought to elicit the state’s sympathy and support to their 
grievances (Lee, 2000; Cai, 2006; Lee, 2007; Chan, 2010; Friedman, 2014). 
More important, these researchers uncover a pivotal yet contradictory role of 
the Leninist state in its handling of social unrests. On the one hand, the state 
seems to demonstrate a strong incentive in dissipating social unrests which 
endanger regime legitimacy and social stability. On the other hand, they also 
find that the very procedure through which the Leninist state maintains 
stability sometimes legitimizes the claims of grieved citizens. As Perry & 
Selden (2000) contend, local governments simultaneously constrain and 
enable social resistance:      
 
“In short, while local officials frequently crack down on popular 
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resistance, in numerous cases their leadership is instrumental in 
shaping, legitimizing and articulating the demands of social 
movements, and in some instances in networking with state 
officials on behalf of local interests.” (p.11) 
 
  Thus, I argue that it becomes possible for enterprise unions to mobilize 
confrontational collective actions, if they can obtain legitimation from the 
state. I identify two ways in which state intervention shapes the processes and 
outcomes of confrontational collective actions. In the first way, the Leninist 
state arbitrates the legality of union mobilization. Although the state does not 
encourage union leaders to mobilize labor protests, it tolerates union activism 
so long as it restores the order in an otherwise chaotic gathering. By granting 
or withdrawing legitimacy to unions and their staff, the state is able to exert 
some control over union-led collective actions. In the second way, the state 
pressurizes capital in order to induce the latter into making a modicum of 
concessions to grieved workers. Pressurizing capital may alleviate the state’s 
costs in maintaining social stability.  
 




  The state’s arbitration is evident in two ways in which the Leninist state 
grants legitimacy to unions. First, as the state endows legitimacy to unions, it 
is less likely to repress labor protests led by legitimate, state recognized unions. 
Thus, a union mobilization is less likely to induce state repression if the union 
acquires legitimacy, as endorsed by the official unions, prior to its 
mobilization. Being officially recognized by the state also means that the 
union has a legitimate representation of employees in the eyes of the 
government. Second, the state arbitrates the legality of collective action 
processes, expanding and contracting the operational space of union 
mobilizations. Labor protests, because of their combustible nature, are closely 
watched by and placed under the surveillance of the public security authority. 
It is necessary for union leaders to maneuver their mobilizations in a narrow 
safety zone, the boundary of which is vaguely defined but vigilantly patrolled 
by the state.    
 
  The state simultaneously expands and constricts the operational space of 
union mobilizations. As the only authority that grants legitimacy to unions, the 
state is able to exert some control over the collective action processes by 
inducing union leaders and workers to reconcile with capital at critical 
moments. In other words, while the state-granted legitimacy can shield unions 
from repression, it also allows the state to de-radicalize the claims of unions 
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  In order to reduce its own cost in maintaining social stability, the state has 
its own rationale to pressurize capital into making some concessions to 
workers. Industrial conflicts tend to erupt when enterprises refuse to meet the 
demands of their employees. Thus, in a logical sequence, it shall be these 
enterprises bearing a prior responsibility to resolve industrial conflicts with 
their unhappy employees through negotiation, bargaining or whatsoever 
means, rather than having the state involved at the very beginning of their 
disputes. On the part of the state, maintaining social stability consumes a lot of 
its resources, because local governments have to dole out material rewards to 
grieved citizens in an exchange for a quick appeasement of social unrests (Lee 
& Zhang, 2013). If more employers shirk their prior responsibility in 
negotiating with labor, it will inevitably incur a higher cost on local 
governments (Interview 34). Thus, the Leninist state has an incentive to 
pressurize capital into making some concessions to grieved workers in order to 
reduce its own financial burden in handling labor protests. However, as we can 
see in the two case studies, pressurizing capital is much more difficult than 
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pressuring unions and workers.   
 
6.4.2 Agency of Union Leaders: Labor Representatives 
 
Without a constitutional protection, the terrain of labor protests is a legally and 
political contested, in which the state arbitrarily expands and constricts the 
operational space of union mobilizations. Representativeness is hardly a 
sufficient qualification for union leaders to lead union mobilizations to their 
success. Their ability to maneuver collective action processes in a political 
uncertainty is the key to assure the state that their mobilizations will not go off 
the rails and jeopardize social order valued by the latter.  
 
  In this section, I use a more sophisticated indicator, union control, to 
measure the representativeness of union leaders and to predict the trajectories 
of labor unrests. Leadership’s representativeness is generated in union 
elections, often prior to the actual processes and outcomes of collective 
actions. Thus, it may not be effective in predicting these leaders’ 
representativeness in the process of collective mobilizations such as strikes or 
petitions, when workers are more difficult to organize and more opportunistic 
in actions. Instead, I use union control as the indicator to measure union 




Union control in confrontational collective actions 
 
  Trade unions tend to develop into bureaucratic and hierarchical 
organizations (Lipset, 1956). As the size of unions increases, it becomes more 
difficult for local union units and members to constitute an effective 
opposition to union officials at the top. The organizational expansion of unions 
increases the difficulty in their membership control. Only in a few cases, 
union members used referendums or institutionalized party systems to make 
union policies responsive to membership instead of to union bureaucrats. In 
China, by contrast, the problem is not membership control but union control. It 
is difficult for many enterprise unions, including those holding regular 
elections, to control their membership, especially during labor protests. 
Currently, two explanations are given to the ineffective union control in 
Chinese enterprise unions. The first explanation is that enterprise unions lack 
legitimacy to represent workers in collective actions and as a result workers 
resort to wildcat strikes as a more effective means to make demands on capital 
and the state (Friedman, 2014). However, Friedman’s account cannot explain 
the circumstances in which union leaders fail to control membership even 
when they were previously democratically elected. Thus, I offer a second 
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explanation, which places an emphasis on union leaders’ ability in controlling 
collection action processes, regardless of whether they were elected prior to or 
are elected amid industrial conflicts. 
 
  In order to enable a sophisticated comparison of the two selected cases, my 
research analyses three aspects of union control. They are the key mechanisms 
which explain why agency of union leaders is so crucial in determining the 
ways in which a union mobilization is settled. The first mechanism is interest 
aggregation. This is the precondition for unions to initiate negotiation or 
bargaining with employers. After gathering relevant information and 
aggregating the interest of employees, union leaders identify the locus of 
employees’ overlapping interests. Unions’ information gathering and interest 
aggregation also enables their host enterprise to identify core demands of 
employees and to calculate cost of making concessions. With an effective 
interest aggregation on the part of unions, the state is also better informed of 
workers’ grievances and demands in making its decision on intervening at 
critical circumstances and timing. The second mechanism is organizational 
discipline. This mechanism requires union leaders to maintain a unity among 
protesting workers, which aligns their actions with union goals throughout the 
whole collective action process. Effective union leadership disciplines 
protestors’ actions to minimize their opportunistic behaviors such as engaging 
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vandalism or creating chaos in wildcat strikes. The third mechanism is 
union-state connection. Unions need to obtain state recognition in a 
time-sensitive manner in order to justify every step in their mobilizational 
processes, or to re-adjust their strategies to reconcile with capital. Amid a 
political uncertainty, it is necessary for unions to constantly seek recognition 
from the state in order to avoid its repression while at the same eliciting state 
support to their causes. Besides, union-state connection enables the state to 
establish a point of contact with grieved workers at critical junctures of their 
mobilization in order to understand the nature and justification of their actions.  
 
  In short, union leadership co-determines the processes and outcomes of 
confrontational collective actions with the state. Proto-economic unions which 
are able to aggregate employees’ demands, have an effective organizational 
discipline and a strong connection to the state, tend to elicit state support to 
their causes. Proto-economic unions which are unable to aggregate employees’ 
demands, have a low organizational discipline and a weak connection to the 
state, tend to end their mobilizations in a failure.   
 
6.5 Success and Failure of Confrontational Collective Actions: A 




This section traces the processes of the two union mobilizations to 
demonstrate their union leaders’ strategic roles in steering collective action 
processes, which eventually led to their contrasting outcomes. The two cases, 
ASU-1 and AME-1, share commonalities which enable a systematic 
comparison of their mobilizations. They are representative of the recent, 
average-scale labor protests. Their host enterprises were FIEs, labor-intensive 
manufacturers, and employed an average number of employees between 100 
and 1,000. Their average sizes make them representative cases for studying 
union-led collective actions, as it would be organizationally difficult for 
unions to mobilize collective actions in enterprises which have less than 100 
employees or more than 1,000 employees (CLB, 2014, p. 21). Both protests 
were triggered by plant streamlining or closure, which followed the 2008 
financial crisis.  
 
  The two plants underwent different patterns of transition. Hit by the 
financial crisis, the first enterprise (AME-1’s host enterprise) planned to cut its 
manufacturing department, which involved removing all its assembly lines 
and manufacturing workers. The second one (AUS-1’s host enterprise) 
underwent an ownership transfer, which converted itself from a MNC 
subsidiary to a joint-venture enterprise. However, it promised to retain all its 
employees under the same employment condition. In response to these 
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economic uncertainties, the workers of both enterprises staged protests and 
petitions to demand a severance pay37 from the management, which asked for 
compensations beyond what has been required in the law. During the two 
protests, enterprise union leaders tried to aggregate the interests and demands 
of their employees, organize and discipline their actions, and propose 
solutions to solve the industrial conflicts. In the end, their mobilizations led to 
contrasting outcomes. One mobilization succeeded and the other one failed. 
 
  However, before analyzing the two cases, the next subsection will introduce 
the industrial upgrading in the Pearl River Delta as well as the legal reform 
around the 2008 global financial crisis which gave rise to the interest-based 
claims of workers. The two structural changes set the legal and economic 
backgrounds of the two cases under comparison and analysis.      
 
6.5.1 Economic Background: Industrial Upgrading in the Pearl River 
Delta 
 
The 2008’s global financial crisis triggered a drastic re-adjustment in China’s 
macro-economic policies. The crisis has made an industrial upgrading based 
                                                        
37 Severance pay is the compensation paid to workers upon termination of employment or lay-offs. 
Because job displacement has a significant and sustained impact on employees’ earning reductions 
(Couch & Placzek, 2010), in many countries severance pay has been included in labor law, which sets 
the conditions and measures of calculation. 
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on technological innovation imperative in the eyes of Chinese government. 
For Southeastern provinces which traditionally relied on their labor-intensive 
and export-driven sector, this transition has posed a tremendous challenge to 
their regional governments and local enterprises.  
 
  Guangdong is one of the typical cases. The past prosperity of this province 
was primarily contributed by its processing trade sector which produced 
manufacturing products for foreign markets.38 Guangdong was extremely 
reliant on its processing trade sector. It was estimated that 70,000 out of 
90,000 processing trade enterprises in China were located in Guangdong 
(Guangdong Yearbook, 2008). After China joined the World Trade 
Organization in 2001, Guangdong’s processing trades boomed and greatly 
enriched the regional government’s coffers. At the same time, the prosperity 
based on the booming processing trade sector made Guangdong economically 
dependent on foreign investments and markets. In 2002 report of the 
Guangdong party committee, the then party chief, Zhang Dejiang (张德江) 
pointed out that the province’s reliance on its processing trade sector was 
simultaneously an advantage and a weakness (Guangdong Yearbook, 2003). 
As an advantage, this sector did significantly contribute to the economic 
                                                        
38  Between 2002 and 2007, the region’s reliance on processing manufacturing spread to 
technology-intensive industry – electronics & telecommunication (电子信息) and electrical equipment 
and machinery (电气机械), which later became the two pillar manufacturing industries. In 2002, the 
sales incomes of the two pillar industries amounted to 575.2 billion RMB in total, which constituted 36.1% 
of the sales income of the whole manufacturing sector (Guangdong Yearbook, 2003). Their share of 
sales income increased to 40% in 2007 (Guangdong Yearbook, 2008). 
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growth of the region. As a weakness, it made the province dependent on 
foreign markets, technologies and other uncontrolled factors beyond the 
border of China. Although Guangdong’s structural dependence caught the 
attention of the provincial party chief, the provincial government did not come 
up with any policy initiative to revamp the local economy prior to 2008.  
 
  Thus, when the global financial crisis struck in 2008, Guangdong was 
caught off guard. According to a 2009 report of International Monetary Fund, 
the 2008’s crisis contracted global economy, leading to a severe loss in 
consumers’ purchasing power in developed countries (Balakrishnan et al., 
2009). The decrease in consumers’ purchasing power in North America and 
Europe severely affected the economies in East Asia through trade channels, 
due to these economies’ high dependence on their export sector. As the most 
trade-dependent province in China, Guangdong suffered most heavily during 
and after the crisis. By 2009, Guangdong’s export value had decreased by 11.7% 
as compared to that of the previous year (Guangdong Yearbook, 2010). The 
province’s GDP growth rate dropped from an average of 14.6% between 
2005-2007 to 9.5% in 2009 (SBGP & NBS Survey Office in Guangdong, 
2010). The crisis strongly signaled the provincial government that seeking an 




  The government of Guangdong then diagnosed that the “disease” which 
plagued the regional economy was an overreliance on its labor-intensive, 
export-driven processing trade sector and a lack of technological innovation.39 
To cure this disease, the provincial government decided to initiate an industrial 
upgrading which aimed for moving out labor-intensive industries, in particular 
processing trade factories, out of the province. In the subsequent years, the 
municipal governments in the Pearl River Delta such as Shenzhen urged many 
processing factories to either relocate to less-developed regions or to acquire 
legal personality40 if they intended to stay at the same locality (Interview 11). 
 
  In the other parts of the world, industrial relocation is a common strategy 
sought by both governments and enterprises to alleviate the problems 
associated with industrialization and urbanization such as overpopulation, 
industrial pollution, and soaring costs for manufacturing production (Bai, 2002; 
Liao & Chan, 2011; Shen et al., 2012). Relocation is also a business strategy 
                                                        
39 Earlier, this was reflected in a report of the then provincial party chief, Wang Yang （汪洋）, which 
was addressed to the provincial party committee in 2007. In this report, Wang highlighted that the 
development mode of Guangdong was too coarse to be technologically competitive (Guangdong 
Yearbook, 2007) and that the region’s economy lacked a core competitiveness in technological 
innovation. As mentioned in Wang’s report, enterprises in Guangdong only invested 1.2% of its GDP in 
Research & Development (R&D), lower than the 1.4% national average. Even the local high-tech 
enterprises relied heavily on foreign technologies, as 85% of their patents came from foreign companies. 
40 Tax breaks were once privileges enjoyed by the processing trade factories in the Pearl River Delta. 
The policy intended to attract foreign investment to promote the employment of local population and 
local development. Most of these factories were registered as the processing factories of their parent 
companies which are located overseas, and did not possess legal personality (法人资格). After the 
provincial government adamantly pushed through the industrial upgrading, these processing factories, if 
they opted not to relocate, were required to convert into companies with legal personality such as FIEs. 
After ownership transfers and re-registration, these firms acquire but do not enjoy tax break any more. 
As a result, a lot of these processing factories have moved out of Guangdong because of the diminishing 
tax benefits.  
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to evade rigid labor laws and trade union movements (Miyamura, 2016). In 
Guangdong, the provincial government was precipitated to pursue industrial 
relocation in order to evacuate industrial lands for more value-added industries. 
Moreover, rapid industrialization in the previous decades has also led to a 
dramatic increase in land prices, rising land and labor costs, which has been 
forcing manufacturing firms to relocate to inland provinces (Liao & Chan, 
2011; Chang, Jiang, Chang, & Alam, 2013, p. 61; Ruan & Zhang, 2014). Plant 
restructuring or relocation inevitably entails mass termination or alteration of 
employment relations, workforce trimming, and lay-offs. It dramatically 
increases precariousness and flexibility in workers’ labor process, threatens 
unemployment (ILO, 2016) and rapidly deteriorates their economic and 
working conditions as well as their social status (Chand, 2012).  
 
6.5.2 Transformation in the Legal Environment and the Coping Strategies 
of Capital 
 
In the meantime, China’s labor law regime underwent some progressive, 
pro-labor changes. Since 2007, a new set of comprehensive laws has been 
enacted to empower workers to make more economic demands on employers. 
Among which, the 2007 Labor Contract Law supports workers to make a 
stronger interest-based claim on severance pay (the major contention in my 
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comparison of the two cases). The law also seeks to reduce labor flexibility by 
increasing employers’ costs in ending their employment relations with their 
employees. It obliges an employer to offer a severance fee upon the expiration 
of a fixed-term contract, unless he or she renews the contract on 
no-less-favorable terms and conditions. 41  Once employers proceed with 
contract termination, the 2007 law requires them to make severance payments 
to employees based on the length of their services. The total amount of 
compensation is thus calculated as one average monthly salary for each year 
of service.  
 
  In response to the economic downturn and the transformation in the legal 
environment, capital has also developed various coping strategies. According 
to a research, manufacturing firms have pursued three kinds of relocation 
strategies in response to the crisis (Liao & Chan, 2011). Traditional 
manufacturing firms such as textile manufacturers tend to seek a total relocation, 
moving their factories out of the whole region. Other firms opt for stratified or 
pseudo relocation, closing only their low-end production lines or outsourcing 
productions to domestic enterprises in inland provinces. In the following years, 
these coping strategies of capital gave rise to an increase in labor protests 
which demanded for severance compensations.  
                                                        




6.5.3 The Tale of Two Union Mobilizations 
 
The two union-led labor protests under investigation took place in a temporal 
and contextual proximity. AME-1 led a successful petition to the local 
government in 2013. ASU-1’s failed mobilization took place in 2014. In order 
to comply with the industrial upgrading policy, ASU-1’s host enterprise, a 
processing factory which manufactured footwear, converted itself into a FIE 
with legal personality. Its former owner, an Australian-based MNC, transferred 
the factory’s ownership to several shareholders from Southeast Asia. After the 
ownership transfer, the company management promised to keep all its 
employees’ contracts unaffected and the calculation of the length of their 
service was to be continuous. Unfortunately, the management’s reassurance 
did not have its desired effect but triggered a labor protest which lasted for one 
and a half months. Despite ASU-1’s attempted in various ways to control the 
protest, its poor leadership failed to aggregate the demands of most employees 
or obtain any concession from the management.  
 
  AME-1 faced a similar situation. In response to its dwindling market share 
and profitability after the 2008 crisis, AME-1’s host enterprise, a subsidiary of 
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an US-based MNC42, decided to cut all of its production lines and terminate 
employment contracts with all its manufacturing workers. The management 
attempted to handle the laid-off lawfully and proposed a N+2 severance 
package to all its affected employees. The package was slightly better than the 
legal amounts which employees were entitled to under the 2007 Labor 
Contract Law. Upon accepting the package, each dismissed employee was to 
receive two extra months’ salaries, in addition to the compensation prescribed 
by the law. Despite that the management-proposed severance package was 
strictly legal, most employees insisted to be better compensated given their 
long tenure. In response to their demands, AME-1’s successful organization of 
a labor petition to the local government finally pressurized the headquarter 
management into offering a more generous package to the employees.  
 
  In short, the two labor unrests were not triggered by law violations on the 
part of enterprises, but by employees who anticipated to receive a 
higher-than-law compensation when facing a perceived or imminent 
termination of their employment contracts. Both enterprises were law-abiding 
before the outburst of the unrests. The workers were prompted to protest, 
because they anticipated a reasonable rather than merely a legally prescribed 
amount of compensation for their long-term services from their departing 
                                                        
42 AME-1’s host enterprise is one of the 105 subsidiaries of its parent company, an US-based MNC 
specializing in manufacturing electronic-communication connectors.  
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enterprises. Despite the similar causes and repertoires, the two union-led 
protests resulted in contrasting outcomes. The management and the state saw 
ASU-1’s demands unreasonable, since its workers faced no immediate threat 
of dismissal or an alternation of their contracts. ASU-1 was also seen as 
incapable of reconciling conflicting interests of its grieved workers, 
aggregating their demands, and disciplining their actions during the protest. In 
the end, the union failed to create a centripetal force among the protesting 
workers. In return, the management seized the organizational weakness of 
ASU-1 to curtail the morale of the union and strikers. The management first 
declared the protest as illegal, followed up with a mass dismissal of the 
strikers, and eventually retaliated against ASU-1’s leadership by dismissing its 
union leaders. In the end, ASU-1 failed to achieve any positive outcome for its 
workers. Even worse, its weak leadership and weak organizational discipline 
provided a ready-made excuse for the management to dismiss the employees 
en mass.  
 
  Contrastingly, the success of AME-1 laid in its organizational strength, in 
particular, its effective leadership. Similar to ASU-1’s experience, the early 
demands of AME-1 were turned down by its host enterprise. The 
management’s arrogance soon prompted some employees to petition to the 
local government. Facing a potential escalation, AME-1’s union chair was 
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aware of a fact that a labor petition was simultaneously an opportunity to 
attract state attention and a risk to invite state repression. Thus, he managed to 
control and discipline the process of the petition to create a unity and an order 
among the employees. His effective leadership and his coordination with other 
union staff transformed the petition a concerted effort instead of a chaotic 
gathering. In the end, AME-1’s mobilization achieved its dual goals. With an 
effective leadership, the union managed to leverage state pressure to push 
capital to sit at the bargaining table with the employee representatives. By 
demonstrating its ability in maintaining social stability in a labor protest to the 
state, AME-1 also deflected potential state repression.        
 
  I argue that the agency of union leaders explains a large part of the success 
and failure of the two labor protests. The difference in union leadership in 
effectuating a union control and maintaining a positive state-union relation 
accounts for the intra-case variance of the two protests. How a union 
mobilization is organized affects the perception and calculation of capital and 
the state, and conditions their responses to the union’s demands. On the one 
hand, the management seeks to curtail the union’s demands as much as 
possible, but it is likely to make some more concessions under state pressure. 
On the other hand, the state has a strong incentive to appease labor protests in 
the shortest amount of time by pressurizing capital into making concessions to 
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the workers. However, the state’s patience tends to evaporate very fast when a 
labor protest protracts to long and workers’ demands become too radical to be 
settled. When this happens, state repression looms large. Thus, it becomes 
urgent for union leaders to negotiate a way out of the limbo of labor protest by 
leveraging state pressure to obtain as many concessions as possible from 
capital, while at the same time not to protract their collective action processes 
so long as to trigger state repression. In order to obtain such a success, union 
leaders need to develop a time-sensitive, calibrated strategy to steering their 
mobilizations in a climate of political uncertainty.  
 
  The next subsection will analyze the interaction between the two unions and 
the state during their respective protest, which places an emphasis on the dual 
impacts of the Leninist state on union mobilization. The influence of the state 
did not cease at granting an initial legitimacy to the unions, but continued to 
expand or constrict the space of two union mobilizations at the critical 
moments of their protests.  
 
6.5.4 Union Control during the Protests 
 
This section analyzes the difference in union control effectuated by the two 
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union leaders during the protests. ASU-1 was weak in interest aggregation and 
organizational discipline and had a problematic relation with the state, 
whereas AME-1 excelled in all three aspects of union control. The difference 
in union control eventually led to the contrasting outcomes of the two labor 
unrests.   
 
Interest aggregation  
 
  In the case of ASU-1, the initial standoff between labor and capital stemmed 
from the demands for severance compensations from some radical employees. 
The management turned down these demands on the basis of the law and 
government policies. The enterprise insisted that there was no legal or policy 
grounding for the workers to make such as a claim, because the company’s 
ownership transfer had not affected their employment contracts (Interview 12). 
The enterprise did not seek relocation nor had it violated the 2007 Labor 
Contract Law.43  However, for most of the employees, their enterprise’s 
ownership change altered the terms and conditions of their employment 
contracts in substance. With the ownership transfer, the firm had severed its 
                                                        
43 In 2008, the higher People’s Court of Guangdong Province and the Guangdong Labor Disputes 
Arbitration Committee issued a guiding opinion (指导意见) with regard to the claim of severance pay in 
the circumstance of enterprise’s ownership change or transfer. The clause 23 of the opinion states that 
the employee’s length of service will continue after the change in enterprises’ names, legal 
representatives, or investors. However, it does not support employees to claim severance compensations 
from their employers after he or she unilaterally terminates their employment contracts. Accessed from: 
http://www.gdhrss.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/gdhrss/s51/201204/33678.html   
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ties with its former parent company, an Australian-listed MNC, which left the 
firm with few fixed assets. As a result, many workers were uncertain about 
whether the firm could keep up to its promise to feed all its veteran employees. 
A metaphor used by ASU-1’s union leader vividly captured the emotional state 
of the workers when they heard of their firm’s ownership transfer:  
 
“The factory was undergoing an industrial upgrading according 
to the government’s policies. After the upgrading, the company 
changed its legal representatives and means of production. In 
the past, our daddy [referring to the company’s former owner] 
was rich. Now, this daddy had no relationship with our factory. 
With the termination of this father-and-son relationship, our 
factory was in a difficulty situation. Thus, our concern was 
justifiable. We worried that in the future if when our factory was 
in a really bad situation, who would give us a bowl of porridge.” 
(Interview 13) 
 
  Thus, many workers saw demanding for severance compensations as 
legitimate. However, the management found the workers’ demands hard to 




  Amid the standoff, ASU-1 reelected its new union leaders (the 
above-mentioned union leader in interview 13). The new union’s vice-chair, 
Mr. Li (pseudonym), started out to moderate the workers’ demands in order to 
push the management back to the negotiation table. Unfortunately, the new 
leadership failed to effectively aggregate the interests and demands of most 
workers. Although Mr. Li acknowledged that the demand for severance 
compensation was unrealistic and tried to moderate the union’s proposal, he 
was unable to persuade the workers to drop their radical claims on 
compensation. Many of them continued to protest for severance pay regardless 
of the union’s objection. As Mr. Li recalled, he tried multiple times to 
persuade the workers to stop protesting, because their claims were not 
supported by the law (Interview 13). His words fell on deaf ears. Most 
workers ignored him and continued on with their strikes and creating chaos. 
Without a proper justification, the continuation of the strike provided a further 
justification to the management to reject negotiating with the union and the 
workers.  
 
  Thus, ASU-1’s interest aggregation was remarkably ineffective. The diaries 
of ASU-1 and the factory44, which I later obtained, also suggested that ASU-1 
largely failed to aggregate workers’ demands. Instead, the enterprise union 
                                                        
44 I collected firsthand data from both sides of the labor protest of AUS-1. Both the union and the firm 
recorded the process, which allowed me to more objectively examine and evaluate their interactions 
throughout the whole protest.    
  
211 
was mired in the competing claims posed by different groups of workers, 
which it was unable to reconcile with. While the union called for a restraint 
and negotiation between labor and the management, many employees 
continued on their radical mobilizations for severance compensations, which 
the management found it hard to accept. Even worse, ASU-1’s leaders failed 
to persuade radical workers to moderate their demands or to refrain from 
creating disruptions. Besides, the union failed to come up with a 
well-articulated proposal for a renegotiation with the enterprise and the state. 
 
  In a contrast, AME-1’s interest aggregation was effective and efficient, 
which allowed it to propose an alternative solution to its workers’ unrest. 
AME-1’s strength laid in its effective union leadership. Its union leader played 
a crucial role in aggregating the interests and demands of its workers, 
brainstorming the bargaining strategies, and constructively approaching the 
management and the state in search for a reasonable solution to the dispute. 
From the very beginning, the union’s demands were crystal clear, requiring its 
host enterprise to offer a compensation package to reward the veteran 
employees affected by the imminent laid-off. In order to allow a certain degree 
of flexibility and a space of negotiation, AME-1’s proposal also stated that the 
compensations should be more generous than the original N+2 package, but 
was negotiable. This proposal came from a prior research conducted by the 
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union leader, Mr. Cao (pseudonym). In order to craft a good proposal, Mr. Cao 
collected intelligence from many firms which had encountered the similar 
disputes. With the new information, he brainstormed a few solutions and 
negotiated them one by one with the management. These initial negotiations 
lasted for nearly two months but achieved no outcome because of the 
management’s objection. The management insisted that the original N+2 
package was strictly legal and slightly above the law. It then became very 
stern, refusing to engage any further conversation with AME-1 and the 
employees, a standoff similar to what had encountered by ASU-1. Enraged by 
the arrogant management, many employees decided to petition to the local 
government. Interestingly, what happened in the next stage of the conflict led 
to a drastically different outcome from that of ASU-1. AME-1 managed to 
maintain an effective organizational discipline on the petitioners, inducing 
them to express their demands in a rational and orderly manner through the 
union’s interest aggregation.  
 
Organizational discipline  
 
  AME-1 had a much more effective organizational discipline than ASU-1 did, 
which elicited state sympathy and support to its cause. In the case of AME-1, 
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the threat of state repression was largely attenuated by the union’s effective 
leadership, which maintained an order among their petitioners. Mr. Cao told 
me the key to maneuver a petition in a climate of political uncertainty was to 
demonstrate its “legality” to the government (Interview 14). For that purpose, 
he coordinated efforts with the other union staff and the employee 
representatives to create an organizational discipline of their petitioners. In 
specific, he required his union staff and the employee representatives to urge 
the petitioners to closely follow the directives from the union. He required his 
union staff to try every best means to prevent the employees from acting 
radically and opportunistically to engage in disruptions such as road blockade, 
vandalism, and littering in the process of their petition. The employees were 
also required to obey the law and not to jeopardize the social order. Mr. Cao 
remarked on the way he maintained union control among the workers during 
the petitioning process:   
 
“I gave out an order and [the petitioners] basically followed my 
order. No one disobeyed me and acted on his own. During the 
whole petition, all of them were calm, restrained, and listened to 
us [union chair and staff].” (Interview 14) 
 
  Under this effective organizational discipline, the petitioners peacefully 
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marched towards the local government’s building without creating any chaos. 
When the petitioners reached the government building, it was already at noon. 
They did not have lunch yet. Thus, Mr. Cao and other union staff ordered 
takeout from a nearby KFC and then all the petitioners, including the union 
staff, had their simple lunches in front of the government building. After the 
lunch, they packed leftovers into trash bags and placed all their trashes into 
garbage. In the afternoon, AME-1’s union staff and the employee 
representatives were allowed to enter the government building to negotiate a 
solution with government officials in an informal meeting. The formal 
meeting between AME-1 on the one hand and the enterprise and the state on 
the other hand started on the day after the petition. In the interview, Mr. Cao 
proudly told me: “We did not block the road or do any other illegal things! 
This was because I emphasized repeatedly to them – don’t do illegal things; 
follow the formal procedure.” (Interview 14). Through this well-organized and 
disciplined mobilization, AME-1 and the petitioners demonstrated the 
“legality” of their collective actions to the government as well as their 
preparedness for the upcoming collective bargaining with the enterprise and 
the state.   
 
  In contrast to AME-1’s disciplined mobilization, ASU-1’s organizational 
discipline was nearly ineffective. On the one hand, the workers’ trust and 
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patience on the union evaporated soon after they realized that the management 
was not to make any concession to the union. Subsequently, they resorted to 
individual strategies to pressurize the management, which bypassed ASU-1’s 
leadership completely. Unfortunately, without an organizational control, their 
individual strategies created a further chaos rather than a solidarity. Soon after 
the management turning down their demands for severance compensations, a 
group of 150 workers petitioned to the local government without notifying 
ASU-1.45 In order to pressurize the state into intervening in the standoff 
between them and the company, these workers blocked the entrance of the 
government building for a while, but were soon dissipated by the police. 
Charging with disturbing the public order, some of them were immediately 
brought to a police station. 46  Two days after the initial chaos, ASU-1 
convened an emergence meeting, which called upon all the strikers to resume 
their work and to legally aggregate their demands through the union.47 It was 
obvious that the union intended to control the collective action process in 
order to create a unity among the workers. However, most of the workers 
continued to strike regardless of the union’s objection. On the other hand, for 
the management, the union’s inability in controlling and disciplining their 
workers’ actions called its intent and legitimacy into question. The 
management was unable to differentiate between wildcat strikes and union 
                                                        
45 Police report, May 28th, 2014.  
46 Ibid. 
47 Memo of ASU-1’s committee meeting, May 31st, 2014.   
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strikes in such a chaotic situation. As the strike protracted, it increasingly 
came to convince that ASU-1 had orchestrated this labor unrest. Thus, the 
enterprise’s strategy was to dismiss the protesting workers en mass, because, 
as stated in the factory’s regulation, participation in labor protests constituted 
a sufficient condition for dismissal.48 The strategy of dismissal was effective 
and quickly spread a panic among the workers, prompting them to react even 
more radically. After a few days, some dismissed workers broke into the gate 
of the factory and occupied one of its buildings. They were dissipated by the 
police a few hours later.49 A few days later, another group of 21 dismissed 
and frustrated workers broke into the factory again and climbed onto the 
rooftop of one of its buildings.50 This time, they threatened to commit suicide, 
if the company did not meet their demands. The labor unrests eventually 
escalated into a public security crisis. The situation became so urgent that the 
local police and the fire services department immediately rushed to rescue.51 
One thing we can conclude from the whole episode is that ASU-1 failed to 
stop the workers from engaging in radical and uncoordinated resistance. The 
strikers also never took the union’s call for restraint seriously. In my interview 
with ASU-1’s union leader, Mr. Li, he told me that he was unable to make the 
workers to listen into him in the protest. The workers acted too 
                                                        
48 Nevertheless, it proceeded cautiously and notified ASU-1 each time before its announcement of 
dismissal.  
49 Factory diary, June 6th, 2014.  




opportunistically to allow the union to effectuate a disciplinary control of their 
actions. When commenting on the failed union control, he bitterly remarked:    
 
“I told them [workers] that ‘the factory is on the verge of 
collapse…if you continue to protest…if the boss closes the 
factory…you will not get even a cent.’ At that time, many of the 
workers might feel there was a gap between my suggestion and 
their expectations. They did not seem to trust me. Some workers 
hoped that by making this protest they could eventually force 
the enterprise to offer severance compensations, which seemed 
quite charming to them. If that ever happened, they could get a 
huge amount of compensation. I was unable to stop them…they 
did not listen into my realistic suggestion, but they listened into 
the charming thing [the chance of getting severance pay by 
protesting].” (Interview 13) 
 
Union-state connection  
 
  State intervention is a resource vital to the success of a union mobilization. 
The state not only grants legitimacy to unions, but also decisively shapes the 
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outcome of a union mobilization. Unions that have a strong connection with 
the state are more likely to elicit state support to their causes, whereas those 
with a weak state connection are less likely to do so.   
 
  AME-1’s connection with the state was consistent and constructive. Prior to 
the labor unrest, the union had maintained an amicable relationship with its 
parent official union. Its union leadership was highly responsive to the union 
policies. AME-1 encouraged its employees to participate in recreational 
activities sponsored by the official unions. Its union leaders also participated 
in various workshops on collective bargaining as organized by the SFTU, the 
municipal official union. Through these workshops, AME-1’s union leaders, 
especially Mr. Li, were acquainted with technical skills which were required 
on the part of union leaders in their handling labor disputes. As a result, 
AME-1 not only accumulated a prior theoretical experience in collective wage 
negotiation but also successfully held several wage negotiations with the 
management. PICTURE 6.1 shows one of AME-1’s collective wage 
negotiations. The union staff was sitting on the right-hand side of the round 
table, while the company representatives sitting one the left-hand side of it 
(upfront in the picture). An official from the local labor office was sitting 
between the two groups of people. This picture shows that a positive 
interaction did exist between AME-1, its host enterprise and the local 
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government prior to the 2013 protest. The early experience had created a 
relatively favorable environment for the enterprise union and the management 




PICTURE 6.1 AME-1’s Collective Wage Negotiation 
 
 
  AME-1 was highly responsive to the signals from the state during the 
protest. Its union leaders had a strong incentive to maintain the “legality” of 
their union mobilization. When Mr. Cao was unsure of how to maneuver the 
mobilization, he frequently consulted the union’s two lawyers, who were early 
designated as AME-1’s legal consultants by the SFTU. The two union lawyers 
guided him to “legally” organize the union-led confrontational collective 
action and in particular to refrain from creating any chaos or disruption to the 
public order. Mr. Cao later recounted: “without them, we may very likely have 
made a mess.” (Interview 14). Because of his effective leadership and his 
responsiveness to the state, the local government eventually pushed the parent 
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company to negotiate with AME-1. In our interview, Mr. Cao acknowledged 
that it was the state power which finally pushed the management to sit at the 
bargaining table with AME-1 and its workers. He admitted that the union 
might have no chance to negotiate with its host firm’s parent company, had the 
state not intervened in the industrial conflict:    
 
“If the state did not intervene in our petition, those people [the 
delegates from the parent company] would not come. We could 
not get the money. State intervention was crucial at this critical 
moment…the role of the government was to create a ‘platform’ 
[for the negotiation between capital and labor]. The company 
needs to take account of the words of the government…the role 
of the government is to pull the two sides to sit down together at 
a table to talk and negotiate…in this way, it [the government] 
makes capital come out to negotiate [with the union]. This is the 
function of the government, which is very good. The 
government does not command the company, but its words 
weigh heavily on the latter.” (Interview 14) 
 
  State intervention also had a prominent impact on the process of collective 
bargaining process between AME-1 and its host enterprise. In order to bring a 
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quick end to the industrial conflict, the local government and the official 
unions urged Mr. Cao to moderate the claims of their employees. A senior 
government official warned Mr. Cao against making radical claims. The 
official informed him: “The company’s plan is legal. If you piss off the firm, it 
will possibly not give you even a cent. Ask some more based on the N+2 plan. 
Ask what you deserve, don’t screw it up.”. In return for the government’s 
support, AME-1 reached a consensus with the enterprise in two weeks. In the 
new settlement plan, the management agreed to add an extra bonus, which 
amounted to RMB one million (USD 155,800), to the N+2 plan for rewarding 
its employees for their long tenures serving the enterprise. The new settlement 
made all parties satisfied. The parent company found the new settlement plan 
in an acceptable range. AME-1 and all the employees claimed the victory of 
the battle for labor dignity. The government appeased an otherwise socially 
disruptive labor protest.    
 
  In contrast to AME-1’s strong ties to the state, ASU-1’s connections with 
the state were weak from the very beginning and became even more 
problematic since the protest. Prior to the protest, ASU-1 was largely inactive. 
The union had no regular interaction with its parent official union. Workers 
also did not display any interest in union activities. Soon after the protest 
began, ASU-1 elected its new union leaders, which was not approved by the 
  
223 
official unions. Since then, ASU-1’s legitimacy was called into question and 
became a hindrance to its collection actions. After the election, ASU-1 turned 
to its parent official union for a formal endorsement, but the latter refused its 
request. Although the official union claimed that ASU-1’s election was not in 
line with the law, it suggested its union leaders to continue their mobilizations. 
The official union’s murky response was intriguing. As a part of state 
apparatus, the official unions are obliged to maintain social stability and 
demobilize labor protests. Thus, their acquiescence of ASU-1’s mobilization 
was intriguing, because they did not formally endorse the enterprise union nor 
did they suppress its mobilizations. A recent research may provide a tentative 
answer to the ambiguous intent of the official unions in labor protests. The 
official unions may benefit from spontaneous labor agitations, when these 
mass incidents increase their status in the party-state bureaucracy (Fu, 2016, p. 
7). However, their dual role as both state bureaucracies and labor 
organizations (Chen, 2003) make them refrain from openly supporting labor 
agitations. Thus, in the case of ASU-1, it was likely that the official unions 
were opportunistic in handling this labor protest. It just waited to see how far 
this ASU-1’s protest could proceed on its own before it officially recognized 
the union. If the protest failed and the workers got fired, the official unions 
claimed they had nothing to do with this failed labor agitation. If the protest 
succeeded and the industrial conflict was resolved, they then claimed that 
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ASU-1 had contributed to maintain social stability and officially endorsed it 
thereafter.  
 
  Unfortunately, ASU-1’s leadership was too weak to effectuate a union 
control on the workers. Its ineffective leadership reduced its chance to reach a 
quick deal with the management. ASU-1 failed to present itself as a 
representative organ of the workers, with which the enterprise and the state 
could negotiate to solve the crisis (PICTURE 6.2). Even worse, without a 
state-recognized legitimacy, ASU-1 was seen as illegal in the eyes of the 
management. Charging the protest as illegal, the enterprise owner and the 
senior managers refused any negotiation with ASU-1 and its workers. 
Eventually, they managed to dismantle the strike through dismissal. ASU-1’s 
leader, Mr. Li, when reflecting on the failure of the protest, remarked that the 
union’s failure to obtain state recognition was accountable to this outcome: 
 
 “Our union informed our parent official union the outcome of 
our election. They responded that our election’s procedure was 
not in line with the law, because they were not involved. That 
means, an election by our self did not count. We had no idea the a 
union election required their endorsement…an election approved 





PICTURE 6.2 Workers in ASU-1’s Protest 
 
NOTE: Disorganized workers stood in the courtyard of their factory. 
  
  ASU-1’s failure suggests that a union mobilization is unlikely to succeed if 
its leaders fail to factor state intervention into their strategic deliberations. In 
labor protests, the state not only grants legitimacy to unions but also functions 
as a coordinating organ with other parties involved. A well-organized labor 
protest can demonstrate labor militancy to capital and the state, but it is 
insufficient to push capital towards the bargaining table without the state 
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laying pressure on the management. State intervention only becomes favorable 
to union mobilizations, when unions demonstrate their ability in interest 
aggregation and organizational discipline and pose no threat to social stability 
valued by the state. In the case of ASU-1, this condition was not satisfied 
because of the union’s weak leadership and its weak connection to the state. 
During the labor protest, neither side of the industrial conflict was able to 
effectively communicate with the other side. Although many government 
agencies presented at the strike site, none of them was able to persuade the 
enterprise to negotiate with the union and the protestors. The workers did not 
respond to the union’s call for restraint, nor were they willing to aggregate 
their demands through ASU-1’s representation. The union was unable to 
control and discipline those radical workers. The enterprise was unable to 
grasp the true intent of the union and the strikers. Amid the chaos, the state 
was unable to construct a platform for labor and capital to negotiate a solution, 
since maintaining stability had already consumed most of its resources and 
energies. The standoff and miscommunications made the management sterner. 
After a month-long protracted standoff, the enterprise eventually managed to 
dismantle the strike by dismissing all protestors, including union leaders. The 
dismissal literally put the labor protest to its end. 
 
  The aftermaths of the two labor unrests were also strikingly different. 
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Eventually, most labor unrests will enter a phase of institutionalization. Court 
fight starts when street fight stops (Nair, 2016). When the employees brought 
their cases to the court, union legitimacy mattered again. In the case of ASU-1, 
the dismissed workers filed individual and collective lawsuits against the 
enterprise for reinstatement and compensations. However, without the state’s 
endorsement, ASU-1 was disqualified to provide evidences to the court in 
favor of the strikers. In the end, all the workers lost their lawsuits. By contrast, 
AME-1 not only succeeded on street but also in court. The union continued to 
provide legal assistance to the laid-off employees who pursued individual 
lawsuits against their former employer. As a legitimate union, AME-1 was 
qualified to provide evidences favorable to the employees in court, thereby 
helping them win their court fights.    
 
6.5.5 A Discussion of Alternative Explanations: State Repression or 
Capital’s Resistance? 
 
State repression was attributed as the primary cause of the failure of social 
protests, including labor unrests (Deng & Brien, 2013; Li & Liu, 2016). In my 
research, I argue otherwise that the failed mobilization of ASU-1 was not 
caused by state repression, but mainly by its weak leadership and its 
enterprise’s resistance. Thus, why state repression was not the primary cause 
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of ASU-1’s failure? As I argued early on, the Leninist state is Janus-faced in 
handling social unrests. It does have a proclivity to repress or dissipate social 
unrests, but it does not always resort to coercion. State repression appears 
most frequently when social unrests pose an imminent threat to public order. 
In most circumstances, the state only maintains a specter of repression, instead 
of directly applying repression to social unrests.  
 
  ASU-1’s failed mobilization constitutes a good case for assessing the 
impact of state repression on union mobilization. Throughout the episode, 
there were two incidents of police intervention, but none of them targeted the 
union. The main function of police intervention was to restore social order or 
to preempt radical actions such as suicide on the part of workers, rather than to 
preempt labor’s collective actions. In the first incident, some 100 workers 
petitioned to the local government and then blocked the gate of the 
government building. The police soon dissipated the crowds and brought 25 of 
them52 to a police station for questioning. This police intervention seemed a 
typical instance of state repression. However, a closer look of the questioning 
process revealed a lot more information. Two police reports, which I managed 
to obtain, showed that the police only inquired the workers about their reasons 
to block the government building.53 They informed the workers it was illegal 
                                                        
52 Factory diary, May 28th, 2014. 
53 Police report (worker A), May 28th, 2014; Police report (worker B), May 28th, 2014. 
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to gather in front of the government building, which had constituted a 
disruption of the government’s work and the public order. The police also 
suggested the workers to use legal and reasonable means to protect their rights 
and interests. In the second incident, some dismissed workers climbed onto the 
rooftop of the factory’s building and threatened suicide in order to force a 
concession from the enterprise.54 The police soon rushed to rescue them.  
 
  I also obtained the factory’s diary as the evidences from the oppositional 
side of the industrial conflict. The diary showed that the company did call for 
police involvement many times throughout the labor protest. However, the 
police was largely unresponsive, and, when it did intervene in a few 
circumstances, its intervention was impotent.55 Its inertia actually allowed 
many workers to repeatedly use sabotages and disruptions to sustain their 
strikes. On the part of the union, ASU-1’ vice chair, Mr. Li, primarily blamed 
the enterprise for their failure, not the state.56 He regarded the enterprise 
owner as the culprit of ASU-1’s unsuccessful labor protest (Interview 13). In 
his eyes, it was the enterprise’s stubbornness and arrogance, which refused 
any conversation with the workers, eventually pushed the workers and the 
state to exhaustion. 
                                                        
54 Factory diary, June 19th, 2014. 
55 Factory diary, from May 26th to July 10th, 2014. 
56 Mr. Li was charged with inciting worker unrests and was detained by the police for 5 days. He was 
released soon after the protesting workers wrote to the SFTU for help. The municipal official union did 




  Although the state resorts less to repression in handling social unrests, it 
seeks to maintain a specter of repression. That means, the state threatens to 
repress more often than it actually represses. This specter of state repression 
makes the terrain of union mobilizations a highly contested process, in which 
union leaders are compelled to make calibrated decisions in order to avoid a 
potential state repression. AME-1’s excellent union leadership and its 
cooperation with the state shielded itself from state repression. Nevertheless, 
the specter of state repression has a significant psychological impact on union 
leaders. AME-1’s union chair, Mr. Cao, told me that the local government had 
an initial intent to detain him, because he appeared to be the organizer of the 
petition (Interview 15). The intent was only dropped after he proved himself 
capable of alleviating, rather than aggregating, the labor unrest. Later on, 
AME-1’s parent official union also informed Mr. Cao that it was not good for 
an enterprise union to lead a petition, although they were quite happy with his 
performance during the whole event.  
 
  As for the second alternative argument, I argue that the state, though having 
a strong incentive to pressurize capital, faces a severe limitation. The 
likelihood of an enterprise to satisfy its employees’ interest-based claims, 
which usually involve making a huge amount of compensations, depends on 
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its financial condition. If an enterprise is financially incapable of 
compensating its workers, neither labor militancy nor state pressure can force 
a concession out of it. AME-1’s host enterprise was willing to increase the 
amount of severance compensations for its laid-off workers was also because 
it had a separate budget for employees’ severance compensation. Thus, what 
AME-1 achieved was to maximize their workers’ relative gains within the 
scope of this budget. In the case of ASU-1, some circumstantial evidence 
pointed to a speculation that the enterprise actually had no money to 
compensate its worker at all (Interview 12; Interview 13). Therefore, although 
state intervention in ASU-1’ protest was much more heavier than in AME-1’s, 
it eventually failed to persuade the enterprise to sit at the bargaining table with 
the union or the workers. Here, a tentative argument can be made is that some 
micro-economic factors such as a host enterprise’s financial condition may 
have a more significant impact on the outcomes of union mobilizations than 
those of the state and labor. Unfortunately, these micro-economic factors may 




6.6 Conclusion  
 
The emergence of proto-economic unions suggests that collective labor power 
can emerge in Leninist states. When enterprises are open to collective 
employees’ representation, the unions can rely only on mobilizing conciliatory 
collective actions to support the interest-based claims of their employees. In 
the meantime, an effective union leadership is necessary to aggregate the 
interests of employees and to coordinate their collective actions. However, a 
meeting of these two conditions is infrequently seen in reality. When 
enterprises are not open to collective bargaining, proto-economic unions resort 
to mobilizing confrontational collective actions such as strikes and petitions to 
wring concessions from capital. 
 
  The success of a confrontational collective action relies on union leaders to 
control and discipline the collective action process as well as to leverage state 
pressure to push capital toward the bargaining table. The state variable thus 
becomes crucial as it determines the mobilizational space of proto-economic 
unions. In particular, the state delineates the boundary between “legal” and 
“illegal” confrontational collective actions. However, different from those who 
see the state-union relation in labor protests as a zero-sum game (Chen, 2003; 
C. Li & Liu, 2016), I argue that state intervention is actually a vital resource 
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for union mobilizations to succeed in a climate of political uncertainty. As the 
two cases study shows, Proto-economic unions which have a stronger tie with 
the state are more likely to be seen as legal in union mobilizations than those 
with a weaker tie. Moreover, state intervention closely interacts with the 
agent-level variable – the agency of union leaders. In order to elicit state 
support and sympathy, union leaders need to demonstrate their ability in 
aggregating the interests of their employees, effectuating an organizational 
discipline of their workers, and maintaining an effective interaction with the 
state during their collective action process. 
 
  Proto-economic unions may have a bifurcated impact on Leninist states. On 
the one hand, their conciliatory variants can promote the interest-based claims 
of their employees without resorting to strikes or petitions. In this regard, 
these unions can help with alleviating the pressure on the state in handling 
labor conflicts arising from wage stagnations. They can serve the interests of 
employees and the state simultaneously. On the other hand, their 
confrontational variants are unintended outcomes of the state-sponsored 
unionization. Possessing collective action power, proto-economic unions hold 
the potential to mobilize industrial actions, which are seen socially or 
politically threatening in the eyes of the state.
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION   
 
Chapter 7 concludes the whole thesis and paves the way for future research. I 
will first summarize the major arguments in this thesis. Following the 
summaries, I will then test my explanatory framework in a most-similar case: 
state-sponsored unionization in Vietnam. The last section presents the 
concluding remarks of the thesis.  
 
7.1 A Summary of the Major Arguments in the Thesis 
 
State-sponsored unionization represents an institution-building effort of 
Leninist states in their adaptation to the industrial relations in a market 
economy. The Leninist state seeks to unionize private enterprises in order to 
reestablish social control and recreate social stability in the private sector. The 
state anticipates these workplace unions to protect and promote worker 
interests, engage in an amicable and constructive relationship with the 
management, facilitate the implementation of state policies, and preempt labor 
unrests.  
 
  Thus, my research investigates how and to what extent the state has 
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transformed the factory regime in capitalist firms through institutionalizing 
enterprise unions. I intend to answer three research questions: How does a 
Leninist state, when it institutionalizes enterprise unions, intervene in the 
factory regime of capitalist firms? What outcomes have the state-sponsored 
unionization produced? How can we explain the variance in union efficacy? I 
argue that the state-sponsored unionization has created neither state apparatus 
nor managerial tool, but a union variance as manifested in three types of union 
– paperwork unions, managerial unions and proto-economic unions.  
 
  In Chapter 2, I create an explanatory framework to explain this variance. I 
argue that the unionization’s outcomes hinge on responses and reactions from 
capital and union leaders. At the structural level, managerial perception 
conditions the timing and the extent to which state intervention is allowed to 
influence factory regime. At the agent level, I assign the causal proximity to 
agency of union leaders, stressing their ability in expanding union functions 
and in navigating collection actions in a climate of managerial dominance and 
political uncertainty. 
 
  In Chapter 4, I investigate why and how state intervention has failed in 
some parts of the private sector, resulting in paperwork unions. Contrary to the 
conventional wisdom, I argue that paperwork unions are resultant from a weak 
state intervention rather than a state repression of the grassroots labor activism. 
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Hostile enterprises can compromise state intervention in their factory regime 
and suppress the emergence of union leaders and activists. Paperwork unions 
do not serve the interest of the state or the interests of employees. Their 
presence indicates a failure of the Leninist state in transforming the internal 
environment of capitalist production in some parts of the private sector due to 
the resistance of capital. This chapter also addresses an alternative argument 
on the weakness of labor organizations in China. I argue that migrant workers’ 
apathy, largely caused by their fluid work and life patterns, accounts for the 
weakness of labor organizations, either official or non-governmental.   
 
  Friendly enterprises are the preconditions for managerial unions and 
proto-economic unions to emerge. In Chapter 5 and 6, I explain their 
mechanisms of formation and their intra-case variance. The qualitative 
difference in their union leaderships marks their further institutional 
divergence. Managerial unions emerge in response to a combination of two 
structural factors and one agent-level factor. At the structural level, the 
progressive labor law reform since the mid-2000s has led to a favorable 
change in managerial perception in a larger part of the private sector. More 
enterprises are open to unionization, when it brings intangible or tangible 
benefits to them. The positive changes in managerial perception have created 
more opportunities for the official unions to reach out to enterprise union 
leaders and to encourage them to be more responsive to the unionization 
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policies. Thus, the more responsible and competent union leaders are, the 
more likely managerial unions are able to develop a broader set of functions 
which include resource transfer, promotion of industrial democracy and 
support of the rights-based claims of their employees. For the official unions, 
managerial unions are definitely better than paperwork unions. Managerial 
unions facilitate a partial implementation of state policies by increasing the 
contacts and communications between the official unions and the unionized 
enterprises. Through managerial unions, the official unions also gain an access 
to the enterprise-level information, which may facilitate them to monitor union 
development. Thus, managerial unions can be said as the entry points for the 
official unions to intervene in the factory regime in the private sector. 57 
However, managerial unions do not possess collective action power due to 
their leaders’ constrained agency. As constrained middlemen, these leaders 
have a strong incentive to prioritize managerial interest over the interest of 
employees and the state. They rarely support the interest-based claims of their 
employees, which require a substantial bargaining power on the part of the 
enterprise unions.  
 
  Among the three types of union, only proto-economic unions possess 
collective action power, which enables them to support the interest-based 
                                                        
57 According to a grassroots union cadre, the official unions intend to increase union’s quantity before 
promoting its quality (Interview 17). The current union policies aim for unionizing as many as private 
enterprises as possible to spread union knowledge and ideology. The next step is to promote these unions’ 
quality, which makes them "useful". Thus, the future of managerial unions remains to be seen. 
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claims of their employees. In Chapter 6, I argue that these unions’ collective 
action power stems from the agency of their leaders. Union leadership is 
strategic in shaping the trajectories and outcomes of the union-led collective 
actions, conciliatory or confrontational. With an effective union control, 
proto-economic unions can facilitate collective wage negotiations between 
employees and enterprises and can possibly lead a successful strike or petition. 
Without an effective union control, the union-led confrontational collective 
actions are more likely to fail. Once a union mobilizations spills over the 
factory, its success and failure is intertwined with state intervention during its 
collective action process. The state expands or contracts the mobilizational 
space of the union-led confrontational mobilizations. Thus, it is strategic for 
union leaders to maintain a positive interaction with the state during the 
process of union mobilizations, if they intend to lead their mobilizations to 
success while at the same time avoiding state repression.  
 
  Together, my research challenges the structural-centric notion that the 
state-sponsored unionization can only create state apparatus or managerial tool 
in the private sector. My central argument is that this unionization campaign 
has created social organizations with varying degrees of responsiveness to 
state policies, rather than state apparatus or managerial tools. As my research 
shows, none of these unions is state apparatus, which only serves the interest 
of the state, or managerial tool, which is irrelevant to workers. The variance 
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suggests an important role of union leadership in expanding union functions 
and handling industrial conflicts. What makes these union leaders matter is the 
Leninist state’s reliance on grassroots agents to facilitate policy 
implementation and to maintain social stability in a market economy. It means 
that societal actors such as union leaders and managerial personnel can also 
advance their own interests if they properly utilize the Leninist institutions. 
 
7.2 Future Research: the State-sponsored Unionization in Vietnam 
 
This section presents a comparative study of the state-sponsored unionization 
in Vietnam in order to test the applicability of my explanatory framework. The 
question here is: are the structural conditions (e.g. legal and political 
institutions) in Vietnam more favorable to the emergence of proto-economic 
unions than those in China? The answer here is that although Vietnam 
provides a more favorable legal and political environment to unionization, 
current evidences suggest that it does not seem to have more proto-economic 
unions than China does. In fact, Vietnam shares the same problem with China 
with regard to unionization: workers resort to wildcat strikes rather than 
enterprise unions to bargain with capital in industrial conflicts. My explanatory 
framework can roughly explain this puzzling outcome. Although Vietnam has 
favorable legal and political institutions for union governance, it scores low on 
  
240 
managerial acceptance of unionization and agency of union leaders. As I argued 
earlier, the outcome of the state-sponsored unionization hinges on the response 
from capital and enterprise union leaders. Private enterprises in Vietnam, 
mostly FIEs, are from those countries which lack a tradition of collective 
employees' representation, so they are less likely to embrace unionization than 
private firms in China. At the agent level, there is no evidence that 
enterprise union leaders in Vietnam are more representative than their Chinese 
counterparts, since their union finance is dependent on employers’ 
contributions. Enterprise unions in Vietnam seek conciliation rather than 
confrontation with capital even in a climate of political toleration. Thus, it is not 
surprising that workers in Vietnam do not select enterprise unions as the 
primary vehicles for staging strikes. In a market economy, Leninist states have 
to cultivate the incentives on the part of private sector actors, capital and union 
leaders, in order to make its policies produce some intended outcomes. State 
variables do not solely determine a policy’s outcome.   
 
  The history of the Vietnamese union movement is similar yet distinct from 
that of China. The union movements in the two Leninist states are similar in a 
sense that they maintain the same Leninist framework of organizing labor 
organizations after they transited into market economy. They maintain the key 
features of the Leninist union system: enterprise unionism. Since the economic 
reform in 1986, the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP), similar to the CCP, 
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has demonstrated a strong incentive to penetrate into a dramatically 
transformed Vietnamese economy and society. Under the VCP’s new directive, 
the national peak labor organization, the Vietnam General Confederation of 
Labour (VGCL), has sought to promote unionization in the country’s 
emerging private sector (Nguyen, 1989). The VGCL’s move serves a dual 
purpose for the party-state (Norlund, 1996). As the tool of the state, the 
VGCL’s unionization campaign can facilitate a smooth transformation of 
Vietnam’s economy from Socialism to capitalism. As the sole representative 
organ of labor, enterprise unions can provide a base of workers’ organization 
and protection in the private sector. Some scholars suggest that since the VCP 
has a higher tolerance of strikes than the CCP does, we may see a divergence 
between the labor regimes in the two Leninist states (Norlund, 1996; Chan & 
Norlund, 1998). Others suggest that it is too early to reach such a conclusion, 
because the VCP and the VGCL show no sign of relinquishing their grips on 
social organizations and continue to restrict the associational space of labor 
(Khanh, 2015).  
 
  The VGCL does has a much more harmonious relation with the party-state 
than its Chinese counterpart. In China, the ideological clashes between the 
ACFTU and the CCP dated back to the early 1950s and eventually resulted in 
the purge of union cadres and the violent destruction of the ACFTU in the 
Cultural Revolution (Chapter 2). In Vietnam, the VGCL and the VCP never 
  
242 
came into such a political clash (Norlund, 1996). During the Vietnam War 
period, the trade unions played a subordinate but effective role in 
implementing the VCP’s decisions in war and production mobilization as well 
as in mobilizing workers’ support.  
 
  This state-union relationship seems to be path-dependent. The VGCL 
continues to enjoy a supportive political environment than its Chinese 
counterpart in the reform era. One reason may be that labor unrests pose less 
threat to the VCP than to the CCP. In the 1990s, both China and Vietnam 
embarked on the SOEs reform in order to streamline their ill-performed 
state-owned sector. The restructuring process inevitably caused mass laid-offs 
of state workers. The SOEs reform in China triggered mass labor protests, 
which specifically targeted the local governments. Thus, for the CCP, labor 
unrests became increasingly intertwined with political instability. The ruling 
party’s perception of industrial conflicts has a heavy imprint on its industrial 
relation policies. Although the ACFTU is given a role as the guardian of labor, 
its primary functions, as required by the CCP, are restricted to maintain an 
industrial harmony. In Vietnam, the SOEs reform did not trigger mass 
upheavals among state workers, perhaps because of the low concentration (5%) 
of industrial workers in state sector (Chan & Norlund, 1998). Instead, most 
labor unrests in Vietnam took place in FIEs.58 These unrests targeted foreign 
                                                        




investors rather than the state. From the very beginning, labor unrests in 
Vietnam appeared much less politically threatening to the VCP. Thus, it is 
reasonable to assume that the different perceptions of labor unrests held by the 
two ruling communist parties have shaped their respective union reform policy 
in the coming decades.  
 
  In Vietnam, the legal institution governing unionization is undoubtedly 
more favorable than the legal institution that China has (Chapter 4). The 
Vietnamese labor law and trade union law have granted a greater autonomy to 
the VGCL and its grassroots units than Chinese laws do to its enterprise 
unions (Chan & Norlund, 1998). For example, on union registration, the 
1990’s Law on the Trade Union stipulates that Vietnamese workers can 
establish enterprise unions upon informing the official unions (Article 1.2), 
but the endorsement from the latter is not required. More important, 
managerial consent is not required in union registration, which means 
Vietnamese workers can create their own enterprise unions regardless of the 
management’s objection. In China, the 2001 Trade Union Law requires union 
registration to be approved by the management and the official unions 
(Chapter 5). This state-granted legitimacy affects the bargaining position of 
unions in their collective actions (Chapter 6).  
 
  Yet, the most important divergence in their respective legal institutions is 
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the right to strike. In Vietnam, strikes have not only been legalized but also 
de-politicized. The 2012 Labor Code allows workers to resort to strikes in 
industrial conflicts upon fulfilling certain procedures. In Article 209, the Code 
defines a strike as “a temporary, voluntary and organized stoppage of work by 
the worker’s collective in order to achieve the demands in the process of the 
labour dispute resolution.”59. Enterprise union is designated as the only legal 
body to lead strikes at the firm level; the official unions at upper-levels could 
lead strikes when the enterprise has no union.60 Enterprise union is required 
to solicit the consent from over 50% employees before issuing a written strike 
notice.61 A strike notice must be issued simultaneously to the employer, the 
provincial labour management authority and the provincial official union 5 
working days prior to the action and must contain issues with regard to the 
timing and venue of the strike, the demands of workers, the particulars of 
union representatives, and other information related to agents and process of 
the intended strike.62 In this regard, Vietnam has stridden far ahead of China 
to institutionalize industrial strikes. In China, by contrast, the CCP has 
withheld the constitutional protection on right to strike since 1982. Labor 
unrests are still treated indiscriminately along with other collective unrests and 
are primarily dealt with by the public security authority rather than the official 
unions or other labor management authorities. This legal limbo does not 
                                                        
59 Article 209, Labour Code, 2012. Accessed from: 
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/MONOGRAPH/91650/114939/F224084256/VNM91650.pdf  
60 Article 210. Ibid.   
61 Article 213. Ibid. 
62 Article 213. Ibid. 
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prevent state workers and migrant workers from staging strikes to voice their 
grievances and demands, but it does impose a specter of state repression on 
strike participants (Chapter 6). 
 
  Thus, given that the VCP is more open to grassroots union activism, can we 
make a prediction that more proto-economic unions will emerge in Vietnam 
than in China? That means, more workers are willing choose enterprise unions 
as their strike organizations. Clarke (2006), however, suggests the opposite. 
He argues that this favorable legal institution has failed to channel most labor 
unrests into the structure of enterprise unions. Wildcat strikes remain as the 
dominant form of workers’ resistance. He suggests looking at the causes at 
both the structural level and the agent level. At the structural-level, the VGCL 
only allows enterprise unions the right to organize strikes, excluding all other 
non-official labor organizations as strike organizers. It is obvious that the 
VGCL has no intention to give up its monopolistic but ineffective 
representation of the working class, which is a form of “appropriated 
representation” as criticized in Friedman (2014). In this regard, the VGCL is 
not different from the ACFTU. At the agent level, Vietnamese workers are 
suspicious of the loyalty of employee representatives of their enterprise unions, 
because these union officers are often managerial personnel who tend to have 
little interest in speaking up for workers. Clarke’s observation is confirmed by 
a latest research on the implementation of the 2012 Labour Code (Khanh, 
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2015). This study finds that workers continue to stage wildcat strikes to make 
claims instead of organizing their strikes through enterprise unions. More 
ironically, most strikes occurred in unionized enterprises. an attributes the 
ineffectiveness of enterprise unions to three factors: First, the associational 
power of enterprise unions is still very limited. The official unions usually 
persuade enterprises to establish unions only after the latter’s opinions are 
solicited. Second, state intervention is so heavy in wildcat strikes that it actually 
hollows out enterprise union as an effective mechanism of dispute resolution. In 
practice, wildcat strikes are settled by a group of state envoys, which is a joint 
working group constituted by the People’s Committee, the official unions, labor 
department and police. Similar to the Chinese state, the Vietnamese state 
intrusively intervenes in labor unrests in order to restore social stability. 
Unfortunately, this bureaucratic settlement not only bypasses enterprise unions 
but also increases the incentive of workers to use wildcat strike for making their 
demands, both of which weaken enterprise unions. Third, the leaders of wildcat 
strikes have never been punished. It further reduces the risk on the part of 
workers to use wildcat strikes to push their demands in industrial conflicts. In 
short, current research is state-centric. It suggests the Leninist institution 
hinders the progress of unionization in Vietnam, despite that this country 
seems to possess more favorable structural conditions for union development 




  Here, I provide a complementary argument to Clarke (2006), Friedman 
(2014), and Khanh (2015). I argue that a prediction on the future of the 
state-sponsored unionization in Vietnam needs to take account of managerial 
response to unionization and the agency of union leader, as my explanatory 
framework has suggested. As I argue, state intervention is necessary but not 
sufficient to explain the variance of union efficacy in transitioning Leninist 
states, where capital has created its own domain of dominance. In Vietnam, 
most FIEs come from countries without a tradition of collective employees’ 
representation such as South Korea and Taiwan.63 Past research in China 
suggested that these Korean- and Taiwanese-invested SMEs had the most 
abusive and inhuman factory regime among all FIEs (Chan, 2001; Won, 2007). 
Thus, they are unlikely to be friendly to unionization at the first place. In fact, 
the majority of wildcat strikes in Vietnam did take place in Korean and 
Taiwanese enterprises.64 Clarke (2006) once remarked on the despotic factory 
regime in these firms: 
 
“Korean and Taiwanese investors have tended to use the 
authoritarian management methods inherited from the SMEs from 
which many of them have grown, but they are also working in 
very competitive, low-skilled, labour intensive light industry 
where such management methods are common” (p.348) 
                                                        
63 South Korea and Taiwan are the two largest investors in Vietnam.  




  It is highly likely that these enterprises are union-free or they have 
suppressed unions (e.g. paperwork unions). When they do have unions, it is 
likely that their management perceives unionization as an extraction rather 
than a resource and has managed to suppress the agency of union officers. 
However, since Clarke’s data was collected in the early 2000s, which was ten 
years from now, it is likely that his data no longer captures the latest 
composition of FIEs and the changes in their factory regimes. Thus, more 
research on enterprise ownership and corporate culture is needed before a 
robust comparison can be made between the two transitioning Leninist states.    
 
  Lastly, are union leaders in Vietnam empowered to lead strikes because 
they have the legal right to strike? This is a hard question, because the 
agent-level qualitative data is absent. Nevertheless, some scholars have tried 
to answer it based on indicators such as union finance. They assumption is, if 
union leaders are paid out of union funds instead of by their employers, they 
are more likely to act independently and defensive of labor interest. For 
example, Chan & Norlund (1998) suggest that the 1992 Trade Union law 
provides some independent financial sources to union officials, as the law 
requires union staff to be paid out of union funds instead of company’s 
payrolls (Article 15.3). However, I would suggest their observations were 
premature, which fails to capture the labor law reform in Vietnam in 2012. 
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The 2012 Labor Code provides some support to my caution. In its Article 26 
on union finance, the law includes 2% of wage bill as one of the main 
revenues of union funds.65 Interestingly, this article is exactly the same as 
Article 42 of the 2001 Trade Union Law of China. It is possible that the 
VGCL has learned from the ACFTU to supplement union funds from 
employers’ contributions due to its insufficient membership contributions. The 
insufficient membership contribution may be caused by Vietnamese workers’ 
work and life patters. In Vietnam, most workers work in labor-intensive 
industries. It is unclear to what extent union members are willing to make a 
regular contribution to union funds and whether or not these union funds are 
sufficient to pay union officers. It is also unlikely that Vietnamese migrant 
workers are willing to contribute regularly to union funds out of their meager 
earnings. They are highly mobile and thus it is irrational for them to invest in a 
single enterprise union for long-term goals such as labor welfare. 
 
  Thus, Chan & Norlund (1998) can be too early to argue that Vietnamese 
union officers can act relatively independently from management because of 
their independent incomes. Khanh (2015) confirms that most grassroots union 
officers are part-time staff and paid by the employer. As a result, they are 
unwilling to lead strikes. So far, the evidences suggest that Vietnam does not 
have a higher frequency of proto-economic unions than China does. This is 
                                                        




because the two non-state variables, managerial perception and union 
leadership, are not favorable to the emergence of proto-economic unions. First, 
there is little evidence that FIEs in Vietnam have a greater respect of labor rights 
than their counterparts in China. Second, due to the lack of independent funding, 
union officers act conservatively and refrain from confronting the management.     
 
  To summarize, the Vietnamese laws allow the official unions to enjoy a 
greater associational freedom. Strikes are de-politicized. Enterprise unions are 
granted a greater autonomy in initiating industrial actions such as strikes. 
However, these favorable structural conditions do not produce a higher 
frequency of proto-economic unions in Vietnam because of the low values on 
the two other non-state variables.  
 
7.3 The Concluding Remarks 
 
This thesis argues that Leninist states rely on utilizing its legal institutions 
while at the same time generating incentives on the part of private sector 
actors in order to induce them to conform to labor policies. The state can no 
longer intrude into the society from the commanding height as it did in the era 
of state socialism. As the concluding remarks of the thesis, I want to discuss 
my three variables in a broader research context, which hopefully can provide 




  One of my major findings is that the state is simultaneously a source of 
support to and constraint on enterprise unions. As a source of support, state 
intervention matters not only in the daily operation of enterprise unions but 
also when enterprise unions mobilize strikes. Many enterprise unions would 
have not existed if the state did not push unionization in the private sector. The 
state-sponsored unionization has indeed spread union ideology and knowledge, 
making more private sector actors aware of the existence of unions. Unlike 
previous research which suggests that the state undermines union 
mobilizations in industrial conflicts (Chen, 2003; Chen, 2015; Li & Liu, 2016), 
I argue that the state is Janus-faced in handling labor unrests because it relies 
on grassroots leaders to bring a quick end to industrial conflicts. In a short 
time span, the interest of the state overlaps with the interest of unions. When 
this overlapping interest between the state and labor occurs, unions can seek 
support from the state if their leaders manage to create an effective union 
control to demonstrate their ability in facilitating the restoration of social 
stability.  
 
  However, as a source of constraint, the impact of the state shall never be 
underestimated. The state defines “the political and legal constraints on labor 
actions” (Chen, 2015, p. 27). Although Leninist states do not necessarily stifle 
union activism (as shown in my research), the very enterprise unionism they 
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hold to makes enterprise unions in paradoxical and precarious existence. 
Being paradoxical in existence, enterprise unions have to reside in employers’ 
organizations. Labor and capital, the two opposing sides of industrial relations, 
co-exist in a single economic organizations dominated by capital. The Leninist 
enterprise unionism encourages enterprise unions to develop a symbiotic and 
dependent relationship with their host enterprises, while at the same time 
discouraging them engage in confrontation with the management. As 
Friedman (2014) criticizes, enterprise unionism is a form of appropriated 
representation, in which “…the state unilaterally grants exclusive rights of 
political representation of an entire class to a particular organization in the 
absence of substantive or formalistic delegation from membership.” (p.22). 
This appropriated representation eventually makes workers disenchant on 
enterprise unions. He contends that the Leninist enterprise unionism is too 
obsolete to adapt itself to a market economy. Although I do not agree with 
Friedman (2014) that enterprise unionism is the primary cause of union 
weankess (as I have discussed an alternative explantion in Chapter 4), I do agree 
with him on this Leninist institution’s constraining impact on union organizing 
in the private sector. The state’s insistence on enterprise unionism makes unions 
in paradoxical existence, which means they have to balance the interests of both 
sides of industrial relations rather being being the sole representative of labor. 
Being precarious in existences, the fate of enterprise unions is ultimately 
decided by the fate of their host enterprises. In my follow-up fieldwork, I 
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traced two proto-economic unions, ASU-1 and AME-1, after their respective 
labor protest. Unfortunately, I found that both unions had ceased to exist after 
their host enterprises relocated to the other regions or entered into liquidation. 
With their host enterprises gone, enterprise unions are gone as well. The 
precarious nature of private firms makes enterprise unions in precarious 
existence.  
 
  I regard managerial perception as preconditioning the timing and the extent 
of state intervention in factory regime, but I admit that factory regime 
nowadays is not isolated from the macro-level state policies. On the one hand, 
the management determines whether or not an enterprise union is established 
at the first place and subsequently how much institutional space is allowed for 
union development. On the other hand, as the market reform matures, it opens 
up Leninist states have more channels to contact with private sector actors in 
order to influence their behaviors. With the labor law reform, more and more 
enterprises embrace unionization out of their concern on legitimacy or 
resource. In an incremental pace, these firms come to understand unionization 
as a legal obligation and show less resistance to it. As a result, the 
state-sponsored unionization is able to spread union ideology to a larger part 
of the private sector, where “union” is no longer a foreign concept to 
employees and employers. However, managerial consent on unionization is 
still half-hearted. Most enterprises try to maximize the utility of unionization 
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while at the same time minimizing the cost of it. As shown in Chapter 5, many 
enterprise owners are happy to have enterprise unions to channel free 
resources into their firms, but try their best to avoid paying union dues.  
 
  As for the agent-level variable, I conceptualize the variance in union 
leadership, but I do not seek to explain how and why this variance occurs at 
the first place. Here, my major assumption is that structural environments do 
not predetermine actors’ behaviors at micro-levels. In most market economies, 
union leaders are tamed or suppressed, behave like middlemen, or are adamant 
in advocating labor interests. For examples, in mature democracies such as 
India, union leaders in the formal sector are tamed by the management and the 
pro-business state, whereas union activists in the informal sector defend 
worker interests at their own expenses such as self-sacrifice for their union’s 
cause and in police repression (Nair, 2016). In any country with a market 
economy, this classic variance can be observed. Thus, I take this variance in 
agency power for granted. Nevertheless, future research may need to explore 
whether certain structural conditions such as regime type, state policy and 
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Date Informant Location Remark 
1 TAI-1 Dec 2014 Human 
resource 
personnel 
Bao’an, Shenzhen  
2 PEU-1 Jun 2015 Union chair Nanshan, Shenzhen  
3 FTU-1 Apr 2015 Union cadre  Futian, Shenzhen Community level 
4 CEU-1 Feb 2015  Union cadre Singapore Retired 
5 JAP-1A Apr 2015 Union chair Nanshan, Shenzhen  
6 JAP-1B Apr 2015 Human 
resource 
manager 
Nanshan, Shenzhen  
7 JAP-2 Jul 2015 Union 
committee 
member 
Nanshan, Shenzhen  
8 PEU-2 Jun 2015 Union chair Luohu, Shenzhen  
9 SIN-1A Mar 2015 Union 
vice-chair 
Bao’an, Shenzhen  
10 SIN-1B Apr 2015 Union chair Bao’an, Shenzhen  




12 ASU-1A May 2015 Worker Longgang, 
Shenzhen 
 





14 AME-1A Jun 2015 Union chair Nanshan, Shenzhen  
15 AME-1A Jul 2015 Union chair Nanshan, Shenzhen Follow-up 
interview 
16 AME-1B Jul 2015 Company staff Nanshan, Shenzhen  
17 NSU-1A May 2016 Union cadre Nanshan, Shenzhen Sub-district 
level 
18 LNGO-1A Mar 2015 Staff Bao’an, Shenzhen  
19 LNGO-1B Mar 2015 Migrant worker Bao’an Shenzhen  
20 LNGO-2A Mar 2015 Staff Longgang, 
Shenzhen 
 
21 PHU-1A Mar 2015 Union chair Shekou, Shenzhen  
22 PHU-1B Dec 2015 Union chair Shekou, Shenzhen Follow-up 
interview 
23 TAI-2A Mar 2015 Union chair Futian, Shenzhen  
24 TAI-2B Jul 2015 Union chair Futian, Shenzhen Follow-up 
interview 
25 PEU-3 Jul 2015 Union chair Nanshan, Shenzhen  
26 PHU-2 Apr 2015 Union chair Futian, Shenzhen  
27 PHU-3 Jul 2015 Union chair Shekou, Shenzhen  
28 HKU-1 Apr 2015 Union staff Yantian, Shenzhen  
29 PEU-4 Jul 2015 Union 
committee 
member 
Nanshan, Shenzhen  
30 FRE-1A Mar 2015 Union chair Shekou, Shenzhen  
  
273 
31 FRE-1B Apr 2015 Union chair Shekou, Shenzhen Follow-up 
interview 
32 KEA-1 Jul 2015 Union 
committee 
member 
Nanshan, Shenzhen  
33 JCC-1 May 2015 Secretary Nanshan, Shenzhen Commercial 
chamber 
34 LSF-1 Aug 2016 Labor inspector Futian, Shenzhen  
 
